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This thesis examines how the internal dynamics of authoritarian regimes influence the 
outcome of mass nonviolent uprisings. Although research on civil resistance has 
identified several factors explaining why campaigns succeed or fail in overthrowing 
autocratic rulers, to date these accounts have largely neglected the characteristics of the 
regimes themselves, thus limiting our ability to understand why some break down while 
others remain cohesive in the face of nonviolent protests.  
This thesis sets out to address this gap by exploring how power struggles between 
autocrats and their elite allies influence regime cohesion in the face of civil resistance. I 
argue that the degeneration of power-sharing at the elite level into personal autocracy, 
where the autocrat has consolidated individual control over the regime, increases the 
likelihood that the regime will break down in response to civil resistance, as dissatisfied 
members of the ruling elite become willing to support an alternative to the status quo. In 
contrast, under conditions of power-sharing, elites are better able to guarantee their 
interests, thus giving them a greater stake in regime survival and increasing regime 
cohesion in response to civil resistance.  
Due to the methodological challenges involved in studying authoritarian regimes, this 
thesis uses a mixed methods approach, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data 
and methods to maximise the breadth of evidence that can be used, balance the 
weaknesses of using either approach in isolation, and gain a more complete 
understanding of the connection between authoritarian politics and nonviolent uprisings. 
Analysis of a global sample of civil resistance campaigns supports the argument, revealing 
a significant association between measures of personalisation and campaign success. I 
then explore these results in more detail with two case studies of civil resistance in 
Southeast Asia. The Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos shows how the personalisation 
of power generated grievances amongst members of the ruling coalition, leading to the 
rebellion by some of Marcos’s core supporters which directly contributed to the success 
of the 1986 People Power revolution. The failed 2013 democracy campaign in Cambodia 
is then analysed as a deviant case. I conclude that, contrary to previous interpretations, 
prime minister Hun Sen was still constrained by a power-sharing agreement in 2013, and 
that this played an important role in maintaining regime cohesion against the uprising. 
Taken together, the results of quantitative analysis and in-depth case studies demonstrate 
that the internal power dynamics of authoritarian regimes have an important role to play 
in explaining the outcomes of civil resistance. 
Keywords: authoritarianism, personalism, civil resistance, Southeast Asia, the 
Philippines, Cambodia, mixed methods.  
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There are people who have asked me about the [rumoured] list of 100 or 200 to be 
executed. Let me make it clear here. Whoever does not take part in destroying peace, you 
are not the target. Whoever intends to destroy peace of this country, you will get what is 
coming to you. If you keep saying that you will fight for power through colour revolution, 
then you are on the list. 
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, 21 June 2017.1 
 
1.1. Authoritarian rule and civil resistance 
Civil resistance against authoritarian rule is now recognised as a major political force. 
Uprisings using nonviolent civil resistance tactics over the last century have successfully 
toppled entrenched dictatorships from the nationwide strike that overthrew El 
Salvadoran president General Hernández Martínez in 1944 to the sudden, massive 
protests that led to the downfall of Tunisia’s Ben Ali in 2011. Other nonviolent revolutions 
in the Philippines, Chile, East Germany, Nepal, South Africa, and Serbia, to name a few, 
have proven this to be a global phenomenon.  
Furthermore, empirical research has shown definitively that nonviolence can be 
successful in achieving radical goals of regime chance and secession, and indeed has been 
on average more successful than violence (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Nonviolent 
uprisings are more likely than armed uprisings to lead to democratisation rather than 
renewed authoritarianism (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013), and the resulting governments 
are more likely to remain democratic over the medium to long term (Karatnycky & 
Ackerman, 2005; Shin & Tusalem, 2007; Johnstad, 2010). Yet the success of civil 
resistance is not guaranteed. This fact was brought to the fore during the Arab Spring, 
where the majority of the uprisings led not to democratic change but to violent 
crackdowns, political instability, or civil war. Other major campaigns have failed to 
achieve their objectives in countries such as Pakistan, China, Belarus, Myanmar, Iran, 
Guinea, and Togo. Indeed, over the last decade major civil resistance campaigns have 
failed more often than they have succeeded.2  
A substantial and growing body of research has examined this topic. For much of the 20th 
century, scholarship on regime change and democratisation dismissed the role of popular 
                                                        
 
1 “Selected Comments Samdech Techo Hun Sen at the Commemorative Day of the Commencement 
of 40 Years Ago to Overthrow the Pol Pot’s Regime [sic]”, speech [unofficial translation], Koh 
Thmar village. http://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/6855. Edited for clarity. 
2 Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan, Washington Post, January 18, 2016. “How the world is 
proving Martin Luther King right about nonviolence.” See also Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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protest as ephemeral and unimportant (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013). Early studies of civil 
resistance worked to counter this perception and show that effective nonviolence is 
possible by describing exemplary, standout cases, often motivated by a normative 
commitment to nonviolence as a better alternative to violent struggle (McCarthy & 
Kruegler, 1993; Martin, Varney & Vickers, 2001). More recently, the field has moved 
towards comparative theory building and quantitative analysis of empirical data to 
understand the onset, trajectories, and outcomes of civil resistance campaigns (e.g., 
Schock, 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Nepstad, 2011; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; 
Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017).  
Perhaps the most important advance in this area has been the release of the Nonviolent 
and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) data project, the most comprehensive 
examination of the outcomes of nonviolent uprisings to date (Stephan & Chenoweth, 
2008; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). Chenoweth and Stephan 
(2011) argue that the reason that nonviolent resistance is more effective than violent 
insurgency is that nonviolent campaigns have lower barriers to participation, and so can 
gain a substantial advantage in mobilising supporters. Indeed, they find that the number 
of participants in protest campaigns is the strongest overall determinant of success, while 
other factors—including regime characteristics—are unable to fully explain civil 
resistance outcomes. 
Aside from protest size, other success factors that have been proposed or tested include 
the opposition’s strategy, organisational structure, ability to employ multiple tactics, and 
resilience to repression (e.g., Ackerman & DuVall, 2000; Schock, 2005); the goals of the 
campaign (e.g., Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a); and nonviolent discipline by protestors 
(e.g., Nepstad, 2011). Notably, explanations of reasons for success and failure have to date 
primarily centred on the actions of protestors; indeed, inquiry across the civil research 
literature has been firmly focused on opposition movements and participants, while less 
weight has been given to the characteristics of the regimes that are being opposed. This 
is largely a response to the historical predominance of state-centric views in political 
science that denied or downplayed the existence of popular agency, as well as earlier 
claims that nonviolent methods could only be effective against ‘soft’ democratic targets; 
civil resistance researchers have responded to this by emphasising that popular agency 
exists and is capable of challenging all kinds of opponents (e.g., Ackerman & DuVall, 2000; 
Schock, 2003; Martin, 2015). Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) work, for example, 
explicitly counters this dismissal of nonviolent action by showing, using quantitative data, 
that civil resistance is capable of working against all kinds of regimes. 
At the same time that the possibilities of democratic change through nonviolent action 
have become increasingly well-known, and civil resistance has become the “modal 
category” of contentious politics worldwide,3 there has also been a global resurgence of 
                                                        
 
3 Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan, Washington Post, January 18, 2016. “How the world is 
proving Martin Luther King right about nonviolence.” 
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authoritarianism, and with it a growing perception that democracy is under threat. This 
perception is supported by empirical data: Freedom House (2017), for example, has 
marked an average decline in political freedoms and civil liberties worldwide since 2006. 
The Varieties of Democracy data project likewise shows that, at the very least, the global 
level of democracy has stagnated over the last decade, with 2013 marking the first time 
since 1978 that more countries worldwide experienced setbacks to democracy than made 
gains (Lührmann et al., 2017).  
Unlike popular stereotypes of totalitarian states or tinpot third-world dictatorships, 
modern autocracies are becoming increasingly advanced and diverse in their institutional 
makeup (Brooker, 2014). As Geddes (2003, 48-49) puts it,  
Dictatorships can differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy […] 
They draw on different groups to staff government offices and on different segments 
of society for support. They have different procedures for making decisions, different 
characteristic forms of intraelite factionalism and competition, different ways of 
choosing leaders and handling succession, and different ways of responding to 
societal interests and opposition.  
Most now adopt at least some nominally democratic institutions, including elections, 
parliaments, or opposition political parties. Nearly half of all autocracies since the end of 
the Second World War have allowed multiple political parties to operate (Svolik, 2012, 
34), for example, while ‘competitive authoritarianism’—to use Levitsky and Way’s (2002, 
2010) term—is on the rise, with an increasing share of dictators now elected by simple 
majorities of less than 75% of the vote (Svolik, 2012, 37). Legislatures and executives vary 
widely in terms of how they are selected, whether unelected, selected by a small body, 
elected with a single party or candidate per seat, elected by a super-majority, or elected 
by a simple majority; indeed, in only a quarter of all autocratic country-years in Svolik’s 
data were both the executive and the legislature entirely unelected (Svolik, 2012, 38). 
Even seemingly uncomplicated forms of authoritarian rule such as military governments 
range from outright military rule, to ‘civilianised’ regimes staffed by supposedly retired 
military personnel, to indirect rule from ‘behind the throne’ in which the military does not 
overtly rule but retains a veto over key policy decisions (Brooker, 2014). And beyond 
central government, an even wider variety of institutional forms can be seen at the local 
level, including experiments with relatively democratic consultative agencies as a way of 
channelling citizens’ frustrations without threatening the stability of the overall system 
(e.g., He & Thøgersen, 2010). 
Authoritarian practices are also becoming more sophisticated. While violent repression 
of opponents is still a feature of many regimes, many also now make use of ‘lawfare’, the 
abuse of laws passed by rubber stamp legislatures and enforced by controlled judiciaries 
to eliminate political opponents in a way that is technically or superficially legal in order 
to provide a veneer of legitimacy to repression. Propaganda spread through traditional 





media is also becoming more technically adept and convincing to target audiences (e.g., 
Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). Warned by the role of newer communication technologies 
in previous uprisings (e.g., Shirky, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012), authoritarian rulers 
have moved into the online realm, using automated ‘bots’ and hired users to challenge or 
simply drown out online opposition on social media platforms (e.g., King, Pan & Roberts, 
2017). The increasing prominence of civil resistance has not been lost on authoritarian 
rulers either, with some beginning to adapt and learn from previous successful campaigns 
against other regimes (e.g., Chen, 2010; Heydemann & Leenders, 2011). Even academics 
in authoritarian countries are being utilised: in September 2017, for example, China and 
Cambodia established a joint research group to investigate the causes of nonviolent 
uprisings and develop strategies for preventing them.4 
Like civil resistance, authoritarianism has seen a substantial growth in interest from 
scholars. Although the most common form of government in history, until recently it has 
remained on the margins of political science research which was more concerned with 
understanding democratic systems (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). Work on 
authoritarianism in the latter half of the 20th century focused on the creation of regime 
typologies, grouping different systems together based on essential characteristics, such 
as differentiating between the totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R. and 
the more ‘bureaucratic’ military-led regimes in Latin America (Brooker, 2014). Following 
the third wave of democratisation in the early 1990s, more attention has been paid to the 
‘hybrid’ regime types—those which use nominally democratic institutions while 
remaining fundamentally non-democratic—that lie in the grey zone between highly 
repressive regimes and liberal democracies (Brooker, 2014). 
There has also been a rapid expansion of research on authoritarianism using formal 
methods, drawing on work from economics and democratic politics to analyse strategic 
interaction between key regime actors in non-democratic regimes (e.g., Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2003; Myerson, 2008; Svolik, 2012). A key foundation in this field is the 
observation that authoritarian institutions cannot be taken at face value, as the 
underlying ‘rules of the game’ in autocracies are fundamentally different to those in 
democratic polities, thus adding a layer of complexity to analysis (Gehlbach, Sonin & 
Svolik, 2016). Formal models are by nature highly abstract and simplified, typically 
consisting of just a small number of ‘players’ who interact under extremely restricted 
conditions. Yet they show that there are similarities in incentives that cut across the huge 
variety of authoritarian regimes. In particular, formal modelling has highlighted the 
central role that information, coordination, and commitment problems play in 
determining what form authoritarian rule takes and how autocrats maintain their power 
(Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). 
                                                        
 
4 Schmidt, Blake, Bloomberg News, 9 October 2017, “Asia's Longest-Serving Strongman Shows 
Power of China's Cash.” See also Chen (2010). 
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To date, however, this increasingly sophisticated and rigorous research on the internal 
dynamics of authoritarian politics has not been adequately reflected in studies of 
nonviolent civil resistance. While the focus on opposition actions has been a deliberate 
choice, intended to counter the aforementioned tendency of mainstream research to deny 
the agency of ordinary people in explaining political change, it neglects that fact that civil 
resistance campaigns are inherently dyadic, involving two sides in conflict with one 
another (see also Nepstad, 2015b). Indeed, much of the research on authoritarian politics 
is of direct relevance to understanding the outcomes of civil resistance, including (but not 
limited to) the role of institutions under dictatorship (e.g., Gandhi, 2008; Myerson, 2008; 
Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010; Frantz & Ezrow, 2011; Boix & Svolik, 2013), the function of 
non-competitive elections (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Morgenbesser, 2016), autocrats’ 
information problems regarding popular and elite preferences (e.g., Wintrobe, 1998; Shih, 
2008; Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014), how regimes anticipate and pre-empt mobilisation 
(Chen, 2010; Sullivan, 2016), and the effects of different regime origins on the cohesion of 
ruling parties (Smith, 2005; Levitsky & Way, 2012). As a result of this omission, we are 
currently left with an incomplete understanding of why nonviolent uprisings succeed or 
fail.  
 
Purpose of the thesis 
This thesis addresses this gap in civil resistance research by examining how the 
characteristics of authoritarian politics influence the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. 
Much recent research is part of the ‘new institutionalism’ or ‘institutional turn’ in 
comparative authoritarianism, focusing on the ways that formal government 
institutions—especially nominally-democratic institutions such as dominant political 
parties and elections—help to maintain authoritarian rule (Schedler, 2009; Pepinsky, 
2014). In this thesis however, I am instead concerned with what might be termed 
authoritarian power politics, that is, struggles amongst members of the topmost political 
elite—which I refer to as the ruling coalition—for control over decision-making, resource 
allocation, and coercion within the government as a whole, regardless of institutional 
makeup. While power struggles can take place within the context of government 
institutions, they can equally operate through informal backchannels and even 
degenerate into outright violence; indeed the ever-present threat of noninstitutional 
violent resolution of conflict within the regime is a fundamental characteristic of 
authoritarian politics (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016).  
Particularly important for this thesis is Svolik’s (2012) finding that the power politics 
dimension of authoritarian rule has a profound impact on regime stability. While a 
minority of authoritarian regimes operate through formal, well-institutionalised 
methods, including regular leader turnover, it is far more common that leaders are 
removed by disgruntled members of their ruling coalition. But Svolik shows that 
uncertainty and coordination problems caused by the conditions of information scarcity 
that exist in authoritarian regimes can allow some leaders to avoid this fate and establish 
absolute rule, in which they personally dominate the regime and are capable of effectively 
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deterring threats from the ruling coalition. Under these conditions, which I refer to as 
personal autocracy, elites are vulnerable to the autocrat’s whims and incapable of 
protecting their interests, yet the balance of power makes challenging the status quo 
prohibitively difficult from within the regime. Notably, Svolik argues that elites’ inability 
to coordinate against a leader who has consolidated personal power leads to long periods 
of rule by a single autocrat, as other figures in the regime are incapable of challenging 
them for control.  
Svolik’s (2012) argument assumes that the ruling coalition’s decision to rebel or remain 
loyal is determined solely by factors internal to the regime, most importantly the relative 
power balance at a given point in time. Yet I argue that a mass civil resistance campaign, 
which creates a crisis for the regime as a whole and requires a coordinated, cohesive 
response to suppress, acts as an exogenous shock to this calculus by providing an 
alternative claim to power and enabling elites to overcome their barriers to coordinated 
action. Hence, the same internal struggles in authoritarian regimes which influence the 
likelihood of coups d’état should also be related to the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. 
Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to examine how the consolidation of personal rule 
by authoritarian leaders influences the success of nonviolent uprisings. In doing so, it 
demonstrates that insights generated from the study of authoritarianism can improve our 
understanding of why some nonviolent campaigns are able to overthrow autocratic 
regimes, while others are unsuccessful in achieving political change.  
The thesis begins by turning to previous work on civil resistance and authoritarianism to 
more clearly highlight the research gap and justify the focus on the internal power politics 
rather than the institutional characteristics of authoritarian regimes. The theoretical 
framework explains in more detail why power personalisation should impact elite 
incentives to remain loyal or support a nonviolent uprisings. The plausibility of this 
argument is then tested using quantitative cross-national data, while the processes 
involved are examined more closely through two in-depth qualitative case studies of 
power personalisation and its impact on civil resistance outcome. A more detailed outline 
follows at the end of this chapter; first, however, I define some of the key terms and 
concepts used in this thesis. 
 
1.2. Key terms 
In this thesis I use a number of key terms related to authoritarian politics and civil 
resistance campaigns with specific meanings which may differ somewhat from colloquial 
usage, and so brief descriptions and definitions are in order. 
The object of inquiry is authoritarian regimes challenged by nonviolent uprisings. As is 
standard in research on authoritarianism, I use the terms ‘authoritarian regime’, 
‘dictatorship’, and ‘autocracy’—and their various derivatives—interchangeably. 
Following, for example, Alvarez, et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), Schedler (2006), 
Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), and Svolik (2012), I adopt a minimal, either/or 
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definition of dictatorship and democracy. First, democracies are defined as “regimes in 
which government offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections” (Cheibub, 
Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010, 69). Three key elements of this definition are (Cheibub, Gandhi 
& Vreeland, 2010): 
1. Ex ante uncertainty: the winner of the election is not effectively known in 
advance, 
2. Ex post irreversibility: the winner of the election takes office in accordance 
with the rules governing the election, and 
3. Repeatability: the winner of the election is then subject to the first two 
criteria at regular intervals. 
Dictatorships are then all regimes that do not meet any or all of these criteria. In other 
words, they are a residual category of regimes in which the result of elections are not 
genuinely in doubt and/or the results of elections do not effectively constrain power-
holders, or, having won a genuinely contested election, power-holders alter the playing 
field so that the either of the first two conditions no longer holds. This definition assumes 
that democracies and dictatorships are qualitatively different forms of government rather 
than lying along a scale: democracies are those in which governments give up power 
through regular, institutionalised means, while dictatorships are those in which the 
power-holders do not (Przeworski, 1991; Svolik, 2012). This means that in democracies 
civil resistance can affect decision-makers because they are constrained by the need to 
win elections (e.g., Meyer, 2003), whereas in dictatorships power-holders do not face the 
same constraints, as elections serve a different purpose (Schedler, 2006; Morgenbesser, 
2016). The implication of this definition is that civil resistance campaigns under the two 
different forms of government are also qualitatively distinct political phenomena, with 
different mechanisms of action, success factors, and likely outcome. Hence, in this thesis I 
consider only civil resistance campaigns against authoritarian regimes, with the 
expectation that the findings presented here will not necessarily generalise to civil 
resistance against democratic governments. 
I use the terms ‘civil resistance campaign’, ‘nonviolent uprising’, and associated variations 
synonymously. Following Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Schock (2013), I define 
civil resistance campaigns as nonviolent, mass campaigns of active non-cooperation that 
do not necessarily follow a particular philosophy or require a commitment to principles 
of nonviolence, and which typically seek maximalist aims such as regime change, 
secession, or major policy reform. Campaigns themselves are “a series of observable, 
continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective”, typically 
with a clear leadership and sometimes a defined organisational structure and name 
(Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013, 416). While some campaigns may feature occasional acts 
that could be classed as violence, such as rock throwing or property damage, I follow 
previous studies in focusing on the primacy of nonviolent tactics in identifying civil 
resistance campaigns (e.g., Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). A range of terminology has been 
used in prior research to refer to civil resistance campaigns, such as unarmed insurrection 
(Zunes, 1994; Schock, 2005), unarmed uprisings (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011b), 
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nonviolent social movement (Zunes, Kurtz & Asher, 1999; Ackerman & DuVall, 2000), 
nonviolent resistance (Stephan, 2009), people power (Ackerman & DuVall, 2006; Carter, 
Clark & Randle 2006), and nonviolent revolution (Nepstad, 2011). These terms generally 
refer to broadly the same phenomenon, but may be distinguished in some aspects of their 
definition. In particular, most definitions do not explicitly exclude nonviolent challenges 
to democratic governments. However, in practice most studies are of campaigns against 
repressive or corrupt non-democratic governments, and this is the focus that I continue 
in this thesis.5 
When referring to autocracies, the term ‘ruler’ or ‘autocrat’ refers to the individual leader 
of the regime. This is not always identical with the nominal leader of the regime, as in 
cases where a constitutional monarch reigns but does not hold real influence or where a 
powerful figure selects protégés to fill formal leadership positions (cf. Baturo & Elkink, 
2017). For example, Vladimir Putin has been the effective leader in Russia since 2000, 
even though between 2008 and 2012 he appointed his lieutenant Dimitry Medvedev to 
the office of president to circumvent term limits on his position (Baturo & Elkink, 2016). 
As I am concerned in this thesis with the exercise of real political power, whether through 
formal or informal channels, when I use the term ‘ruler’ I am referring to the figure who 
has the most decision-making authority within the regime, although this authority may 
be more or less constrained by the ruling coalition. Effective regime leaders are identified 
using country-specific works and datasets on authoritarian politics such as Svolik (2012) 
and Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013). The term ‘ruling coalition’ refers to the autocrat’s 
primary group of elite supporters; these can be civilian, military, or a combination of both, 
and vary widely in their background and the resources they can draw on to support the 
autocrat. I use the term ‘regime’ in a colloquial sense to be broadly synonymous with the 
term government—for example, the ‘Hun Sen regime’, as I use it here, refers to the 
government that has led Cambodia since Hun Sen was first appointed prime minister in 
1985. In some sources that are drawn on in the quantitative component of the thesis 
‘regime’ is used in a more technical sense, to refer to a specific system of formal and 
informal rules governing policy decisions and government appointments; this includes 
rule by a single party, such as the Chinese Communist Party following Mao, where 
leadership changes occur but the same basic ruling institution remains in place (Magaloni, 
Chu, & Min, 2013; Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2014). In order to avoid confusion between 
the two terms, I instead use Svolik’s (2012, 88) term ‘ruling coalition spell’ in place of this 
second usage. So, for example, North Korea since independence has had three regimes—
under Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, respectively—but one ruling coalition 
spell, the Kim dynasty.6 Similarly, as will become apparent in Chapter 5, Ferdinand 
                                                        
 
5 Compare this with, for example, the social movement literature, which more typically examines 
the use of nonviolent action in democracies, particularly the United States (see Schock, 2013). 
6 Although Svolik’s (2012, 88) definition of a ruling coalition spell as "a period of uninterrupted 
succession in office of politically affiliated leaders” differs slightly from that used by Magaloni, 
Chu, and Min (2013) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), in practice it effectively identifies the 
same thing (Wright & Bak, 2016). 
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Marcos’s regime in the Philippines consisted of two ruling coalition spells, the first from 
1965-1972 when he operated through the established national assembly and required the 
support of the wealthy landowning class, and the second from 1972 onwards where he 
marginalised many of the landowners and relied more heavily on the newly-politicised 
military.  
The main theoretical argument in this thesis is focused on the power balance between the 
ruling coalition and the autocrat. In this context I take power to mean ‘power over’, that 
is, the ability to influence or direct the actions of others through the use or threat of 
coercion (Sharp, 1973, 1980; cf. Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1974). In the context of authoritarian 
regimes, where the struggle over coercive power is a central problem and violence is 
always a possible solution for conflicts of interest, this realist view of power is more 
applicable than other, more structurally-oriented views (Sharp, 1973).  
I develop a theoretical framework that classifies regimes as either power-sharing or 
personal autocracy. Power-sharing regimes, while diverse in their institutional makeup, 
are those where autocrats face internal constraints from the ruling coalition that limit 
their decision-making and implementing ability. As a result, they are obliged to balance 
their own personal interests with the interests of other centres of influence within the 
regime such as rival elite coalitions or autonomous institutions. Personal autocracies, on 
the other hand, are those where autocrats do not face these constraints, as—typically due 
to their progressive capture of power—autonomous institutions have been undermined, 
rival elite coalitions eliminated or co-opted, and other institutional limits such as term 
limits removed. Autocrats in personal autocracies are hence able to operate largely 
independently of the remainder of the political elite, making decisions purely as they see 
fit and able to take courses of action that may be inimical to institutionalised interests 
within the regime. These two forms of authoritarian government are central to the 
argument of the thesis, and so are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 below. While 
personal autocracy refers to a particular regime type, the term ‘personalisation’ refers to 
moves by autocrats to consolidate their power and remove limits on their position, such 
as through appointing loyalists to key posts or revising constitutional term limits. Hence, 
personalisation is the process of establishing personal autocracy, while personal 
autocracy itself is the end state of the successful personalisation of power.  
 
1.3. Outline of the study 
Chapter 2 reviews existing empirical nonviolence research in more detail to more clearly 
identify the research gap that I set out to fill. I also survey two main approaches to 
studying authoritarian politics, namely, the creation and analysis of regime typologies and 
the use of deductive, formal models. Building on this review, I then develop the theoretical 
framework that informs the remainder of the thesis. I outline the definitive features of 
power-sharing regimes and personal autocracy, and explain why autocrats may try to 
subvert power-sharing agreements to gain personal control over the regime. I then 
explain why the consolidation of personal control is a double-edged sword, decreasing 
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the likelihood of challenges to the autocrat’s position from within the ruling coalition 
while at the same time making the regime vulnerable to mass protests, as elites who can 
no longer ensure that their interests are protected become willing to support an 
alternative to the status quo.  
Chapter 3 sets out the mixed methods research design that I have used to test and explore 
this argument. It summarises the mixed methods approach, including explaining the 
motivation for combining both qualitative and quantitative analysis and outlining the 
explanatory sequential design that structures this thesis. It then addresses the 
quantitative and qualitative components in turn. Data sources, variables, and methods for 
analysis are set out for the quantitative component. Measures of concepts such as 
personal autocracy in authoritarian regimes are not yet settled in the field; one indirect 
indicator that I use, the time that the individual leader has been in power, is somewhat 
novel, so I pay particular attention to explaining and justifying this choice. I also devote 
space to explaining the methods that I have used, with the intention that they should be 
understandable by both quantitatively- and qualitatively-oriented readers. The final 
section describes the case study design for the qualitative component, including how the 
cases were selected and analysed and how field research was carried out. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of quantitative analysis. It shows that there is a strong 
association between personalisation of power and civil resistance success in achieving 
regime change. I especially highlight the counter-intuitive finding that the vast majority 
of campaigns that challenged long-serving autocrats—those who had been in power for 
more than a decade or so at the time of the campaign—succeeded, while results for 
autocrats who had been in power for less time are more mixed. This relationship, I argue, 
is consistent with the argument that personalisation increases the vulnerability of 
autocratic regimes to civil resistance. I then show how the quantitative results were used 
to select the case studies for further exploration of this finding. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings of the qualitative component of the study, 
comprising two case studies of civil resistance in Southeast Asia. Chapter 5 illustrates how 
Ferdinand Marcos’s personalisation of power in the Philippines led core allies to defect in 
the face of the 1986 civil resistance campaign, ultimately leading to his overthrow. 
Chapter 6 analyses the failed 2013 civil resistance campaign in Cambodia as a deviant 
case. Although previous work has highlighted prime minister Hun Sen’s apparent 
consolidation of personal control, the evidence I present in this chapter indicates that, in 
fact, a power-sharing agreement remained in place at the time of the uprising. The chapter 
also highlights a number of factors related to the opposition which, in combination with 
the ongoing balance of power in the ruling coalition, led to the failure of the campaign.  
Chapter 7 integrates the findings of the quantitative and qualitative components, drawing 
out conclusions regarding the research question. It also presents an evaluation of the 
research design and the limitations of the study. I conclude by describing several areas 







2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
 
Authoritarian regimes are extraordinarily diverse in their institutional makeup, 
behaviour, and outcomes, yet to date have received little attention in civil resistance 
research. The chapter begins by surveying empirical research on civil resistance, 
highlighting the research gap and the consequences for our understanding of why anti-
regime civil resistance campaigns succeed or fail. It then highlights two broad approaches 
to understanding authoritarian politics, namely, creating regime typologies and using 
deductive formal modelling, and summarises some key works in each that are relevant to 
this thesis.  
Following this review, I present a theoretical framework connecting intra-regime power 
struggles to the outcome of civil resistance campaigns. This classifies regimes in a way 
that cuts across institutional diversity and instead considers the balance of power 
between autocrats and their ruling coalitions. I label power-sharing regimes as those 
where members of the ruling coalition are able to effectively constrain the autocrat and 
ensure that their interests are protected. Personal autocracies, on the other hand, are 
those where autocrats have overcome limits on their authority and decision-making 
power and are able to act autonomously of the ruling coalition. I argue that elites under 
personal autocracy have incentives to remove the autocrat and re-establish power-
sharing, yet are prevented from doing so by the autocrat’s ability to deter the initiation of 
internal challenges, thus preventing the kind of elite co-ordination required to alter the 
status quo distribution of power. When a civil resistance campaign emerges, however, 
personalisation of power becomes self-defeating, as the crisis caused by mass protests 
allows elites to overcome their coordination problems and withdraw support from the 
autocrat in favour of an alternative. As a result, I conclude that personalisation of power 
should make it more likely that anti-regime civil resistance will succeed in bringing about 
regime change. 
 
2.1. Civil resistance 
2.1.1. Background 
Nonviolence has an extensive history in political thought in both Eastern and Western 
traditions, but empirical analysis is comparatively more recent. Case (1923) is one of the 
earliest examples, examining instances of both passive resistance as well as more active 
nonviolent coercion and non-cooperation. Other scholars, such as Gregg (1934) and 
Bondurant (1958), focused more on the principles and practice of Gandhian nonviolence 
after its success in ejecting the British from India, arguing that nonviolence functions 
through a combination of principled moral force and methods of direct action.  
An important milestone in the study of nonviolence was Gene Sharp’s (1973) 
development of the pragmatic approach, which emphasised the study of nonviolent action 
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as a kind of political action that is distinct from the philosophical or religious principles 
that had informed previous thought (Weber, 2003; see also Miller, 1966). Although 
initially a believer in the efficacy of Gandhian nonviolence in converting opponents and 
undermining systems of oppression, he later moved away from this towards conceiving 
of nonviolent action as what he called a method of combat (Weber, 2003). The 
fundamental principle of Sharp’s (1973) theory of nonviolent action is that authoritarian 
regimes rely on compliance and cooperation to carry out their rule; for example, tax must 
be collected, infrastructure maintained, orders carried out, and legislation complied with. 
As a result, an authoritarian regime’s power is mutable, shifting, and uncertain, capable 
of being reduced or eliminated through collective noncompliance. Of course, not all areas 
of society are equally important for maintaining authoritarian rule, and noncompliance in 
small numbers or by groups which are less important for regime survival is less likely to 
be effective, while noncompliance by key support groups can be critical in undermining 
regime strength. These core allies typically include individuals or groups which have 
control over major economic, communicative, mobilisational, or coercive resources (cf. 
Helvey, 2004).  
Those who oppose authoritarian governments can challenge them by targeting these 
support groups. They do so using tactics of nonviolent action, of which Sharp (1973) lists 
198 with historical examples. These are labelled ‘nonviolent’ because they use methods 
that do not physically harm opponents, and ‘action’ to differentiate them from passive 
acceptance of suffering. Types of action include symbolic protests, non-cooperation with 
expected or sanctioned modes of behaviour, and nonviolent intervention, i.e., direct action 
against the government’s authority (Sharp, 1973; Martin & Varney, 2003). In general, 
these actions influence the government’s supporters by persuading them to withdraw 
cooperation, such as through mass public displays of dissent, or coercing them into 
supporting change through imposing direct costs, such as by carrying out strikes or 
boycotts (Sharp, 1973). When a sufficient level of support for the regime has been lost, 
and the government can no longer have its will enforced by its agents, it can no longer 
govern effectively, and power has shifted to the opposition movement (Sharp, 1973; 
2010). The clearest example of undermining a pillar of support can be seen in the form of 
security force defections in response to protests, a process which has been seen in several 
successful campaigns (Nepstad, 2011; cf. Lee, 2015). Effective nonviolent action therefore 
targets the autocrat’s sources of support, rather than directly confronting the regime 
itself.  
Sharp’s model of nonviolent action opened up a much wider field of study for scholars 
interested in nonviolence (McCarthy & Kruegler, 1993), and has formed the basis for the 
majority of civil resistance research since it was developed (Martin, Varney & Vickers, 
2001; Schock, 2013). Most empirical studies of nonviolence and civil resistance have 
followed Sharp’s framework by focusing on mostly nonviolent, mass campaigns of active 
non-cooperation that do not necessarily follow a philosophy or require a commitment to 
principles of nonviolence and typically seek maximalist aims such as regime change, 
secession, or major policy reform (Schock, 2013). Cases are defined and selected based 
on the primacy of nonviolent tactics rather than any other feature. Aside from the 
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commonly-cited civil rights movement in the United States, most campaigns that have 
been examined have been in non-democratic countries, although the definitions used in 
the literature generally do not exclude the possibility of nonviolent action campaigns 
occurring in democratic contexts. 
In earlier research on nonviolent action, case studies were often used to prove that 
nonviolence can be effective, or to highlight the courage and commitment of the 
protestors, areas which had been neglected in mainstream research (McCarthy & 
Kruegler, 1993; Martin, 2015). As a consequence, many of these case studies are implicitly 
or explicitly normative: for example, Ackerman and DuVall (2000) deliberately 
emphasise the role of nonviolence and individual actions in their accounts of well-known 
revolutions in order to promote knowledge about nonviolent action and highlight its 
ability to challenge dictatorial rule. Notable works based on case studies that have a 
primarily descriptive or normative purpose include Carter, Clark, and Randle (2006), 
Stephan (2009), Roberts and Garton Ash (2009), and Clark (2009). Other works have 
used comparative analysis of case studies for theory building and testing (Schock, 2005; 
Nepstad, 2011). 
A major advance for the field has come through the work of Erica Chenoweth and 
colleagues on the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset, the most 
comprehensive and significant attempt to collect data on civil resistance campaigns to 
date (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth & Lewis, 
2013). Although there have been other quantitative studies using medium- or large-n 
datasets to examine cases of nonviolent resistance (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Shin 
& Tusalem, 2007; Johnstad, 2010), the NAVCO dataset is the first to have the outcome of 
civil resistance as the specific focus of enquiry. The central finding from the NAVCO data, 
which has been widely reported, is that nonviolent campaigns seeking maximalist goals 
of regime change or secession since the end of the Second World War have been nearly 
twice as successful as violent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, 7).  
The NAVCO dataset includes campaigns that pursue radical goals of regime change, 
independence from foreign rule, or separatism, as well as some campaigns pursuing 
major social change, such as the South African anti-apartheid movement. Campaigns are 
defined as movements with a name or discernible leadership that involve the active 
participation of 1,000 people or more (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, 12-14); they are 
labelled nonviolent “based on the primacy of resistance methods employed”, i.e., using 
tactics that do not “directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of the opponent” 
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011 [Web appendix], 4-5). Data is sourced from a survey of the 
nonviolent action literature, supported by scholarly consensus (Chenoweth & Stephan, 
2011 [Web appendix]). More recent versions of the dataset have disaggregated campaigns 
into country-year (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013) and event-based data (Chenoweth, 
Pinckney & Lewis, 2017). 
The NAVCO dataset has formed the basis of a number of quantitative studies, addressing 
areas such as the correlates of campaign success (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Svensson 
& Lindgren, 2011a), the effects of nonviolent as opposed to violent resistance on 
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subsequent levels of democracy (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Bayer, Bethke & Lambach, 
2016), factors prompting campaign onset (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Chenoweth & 
Ulfelder, 2017), the choice between violent and nonviolent tactics (Cunningham, 2013; 
White et al., 2015), diffusion and contagion effects (Braithwaite, Braithwaite & Kucik, 
2015; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017), and the effects of violent repression on mobilisation 
(Anisin, 2016). Additional data collection efforts on civil resistance have addressed 
questions relating to democratic transitions (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Shin & 
Tusalem, 2007; Johnstad, 2010), the effects of violent repression (Sutton, Butcher & 
Svensson, 2014), and gendered dimensions of nonviolent protest (Asal et al., 2013; 
Murdie & Peksen, 2015). 
Existing research has highlighted several factors that play a role in explaining the outcome 
of civil resistance campaigns. Schock (2005), for example, argues that the ability for 
opposition groups to alternate between tactics of concentration (e.g., demonstrations) 
and dispersion (e.g., boycotts) is essential for the success of nonviolent action, as it allows 
the opposition to survive repression. Furthermore, Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson (2014) 
find that when repression does occur, a pre-existing campaign infrastructure including 
parallel media institutions helps activists to spread information about the government’s 
violent response, encouraging wider backlash against the regime. Nepstad (2011) 
concludes that nonviolent movements achieve success primarily by attracting security 
force defections, and that this is more likely when protestors maintain nonviolent 
discipline and are able to make moral and shared identity claims on security force 
personnel. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) emphasise the role of participation in 
campaigns, arguing that protest size is the strongest determinant of campaign success. 
Svensson and Lindgren (2011a) focus on ethnic divisions between protestors and the 
regime and the degree of ethnic polarisation in society as a whole, finding both factors to 
be correlated with decreased chances of opposition success. 
 
2.1.2. Authoritarian regimes in civil resistance research 
Yet despite this progress in understanding why campaigns succeed or fail, civil resistance 
research has to date failed to fully address the role of regimes themselves in determining 
the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. The majority of research on the topic focuses on 
understanding the opposition movement and examining “techniques of nonviolent action, 
strategic choice, and mechanisms through which nonviolent action produces social 
change” (Schock, 2013, 281). It strongly emphasises the agency of ordinary people, rooted 
in Sharp’s (1973; 1980; 1990) argument—discussed further below—that political power 
is derived from cooperation rather than being inherent in a person or position. Existing 
social structures thus may be altered and reconstructed by ordinary citizens, who are 
“capable of wielding great power even against ruthless rulers and military regimes” 
(Sharp, 1990, 18). In this view, political institutions and characteristics of the opponent 
are seen as comparatively unimportant. For scholars who have a normative commitment 
to nonviolence and wish to highlight the possibilities of nonviolent action and civil 
resistance this ‘voluntarist’ approach is desirable, as it emphasises human agency and 
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insists that change is possible under even the most difficult and repressive circumstances 
(cf. Mahoney & Snyder, 1999). It also serves as an important corrective to mainstream 
scholarship, which had been largely dismissive of the role of protest and the possibility of 
real bottom-up political change (Martin, 2015). 
Despite its advantages, however, the heavy emphasis on the nonviolent opposition has 
neglected the fact that nonviolent action is inherently dyadic, involving strategic actors 
on both sides of the conflict. As a result, there has been a lack of attention paid to the 
characteristics and actions of authoritarian regimes and how these might affect the onset, 
growth, and outcome of civil resistance campaigns. In particular, analysis which draws on 
research on the internal structures of authoritarian rule and how these vary across cases 
has as yet remained largely absent. Foundational works address the nature of 
authoritarian power, but have little to say about authoritarian regimes themselves (e.g., 
Sharp, 1973; Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994; Sharp, 2005). An indicative example is 
McCarthy and Sharp’s (1997) annotated bibliography of works on relating to nonviolent 
action and civil resistance campaigns, which contains more than 2,700 entries but only 
two that directly address authoritarianism or authoritarian politics. This gap remains in 
more recent theoretically-oriented works, which either neglect these areas or focus on 
only the repressive tactics used by regimes (e.g., Schock, 2015; Nepstad, 2015a; Hallward 
& Norman, 2015; Vinthagen, 2015).  
Some characteristics of authoritarian regimes have received attention in comparative 
qualitative work. Schock (2005), for example, uses regime type as an organising device, 
specifically including case studies of campaigns against monarchies and military regimes, 
but does not give variation across regimes a causal role in explaining campaign outcome. 
Nepstad (2011) cites some works in the authoritarianism literature, including Geddes 
(1999) and Way (2008), and emphasises that elite divisions in all of the cases she analyses 
were essential for opening up political space. However, she concludes that this factor 
cannot adequately explain campaign outcome. Instead she primarily focuses on 
proximate factors, particularly frontline interactions between protestors and security 
forces. In a subsequent study, Nepstad (2015b) focuses more specifically on the gap in 
understanding created by the one-sided focus on opposition actions by examining the 
range of counter-strategies that are used by non-democratic regimes to avert or repress 
mass challenges. 
On the quantitative side, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 67-68) test whether campaign 
onset or outcome is associated with regime strength—both democratic and 
authoritarian—using the Correlates of War dataset’s Composite Index of National 
Capabilities, which measures population size, urbanisation, iron and steel production, 
energy consumption, and military expenditure and size. However, they do not find a 
statistically significant relationship, which in some respects is not surprising given the 
wide range of potential causal factors captured by such an aggregate measure. They also 
use the Polity scale, which measures levels of democracy from -10 (most non-democratic) 
to +10 (most democratic), to test for selection effects in campaign onset. They conclude 
that the success of nonviolent civil resistance compared to armed rebellion is not merely 
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a result of campaigns being more likely to challenge ‘softer’ (i.e., more democratic) targets, 
finding that more campaigns occur toward non-democratic end of the scale; they further 
find that Polity score is not significantly correlated with campaign outcome. The Polity 
scale is also used in other quantitative studies of civil resistance as an independent 
variable, typically controlling for outcomes in democracies versus autocracies (Svensson 
& Lindgren, 2011a; Cunningham, 2013; Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Murdie & 
Peksen, 2015; Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017). However, issues with 
the way the Polity scale is constructed—particularly relating to coding decisions and the 
aggregation of many correlated variables into a single measure—mean that while it may 
be appropriate as a rough measure of overall democracy versus autocracy, it is less well 
suited to comparing different authoritarian regimes or aspects of authoritarian rule (see, 
for example, Gleditsch & Ward, 1997; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002; Treier & Jackman, 2008). 
Other aspects of authoritarian rule have also been touched on in some previous 
quantitative works. For example, Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) and Gleditsch and Rivera 
(2017) include regime duration in regression analysis to control for possible changes in 
regime stability over time, and Bayer, Bethke and Lambach (2016) include whether a 
regime was based on military rule prior to a democratic transition to test for lingering 
effects on post-transition democracy. These characteristics, however, are treated 
primarily as control variables rather than important independent variables in their own 
right, with relatively little reference made to authoritarianism research. More relevant for 
this project, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) include the regime leader’s time in power in 
one of the models they test for accuracy in predicting civil resistance onset and find mixed 
evidence regarding a relationship, but also do not relate this finding to theories of 
authoritarian rule. Braithwaite, Braithwaite, and Kucik (2015), in their study of how prior 
histories of protest influence campaign onset, include regime type based on the 
prominent Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) typology. They find that single party and 
monarchical regimes are less likely to experience campaign onset in a given year, a 
correlation that is statistically significant and consistent across a range of model 
specifications. They also include the leader’s time in power as a control variable, but do 
not find a strong and consistent correlation. 
Two quantitative studies that address similar topics to this thesis more directly are 
Ulfelder (2005) and Teorell (2010). Ulfelder (2005) examines how different kinds of 
contentious collective action affect different regime types. Using Geddes’s (1999) 
tripartite division of regime types, he finds that single party and military regimes are more 
likely to break down in response to peaceful protests than personalist regimes. Teorell 
(2010) finds that authoritarian regimes with multiple political parties are more likely to 
democratise in response to peaceful protest than those in which only one party exists, 
arguing that this is due to the presence of a pre-existing opposition which can mobilise 
dissent. Both of these works make important contributions by considering the role of 
peaceful protest in democratisation, previously largely absent from quantitative studies 
of democratic transitions. However, as well as problems that arise from relying solely on 
regime typologies, discussed further below, the data source that both authors use 
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somewhat constrains the conclusions that can be drawn from these studies (Celestino & 
Gleditsch, 2013).  
The most relevant previous study for this thesis is Lee (2015). Examining the reasons why 
soldiers sometimes refuse to carry out orders to repress protestors, he argues that 
personalist regimes, where the autocratic leader has a high degree of personal control 
over the government, are more likely to experience security force defections during 
nonviolent uprisings. Using a comparative case study method, Lee argues that 
personalisation involves politicisation of the military by the autocrat—using methods 
such as making personal decisions about promotions, budgets, deployments, and force 
structures while favouring loyalists and purging officers who voice their disagreement—
creates zero-sum competition within the armed forces. This causes grievances amongst 
officers who are excluded from access to power or are concerned about the cohesion of 
the armed forces, and who consequently become willing to refuse orders to carry out 
repression if an opposition movement presents itself as a credible alternative to the status 
quo. 
Aside from Lee’s (2015) study, which informs the theoretical argument developed in 
detail below, it can thus be seen that relatively little direct attention has been paid to 
regimes from the perspective of authoritarianism theory in existing civil resistance 
research.7 Yet by focusing exclusively on opposition movements, existing research has 
neglected the important ways that action and outcomes of nonviolent campaigns are 
shaped by the authoritarian regimes they oppose. Indeed, regimes are precisely the 
formal and informal institutions that shape political conflict in authoritarian societies, 
including both the strategies that opposition activists pursue in challenging the 
government and how regime elites respond to these challenges (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 
2014; cf. Mahoney & Snyder, 1999). In a related field, Fjelde (2010) has argued that failure 
to recognise the heterogeneity of authoritarian regimes has led to mistaken conclusions 
about the predictors of armed civil conflict. Lack of consideration to variation in the 
political institutions faced by civil resistance campaigns in existing research is similarly 
likely to limit our understanding of why some regimes remain cohesive in the face of mass 
protest while others break down. As a result, I now turn to research on authoritarian 
politics to examine ways that findings from this field can address these gaps in the civil 
resistance literature.  
 
2.2. Authoritarian politics 
In recent years political science has come to embrace the comparative study of 
authoritarianism (Goode & Ahram, 2016). This has been spurred not only by the mixed 
                                                        
 
7 Chenoweth (2015) likewise notes that in the social movement literature, which is primarily 
concerned with explaining the emergence and growth of protest movements, consideration of 
regimes is also generally limited to democracy versus autocracy. 
19 
 
results of many of the democratic transitions that took place during the 1990s and 2000s 
and the rise or re-emergence of non-democratic powers such as Russia and China on the 
world stage, but also by the publication of new datasets and conceptual tools that can be 
used to examine the logic and functioning of authoritarian politics (e.g., Geddes, 1999; 
Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012; Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014). While some are still sceptical 
about the empirical roots of these works and our ability to make generalisations as a 
result (Goode & Ahram, 2016), they have enabled scholars to examine the wide variety of 
non-democratic forms of government more systematically than had been possible in the 
past.  
Within this body of research there are two broad approaches. The first I label the 
typological approach, which consists of classifying regimes into a number of categories 
and then examining how behaviours and outcomes vary between different regime types 
(e.g., Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014). The 
second is the deductive approach, which uses game theory and formal models to analyse 
the incentives and behaviours of actors within the regime under different conditions 
(Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). As I draw on both approaches in the remainder of this 
thesis, I discuss each in turn before turning to developing the theoretical argument linking 
authoritarian politics to the outcome of civil resistance campaigns below. 
 
2.2.1. Typological approach 
The most common method of developing theories of authoritarianism has been the 
creation of regime typologies, which group different regimes together based on what are 
perceived to be their essential features. One of the earliest examples on record is 
Aristotle’s classification of government types into rule by one, few, or many, and 
differentiation between correct and deviant types of these (Politics, II, 3.7-14, 4.4-10). Of 
these, monarchic and oligarchic rule—by the one or the few, respectively—has been by 
far the most common, and the most commonly examined, throughout history.  
In the twentieth century, prompted by the rise of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and fascist 
Italy, a new theoretical approach to classifying regimes emerged in the concept of 
totalitarianism (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1966; Arendt, 1967). This approach cast these 
kinds of government as a distinct category, emphasising the presence of a universalist and 
dominating ideology which guided all aspects of policy-making, the use of psychological 
terror to maintain control, and mass mobilisation of the population in support of the 
regime (Brooker, 2014). Although popular, the concept was challenged by subsequent 
scholars as being too restrictive in scope, being ideological rather than empirical, and 
overstating many of the main characteristics of the so-called totalitarian regimes (e.g., 
Rigby, 1972; Przeworski, 1991; Corner, 2009), causing the term to fall out of favour 
(Brooker, 2014).  
Emerging dictatorships in the developing world after the Second World War and the 
subsequent wave of decolonisation led to the introduction of a new category, 
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authoritarianism (Brooker, 2014). Linz (1970 [1964]; 1973) introduced the term in a 
narrow sense to describe new, often military dictatorships that relied on depoliticisation 
rather than mass mobilisation to maintain control and gave a greater role to bureaucrats 
and the military than the totalitarian regimes. A further development was the 
differentiation of military and single party regimes, which focused on the institutions 
rather than the ideology or methods of rule (e.g., Huntington & Moore, 1970; Nordlinger, 
1977; Brooker, 1995). Subsequently there has been a further shift towards identifying 
and understanding the different forms of authoritarian regime that lie in the difficult 
hybrid space between ‘pure’ dictatorship and democracy (Brooker, 2014). Svolik (2012, 
23) notes that there has been a proliferation of studies that seek to classify various forms 
of “authoritarianism with adjectives”, or increasingly-refined subcategories of different 
types of dictatorial rule. These include sultanism and neopatrimonialism (Snyder, 1998; 
Chehabi & Linz, 1998; Brownlee, 2002), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 
2002), electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006), strongman and military council rule 
(Geddes, Frantz & Wright, 2014), bureaucratic authoritarianism (O’Donnell, 1973), 
patronal presidentialism (Hale, 2005), dynastic, inherited, and presidential monarchies 
(Brooker, 2014), amongst others.  
In a highly influential review, Geddes (1999) proposes a more general typology based on 
the primary institution of rule within authoritarian regimes. She divides regimes into 
military, personal, single-party, or hybrids of two or all three types. In military regimes, a 
group of officers rules, often in the form of a junta or consultative council, and no one 
individual has independent decision-making power. Single-party regimes are similar, but 
the ruling group comes from a civilian political party. Under personalist regimes, 
decisions depend to a much greater extent on the discretion of the individual leader, while 
access to power and influence over policy is derived from personal connections to the 
leader rather than formal or bureaucratic means.  
Other works have made use of Geddes’s typology, although some have added monarchy 
as a separate regime type. Escribà-Folch and Wright (2010) find that monarchies and 
personalist regimes are more vulnerable to international economic sanctions than 
military or single-party regimes, as they rely more heavily on patronage to maintain 
control. Escribà-Folch (2013a) finds that leaders of military regimes are more likely to be 
driven out of office if they use violent repression than single-party or personalist regimes. 
He also finds that personalist leaders are more likely to be killed or driven into exile in the 
event of regime collapse, leaders of monarchies and single-party regimes are less likely to 
be jailed, and in general military and single-party leaders are much less likely to be 
punished after a democratic transition (Escribà-Folch, 2013b). Frantz and Ezrow (2011) 
highlight the importance of regime type for determining leader survival, finding that elites 
in military and single-party regimes can remove regime leaders more easily than in 
personalist regimes due to the coordinating functions of their respective organisations 
and their higher degree of control over the military.  
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) retain the same broad categories, but add monarchies 
as a fourth category. They also label regimes in more detail within each category, 
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including hybrid types and additional classifiers such as oligarchy (e.g., Bolivia, 1946-
1951), indirect military (e.g., El Salvador, 1982-1994), and ‘Iran’ for the theocracy that has 
been ruling there since 1979. Magaloni (2008) similarly departs from Geddes’s (1999) 
original typology by using party-based, military, and monarchy as her primary categories. 
Magaloni argues that all dictatorships exhibit some degree of personalism, which 
therefore ought to be treated as a variable attribute of different regime types rather than 
a defining characteristic of one category.8 Magaloni (2008) further categorises regimes by 
the number of parties they allow in politics: none, one, or multiple parties, arguing that 
parties can stabilise regimes they enable elites to credibly threaten defection if the 
dictator reneges on promises of rents, positions, or access to policy-making decisions (see 
also Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010; Magaloni, Chu & Min, 2013).  
Although these regime typologies have been highly influential in research on 
authoritarianism, quantifying regimes based on qualitative dimensions such as where 
genuine political power lies (with an individual or with a collective party leadership, for 
example) and classifying heterogeneous institutional arrangements into limited 
categories is a challenging task, both theoretically and practically. As an example of the 
complexity involved, Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010) comprehensive analysis of the balance 
of power within just a single regime—the Chinese Communist Party—required compiling 
data on the complete career biographies and social ties of some 1,600 party members over 
86 years of rule, a project which took three years to complete. This complexity is 
compounded by the secretive, opaque nature of authoritarian regimes, which actively 
broadcast misinformation about their internal affairs and strongly resist external scrutiny 
(Barros, 2016).  
As a result, although typologies are a useful tool for studying dictatorships, there are some 
issues with the ways they are commonly used. For example, data collection projects 
typically rely on the judgement of non-country experts—often graduate students—who 
make coding decisions about dozens of different regimes over decades of authoritarian 
rule based primarily on secondary sources, a fact which has been argued to have resulted 
in misclassification of even very clear examples of particular regime types (Morgenbesser, 
2018). Svolik (2012, 21) further argues that most typologies conflate “multiple, distinct 
conceptual dimensions of authoritarian politics” into single categories. The 
personalist/single-party/military distinction, for example, fails to recognise that aspects 
of each of these categories may be present in one regime, and that these do not represent 
mutually exclusive empirical boundaries. Snyder (2006) makes a similar point, arguing 
that typologies conflate disparate forms of government. As an example, within military 
regimes there can be significant variation in how directly they maintain control, whether 
through direct rule by a junta, the installation of a puppet government under military 
tutelage, or taking a role as a veto player and supporter of a civilian government (see also 
Svolik, 2012; Geddes, Frantz & Wright, 2014). Military regimes can also ‘civilianise’ 
themselves, with officers retiring in order to take up government positions but 
                                                        
 
8 Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and Svolik (2012) make similar points. 
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maintaining strong ties with the military establishment (Brooker, 2014). Classifying these 
kinds of regimes as one of military, single-party, or a military-party hybrid is thus difficult 
and runs the risk of treating very different political arrangements as being substantively 
the same.  
 
2.2.2. Deductive approach 
Thus, although typologies are still a useful starting point for generating insights about 
authoritarian politics by illustrating broad differences amongst regimes, an increasingly 
prominent alternative approach is the development of deductive formal models of 
authoritarian politics, which can generate testable implications for regime behaviour and 
survival as well as generate insights about opaque or unobservable internal features of 
regimes (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). This approach attempts to explain the 
extraordinarily wide variety of authoritarian governments as parsimoniously as possible, 
showing how relatively minor variations along a few key dimensions of interest can have 
extensive repercussions for a range of regime characteristics (Svolik, 2012). Early works 
that approach the study of authoritarianism in this way include Tullock (1987), Wintrobe 
(1998), and Geddes (1999). Tullock (1987) points out that, despite enormous variety, 
authoritarian regimes have displayed consistent patterns of behaviour throughout 
history due to two core problems of authoritarian rule: gaining information about the 
likelihood of revolutionary plots and maintaining control over the military. Wintrobe 
(1998) similarly emphasises the security problems faced by dictators, arguing that they 
need to make an uncertain trade-off between using repression and cultivating loyalty in 
order to prevent rebellion, compounded by the lack of information popular and elite 
preferences due to the absence of signalling mechanisms such as competitive elections. 
Geddes (1999) not only contributes the influential typology discussed above, but also uses 
a game-theoretic approach to understand internal regime conflict. She argues that 
factions in different kinds of government face systematically different incentives to 
challenge each other for an increased share of power, and that this is the main factor 
explaining varying outcomes for personalist, single party, and military regimes. Military 
regimes “carry within them the seeds of their own destruction” (Geddes, 1999, 122), as 
divisions within the leadership threaten the integrity of the military as a unified whole, 
encouraging them to relinquish power when divisions emerge. On the other hand, factions 
in single-party and personalist regimes are argued to be more durable because cadres 
have fewer options outside of staying in power, and therefore have strong incentives to 
work together or risk losing everything. 
Game theory models of authoritarian politics have become increasingly sophisticated, 
incorporating insights from economics and formal modelling of democratic politics 
(Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). A number of areas have been addressed, including how 
institutions can be used to distribute rents and co-opt potential opposition (Gandhi & 
Przeworski, 2006; Gandhi, 2008) and economic performance and the consequences of 
economic policy for regime survival (Boix, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; 
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Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005; Besley & Kudamatsu, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 
2009). Another relevant area examines determinants and effects of repression (Bueno de 
Mesquita & Smith, 2010; Larcom, Sarr & Willems, 2014a, 2014b). Most important for this 
research project are the fundamentally important roles information, commitment, and 
coordination problems that have been highlighted by formal research on authoritarian 
politics (Myerson, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Acemoglu, Egorov & Sonin, 2009; Svolik, 2009, 
2012; Egorov & Sonin, 2011; Boix & Svolik, 2013; Edmond, 2014).  
A major advantage of this approach is that it provides a solution, albeit an imperfect one, 
for pervasive information problems caused by the opacity of authoritarian politics. While 
acknowledging the limitations of deductive modelling, which is based on indirect 
evidence and implications rather than direct observation of internal processes (Goode & 
Ahram, 2016), the results can then provide a basis for theory-building and further 
analysis by highlighting how regimes should behave, given certain starting assumptions. 
Although the actual models themselves may prove to be based on evidence that is limited 
or equivocal, they can direct the researcher’s attention away from obvious but perhaps 
superficial or overly simplistic explanations for certain regime outcomes towards more 
productive areas of inquiry. Hence, while the typological approach provides the initial 
foundation for thinking about the connection between authoritarian politics and civil 
resistance, I base the theoretical argument in this thesis primarily on the deductive 
approach. In the next section I explore how problems of coordination, commitment, and 
information within the ruling coalition may affect the outcome of civil resistance 
campaigns. I then argue that conflict between elites and the autocrat that come about 
because of these problems can help to explain why some civil resistance succeed in 
causing authoritarian regimes to break down, while in other cases elites remain cohesive 
and movements are effectively repressed. 
 
2.3. Theory: Personal autocracy and civil resistance outcome  
The previous sections have argued that while civil resistance research has generated 
important insights about how nonviolent campaigns succeed or fail, it has largely been 
one-sided in its focus on opposition tactics and strategies at the expense of considering 
how the characteristics of authoritarian regimes influence campaign outcomes. In this 
section I develop a theoretical framework which addresses this gap by connecting internal 
power struggles between dictators and their allies within the regime to the outcome of 
civil resistance campaigns. I classify regimes as either power-sharing regimes, where 
autocrats are limited in their authority and discretion to act by the need to take competing 
interests within the ruling group into account, or personal autocracies, where the autocrat 
has largely superseded these constraints and gained individual control over the regime. 
In personal autocracies many political elites would prefer an alternative to the status quo 
that better protected their interests, but face severe coordination problems that make it 
difficult to act collectively against the autocrat. Under these conditions, I argue that the 
emergence of a civil resistance campaign creates an exogenous crisis which changes elites’ 
decision-making calculus, encouraging them to withdraw their support from the autocrat 
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in favour of an alternative regime. In contrast, power-sharing regimes give political elites 
a stronger stake in the regime’s continued survival, encouraging them to remain cohesive 
in the face of an external challenge. Hence I conclude that, all else being equal, civil 
resistance campaigns which aim at regime change should be more likely to succeed 
against personal autocracies than power-sharing regimes, an argument which has 
important implications for how civil resistance is studied and understood. 
The section begins by defining political power as it is conceptualised in this thesis and 
linking this to the basic structure of authoritarian regimes. I describe the power-sharing 
and personal forms of authoritarian rule, showing how the former can break down into 
the latter if the autocrat succeeds in personalising power as well as explaining why the 
autocrat should be motivated to do so. I then explain in more detail how this fundamental 
shift in the balance of power influences the outcome of civil resistance campaigns, 
particularly focusing on how mass nonviolent protests can help elites to overcome their 
coordination dilemma by creating a crisis that allows room for communication and 
manoeuvre.  
 
2.3.1. Political power and authoritarian rule 
Power is a contested concept in social and political theory, with discussions over its 
meaning often featuring “deep, widespread, and seemingly intractable disagreements” 
(Allen, 2016, §1). One of the key distinctions is whether power is seen as power-over, 
meaning the ability to control other people’s actions, or power-to, meaning the capacity 
to act or do something. Another is whether power is what Allen (2016) labels ‘action-
theoretical’, that is, an actual action or disposition that is done or exercised instrumentally 
by individuals, or whether it is systemic, structuring possibilities for action or (more 
radically) playing a role in creating social reality. Yet while power-to and systemic 
understandings of power may be useful for other areas of inquiry, in this thesis I adopt an 
action-theoretical, power-over understanding, consistent with what might be called a 
broadly realist view of political power. That is, I conceive of power in authoritarian 
politics as the ability to influence or direct the actions of others through actual coercion, 
or the overt or implied threat of it, whether this occurs through institutional channels or 
otherwise. This echoes Sharp’s (1980, 27) view of political power as “the totality of means, 
influences, and pressures—including authority, rewards, and sanctions—available for 
use to achieve the objectives of the power-holder”, with these means typically including 
the ability to mobilise supporters, control over economic resources, and control over 
coercive resources such as security forces. In this ‘non-utopian’ view, power is seen as 
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real and inescapable, and the struggle over who wields power is the basic problem of 
politics (Sharp, 1973).9 
Sharp’s (1973; 1980; 1990) theory of political power further differentiates between 
monolithic and pluralistic understandings. The monolithic view is that power emanates 
from the top of the government and is imposed on those who are ruled, who themselves 
are dependent on the good will and decisions of the rulers. In this view, which Sharp 
characterises as the traditional understanding of power and one shared by many violent 
revolutionaries, political power is solid, unchanging, and can only be defeated using 
destructive, violent means. Drawing on 16th century French philosopher Étienne de la 
Boétie (1942 [1576]), Sharp instead argues for a pluralistic view, in which power is 
understood to be not inherent in the person or position of the ruler but originates in the 
cooperation and quiescence of those who are ruled. This conceptualisation is derived 
from the observation that a single individual cannot enact or enforce decrees, carry out 
repression, or collect enough revenue to maintain the operation of government; these 
actions require the cooperation or compliance of agents of the ruler. Absent that 
cooperation, it cannot be said that the ruler has any meaningful power to enforce their 
will over the will of others at the societal level at all. Hence the removal of cooperation or 
compliance does not challenge the ruler’s power, but actually consists of removing that 
power itself. This understanding of power as pluralistic is common in work on civil 
resistance, and is the one I adopt in this thesis.10 
When it comes to authoritarian regimes, the pluralist nature of power implies that no 
dictator is capable of governing alone. Instead, rulers must rely on the active support of a 
greater or lesser portion of society to have their will enforced. Within this broad network 
is the autocrat’s core group of supporters, the ruling coalition (Svolik, 2012, 57).11 The 
makeup of this coalition varies across cases: in the early part of Ferdinand Marcos’s rule 
of the Philippines, for example, he needed the support of landed aristocrats whose wealth 
and power came from agricultural production (Wurfel, 1988), while South Korea’s Chun 
Doo-Hwan seized power with the backing of his classmates from the Korea Military 
Academy (Moon & Rhyu, 2011), and monarchies in Persian Gulf states such as Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia rely on sprawling royal families which dominate government institutions 
(Herb, 1999). Likewise, the power of this elite group can be based in economic wealth, 
troops under command, an ability to gain the support of various social groups through 
ethnic, family, or other network ties, or other large networks of loyal followers who can 
                                                        
 
9 Although Sharp does not explicitly address only non-democracies, his theory of political power 
is obviously targeted at these forms of government, as implied by the title of his 2005 work From 
Dictatorship to Democracy. 
10 As alluded to above, this model of political power is most suited for describing authoritarian 
forms of government where there is a clear ruler; Sharp’s theory is less appropriate for describing 
more systemic or structural kinds of domination, such as sexism, racism, or classism (Martin, 
1989). 
11 The term ruling coalition is analogous to the term winning coalition used in selectorate theory 
to refer to democracies as well as dictatorships (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). 
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be used to administer rule (Svolik, 2012). Regardless of their individual makeup, however, 
in all cases autocrats rely on their ruling coalition to manage government institutions, 
enact policy decisions, and coerce opponents; without this active support, the leader’s 
survival in office is impossible.  
Although autocrats need ruling coalitions in order to hold power, their relationship with 
their elite allies is undermined by the “distinctively dismal conditions” of authoritarian 
rule (Svolik, 2012, 20). In democracies, leaders are elected through free, competitive 
elections under institutions and rules that are clear, well-defined, and knowable to 
everyone who takes part (Alvarez et al., 1996). In dictatorships, however, institutions and 
the ‘rules of the game’ are typically unclear and contested, with much of political life 
taking place through non-institutional channels—and the use of violence to resolve 
disputes or gain personal advantage always a possibility (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). 
Furthermore, by definition there are no institutions outside the ruling group that are 
independently powerful and capable of guaranteeing elite agreements with a credible 
threat to punish breaches (Myerson, 2008).  
As a result of these conditions, intra-elite conflict always remains a possibility under 
authoritarian rule, and even in well-established regimes behind-the-scenes manoeuvring 
can threaten the status quo distribution of power. Chinese president Xi Jinping’s recent 
moves to subvert limits on his position after decades of apparently stable collective rule 
by the Chinese Communist Party is a clear demonstration of the indeterminacy and 
unpredictability that underlies even apparently settled authoritarian systems (see, e.g., 
Shirk, 2018). Indeed, internal struggles for power pose the biggest threat to the survival 
of rulers in office: from 1946-2008, 68% of all autocrats who lost power in an irregular 
manner did so because they were forcibly removed by disgruntled regime insiders, 
including members of the inner circle, government, or security forces, far outnumbering 
those who lost office due to popular uprisings (11%), democratic transitions (10%), 
assassination (7%), or foreign intervention (5%) (Svolik, 2012, 5; see also Frantz & 
Ezrow, 2011). 
 
2.3.2. Power-sharing and personal autocracy 
The conflictual relationship between autocrats and their elite allies forms the basis of the 
theoretical framework that I develop in this thesis to explain how variation across 
authoritarian regimes influences the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. I divide 
authoritarian regimes into power-sharing regimes and personal autocracies. Unlike much 
recent work in comparative authoritarianism, which focuses on either classifying regimes 
into one of several ideal types or analysing the institutions of rule, I instead focus on elite-
level power politics within the regime, irrespective of institutional variation—which, as 
Pepinsky (2014) points out, may be a cause of political outcomes in authoritarian states, 
but is also often itself an outcome of elite behaviour. I thus distinguish between the two 
regime types based on where the balance of power lies between the autocrat and the ruling 
coalition. An advantage of this approach is that it is based on a characteristic that is 
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common to all authoritarian regimes, and hence not limited by institutional makeup, 
geographical location, or time period (cf. Geddes, 2003). Another advantage is that 
measuring a single dimension of authoritarian rule makes it easier to capture shifts in 
internal regime dynamics over time than approaches which rely on aggregating multiple 
measures across different, potentially incommensurable regime dimensions (Svolik, 
2012; Baturo & Elkink, 2016), or which require substantive changes in institutional 
makeup to identify shifts between regime types (cf. Morgenbesser, 2018). 
The following section defines the two regime types and describes the key indicators which 
I use to identify them. I explain how power-sharing regimes can transition to personal 
autocracies due to the ruler’s successful capture of power and avoidance of elite rebellion. 
I also explain the connection between time in power and the establishment of personal 
autocracy which I use as an indirect indicator in Chapter 4, the quantitative component of 
this study. I then link the variation between these two regime types to the outcome of civil 
resistance campaigns, particularly emphasising the effect of the establishment of personal 
autocracy on elites’ incentives to support the incumbent versus an alternative to the 
status quo. The causal pathway linking regime type to civil resistance outcome is 
summarised in Figure 2.1, with the definitions and indicators for each regime types 
summarised in Table 2.1 (next page). 
 





























Table 2.1: Summary of theoretical framework 
Power-sharing regime Definition 
The ruler is effectively constrained by competing centres of power 
within the ruling coalition 
Indicators 
Direct 
Rival elite coalitions present 
Autonomous decision-making institutions present 
Factional balance of control over high-level appointments 
Limits on leader tenure 
 
Indirect 
Short leader tenure 
Personal autocracy Definition 




Absence of rival elite coalitions 
Absence of autonomous decision-making institutions 
Leader has personal control over high-level appointments 
Limits on leader tenure extended, subverted, or eliminated 
 
Indirect 









I define power-sharing regimes as those in which autocrats are effectively constrained in 
their decision-making ability, coercive power, and direct control over the distribution of 
resources in authoritarian regimes by competing centres of power within the ruling 
coalition. The presence of these internal constraints means that autocrats are not able to 
act entirely as they see fit; while their power to implement decisions outside the regime 
may be extensive, within the regime they must listen to and take other interests into 
account. These centres of power can include individual rivals, autonomous institutions, 
or less formal groupings such as factions based on personal networks, ideological stance, 
shared history, or a range of other shared characteristics and interests (e.g., Treiwes, 
2001). The exact picture is obviously highly context-specific, depending on the history 
and institutional makeup of the regime in question. But what power-sharing regimes have 
in common is that the autocrat must maintain a balance between their own interests and 
those of powerful rivals who retain influence over decision-making, thus limiting the 
autocrat’s individual authority and discretion to act (Svolik, 2012; cf. Jackson & Rosberg, 
1982). 
In order to maintain the support of competing centres of influence, autocrats in power-
sharing regimes agree, willingly or not, to distribute the benefits of rule. These include not 
only opportunities for corruption, exploitation of natural resources, monopoly rights, or 
access to economic rents—all of which can be extremely lucrative—but also influence 
over decision-making and government policy, which can be used to encourage favourable 
legislation or prevent policies that would negatively impact individual or group interests 
within the regime (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Influential members of the ruling 
coalition could, for example, be given autonomy in operating ministries or governing 
regions, including in determining policy and making appointments, or retain veto powers 
over important executive decisions. Such agreements can involve an explicit contract, as 
in the case of the institutional arrangements hammered out by the Argentinian junta in 
the months before the 1976 coup (Fontana, 1987). Perhaps more commonly, though, the 
agreement is implicit, emerging as a pragmatic response to the status quo distribution of 
power and the autocrat’s inability or unwillingness to eliminate other influential elites 
(e.g., Barros, 2001). 
Although direct observation of the power balance between autocrats and ruling coalitions 
is difficult due to the opaque nature of authoritarian politics (Svolik, 2012; Baturo & 
Elkink, 2016), there are a number of empirical indicators that signal that a regime is likely 
to be a power-sharing one. Autonomous decision-making institutions such as legislatures, 
ruling councils, juntas, or politburos—where they remain genuinely independent—
constrain rulers’ ability to implement major policy changes by forcing them to work 
through formal rules or informal norms about collective decision-making processes, thus 
requiring the agreement of at least a substantial portion of the political elite for any 
initiatives (e.g., Slater, 2003; Gandhi, 2008). Regular face-to-face interaction amongst the 
elite in these institutions also aids monitoring the power-sharing bargain by facilitating 
intra-elite communication and providing clear evidence that other elites are not being 
eliminated, for example (Svolik, 2012). Second, the presence of rival elite coalitions in the 
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regime similarly necessitates compromise in policy-making, as decisions running counter 
to their collective interests could otherwise provoke a challenge to the ruler’s authority 
(cf. Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). 
A third indicator is shared control over appointments at the top levels of government. 
Autocrats that have extensive control over hiring and firing are able to grow their power 
base by appointing loyalists to key positions and stacking government ministries with 
their supporters while purging those of opponents (e.g., Slater, 2003; Baturo & Elkink, 
2016; Morgenbesser, 2018). In contrast, where a balance of appointments is maintained, 
particularly with rival factions, rulers are limited in their ability to implement decisions 
without gaining the ruling coalition’s support or to undermine rivals’ bases of support. 
The final key indicator of power-sharing is the presence of constitutional or other 
institutionalised term limits on the incumbent’s time in power, which can include limits 
on length of tenure and how many times a leader can be re-elected or appointed, as well 
as mandatory or informal retirement ages (e.g., Lee, 2015). Undermining power-sharing 
arrangements to consolidate individual power requires careful manoeuvring and building 
support, and hence is not usually quick process; arguably, several years in power would 
be a minimum timeframe for any ruler to fully establish their personal dominance over 
the ruling coalition (see, e.g., Svolik, 2012, 77). Hence, functioning term limits—which 
often consist of one or two terms of 4-7 years in duration (Baturo, 2014, 31)—limit the 
time that any individual leader has to become so powerful that they cannot be constrained 
by the ruling coalition. Attempts by the autocrat to make their position permanent would 
further send a strong signal that their primary goal is the consolidation of their personal 
power without regard for the interests of the political elite, making surreptitious 
personalisation of the regime more challenging (cf. Baturo & Elkink, 2016). 
Note that in each case constraints need to actually function to be considered indicators of 
power-sharing; the mere existence of a legislature, for example, is not sufficient for a 
regime to be classified as power-sharing if it has been essentially gutted and so does not 
actually constrain the autocrat’s decision-making abilities. Indeed, many institutions 
found in power-sharing regimes can also be identified in personal autocracies, albeit in a 
reduced form, as they assist the autocrat in implementing policy and carrying out 
repression (Slater, 2003). Even ostensible compliance with term limits do not always 
mean that power-sharing remains in place: for instance, Vladmir Putin, who has 
substantially personalised power in Russia since the late 2000s, technically complied with 
term limits when he stepped down from the presidency in 2008, but worked around this 
by taking the office of prime minister instead and placing a compliant protégé in the 
presidency without meaningfully giving up power (Svolik, 2012; Baturo & Elkink, 2016). 
Neither are these indicators strictly necessary to classify a regime as power-sharing; in 
some cases, idiosyncratic institutions or channels such as the family decision-making 
processes of the dynastic monarchies in the Arab Gulf identified by Herb (1999) may 
operate as the main limitation on the autocrat’s authority. The most important criterion 
of a power-sharing regime is thus that the ruling coalition is actually able to constrain the 
31 
 




In direct contrast to power-sharing regimes, I define personal autocracies as those in 
which autocrats have successfully eliminated constraints on their decision-making 
authority, control over coercive power, and control over the distribution of resources. As a 
result of the lack of internal constraints on their position, rulers in personal autocracies 
are not obliged to take competing interests within the regime into account; while they 
may still make decisions that are of benefit to major allies, these decisions are far more 
discretionary, not made as a result of a need to placate competing interests. Rulers are 
hence able to act autonomously of rules-based decision-making procedures, institutional 
constraints, or other kinds of limitations (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Chehabi and Linz, 
1998). The career of Mao Zedong as described by Teiwes (2001, 79) illustrates the 
contrast between power-sharing and personal autocracy clearly: 
The PRC under Mao can essentially be divided between the period before 1958 when 
the Chairman listened to interests within the system and sought results that took 
those interests into account […] and the subsequent "later Mao" period when he 
simply overrode interests, or compromised with them because of the dire state of 
the nation and/or because he had no clear idea of what to do. […] In the latter period, 
in both the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, Mao designed courses of 
action profoundly inimical to institutional interests. 
Other paradigmatic examples of personal autocracies include the regimes led by Josef 
Stalin, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, Hafez al-Asad, Saddam Hussein, Mobutu Sese Seko, 
Nicolae Ceaușescu, Mohammed Reza Shah, and Suharto, amongst others; that many of 
these are household names attests to the dominance that they achieved over their 
respective countries. Under these conditions elites’ positions become threatened and 
tenuous, as even those who remain loyal to the autocrat must jockey for position; politics 
becomes a zero-sum competition for the autocrat’s favour, involving winners and losers, 
although the current ‘in group’ may change at any time (Lee, 2015). 
Although I use the term personal autocracy, this concept is closely related to the concept 
of personalism—that is, the dominance of an individual ruler over a regime—which is 
widely used in research on comparative authoritarianism (e.g., Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; 
Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2014; Lee, 2015). A 
number of empirical indicators that can be used to identify personalist regimes are 
commonly highlighted. First, while in non-personalist regimes autocrats are limited by 
the need to gain the support of rival elite coalitions and autonomous institutions, in 
personalist regimes these centres of power are either absent or ineffective (Jackson & 
Rosberg, 1982). Rival elite coalitions, for example, may have lost key members or been 
bypassed with the creation of new government institutions stacked with loyalists. 
Legislatures typically remain in place—the vast majority of modern authoritarian regimes 
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retain legislatures (Svolik, 2012)—but are reduced to ‘rubber stamps’, with no real 
authority or ability to block the ruler’s favoured legislation. Similarly, consolidating 
personal control over appointments allows autocrats to dominate government by 
sidelining major rivals and replacing them with obedient loyalists; this is often 
accompanied by expanding the autocrat’s own patronage network down through lower 
levels of government while marginalising the clients of rival elites (Baturo & Elkink, 2016; 
Morgenbesser, 2018). The final and perhaps most overt indicator of personalism is the 
extension or elimination of term limits on the leader’s tenure (Brooker, 2014). This 
signals that the regime has become less important than the individual ruler (e.g., Svolik, 
2012; Baturo, 2014); indeed, constitutional amendments to extend or eliminate term 
limits are often accompanied with an implicit threat of chaos and disorder if the leader 
were to leave.  
The dominance of an individual leader is particularly obvious when constitutions are 
amended to make the ruler ‘president for life’, or even a new monarch, such as ‘Emperor 
of Central Africa’ Jean-Bédel Bokassa of the Central African Republic. Likewise, the 
establishment of a personality cult, in which the autocrat’s image dominates public space 
and leaders claim superhuman, divine, or supernatural powers, signals the association of 
the regime with a single powerful individual. Both of these latter indicators, however, 
primarily occur at some point after the consolidation of personal rule, rather than 
constituting that consolidation itself, and so are of less usefulness in clearly distinguishing 
between personal autocracy and power-sharing (cf. Svolik, 2012).  
As noted, however, I specifically use the term personal autocracy to distinguish the 
definition I develop here from the more common usage of personalism. As Svolik (2012) 
has pointed out, the commonly-used definition of personalism conflates two conceptually 
distinct aspects of authoritarian politics, namely (1) the ruler’s power relative to the 
ruling coalition and (2) the method by which power is exercised, particularly when this is 
through patron-client relationships rather than formal institutions. Because it relies on 
multiple regime measures, the concept of personalism as it is used in prominent 
typologies such as Geddes (1999) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) also has 
difficulty capturing changes in key indicators over time, especially when the consolidation 
of power is gradual rather than sudden and overt (e.g., Baturo & Elkink, 2016; 
Morgenbesser, 2018). Hence, I use the term personal autocracy to refer specifically to 
cases where rulers have consolidated personal power relative to the ruling coalition, 
regardless of whether this power is primarily exercised through institutional or 
noninstitutional means. 
Even under personal autocracy elites retain some power within the regime, as autocrats 
still need cooperation to have their will enforced, and governments need ministers to 
administer laws, repress opponents, and collect taxes. Indeed, autocrats may never be 
entirely free of constraint in a more general sense, as they remain limited by the capacity 
of the regime to actually implement legislation, lack of resources, powerful neighbours, or 
other practical considerations (cf. Slater, 2003). Influential rivals and their supporters 
may thus still be tolerated within the ruling coalition. For example, during Mao Zedong’s 
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period of rule as the absolute leader of China, the proportion of the all-important Central 
Committee made up of his supporters was in fact surprisingly limited, with his loyalists 
making up at most 60% of its membership, and the balance being supporters of other 
figures in the party leadership (Shih, Shan & Liu, 2010, 90). Nevertheless, he was clearly 
dominant, determining who was allowed to have influence and who was not, giving his 
blessing for key allies to stack the committee with supporters or vetoing proposals to alter 
the balance of power (Shih, Shan & Liu, 2010). 
Personal autocracies are thus characterised by a fundamentally different relationship 
between the ruling coalition and the autocrat. Under power-sharing, members of the 
ruling coalition maintain independent bases of support and horizontal ties with one 
another which are facilitated by power-sharing institutions and allow them to monitor 
the agreement and coordinate to remove the autocrat in the event of power-grabs. Under 
personal autocracy, by contrast, these ties have been weakened to the point that the elite 
has become largely atomised; that is, individuals are still in place, and can still wield a 
substantial amount of power within their bailiwick, but are unable to coordinate it with 
others. Although as a group they retain influence, the overwhelming perception is that 
any individual is not necessary, and can be removed from the ruling coalition entirely at 
the autocrat’s whim (Svolik, 2012). As a result, elites face a severe collective action 
problem, as an attempt to build a strong enough coalition to challenge the autocrat is 
likely to be met with harsh reprisals.  
 
2.3.3. Establishment of personal rule 
How and why do rulers establish personal autocracy? It is assumed here that 
authoritarian regimes begin as power-sharing regimes when they are established or when 
a new leader takes power. As Geddes (2004) argues, taking power requires coordinated 
and costly action by the autocrat’s supporters, who must be convinced to provide this 
support with the promise of future benefits. And as Myerson (2008) points out, a would-
be autocrat who could not at least partly commit to sharing the benefits of rule once 
successful would not be able to motivate allies to engage in the costly action involved, and 
so would fail in the bid to take power in the first place. This is obviously so for violent 
revolutions and coups d’état, where the personal costs of taking part are typically 
substantial. It is also the case when the autocrat takes power in the context of an existing 
regime, such as by achieving the nomination of a dominant party, as potential supporters 
must be convinced to support the autocrat and not an alternative challenger. Even in the 
case of inherited dynasties where power has passed from father to son, such as Syria 
under the al-Asads or North Korea under the Kims, succession involves factional struggles 
between those who support the designated heir and those who would prefer an 
alternative. The transfer of power from Hafiz al-Asad to his son Bashar, for example, 
required six and a half years of building support within the military and security 
apparatus (Leverett, 2005). Even with these efforts, Bashar had an “authority gap” and a 
“less hierarchical relationship” with the ruling coalition than his father, being limited by 
the need to maintain the support of entrenched members of the elite and fend off 
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challenges from opportunistic rivals for at least the first few years of his rule (Leverett, 
2005, 30). The transfer of power from one leader to another, regardless of how it takes 
place, thus ‘resets the clock’, re-establishing power-sharing in some form as incoming 
leaders have to rely more heavily on the support of the ruling coalition than their 
predecessor.  
Although power-sharing agreements are ubiquitous in the early stages of authoritarian 
regimes, underlying tensions between rulers and ruling coalitions mean that it is possible 
for them to break down (Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2012). In particular, the lack of 
independent guarantees of elite agreements means that power-sharing is characterised 
by a commitment problem on the part of the autocrat, as it is in principle possible that 
they could subvert the agreement at their allies’ expense without being punished. Indeed, 
the possibility that the autocrat will opportunistically attempt to acquire more power in 
relation to the ruling coalition poses the biggest threat to power-sharing agreements 
(Svolik, 2012). Resolving this fundamental conflict of interest so that it does not lead to 
regime-destabilising internal conflict is a central problem of authoritarian rule (e.g., 
Myerson, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Frantz & Ezrow, 2011; Svolik, 2012). 
There are two main reasons why autocrats might try to subvert power-sharing 
agreements. The first is that because less active support is needed to maintain the status 
quo than to seize power, autocrats are able to increase the benefits of holding power for 
themselves by reneging on their promise to distribute resources with some members of 
the ruling coalition (cf. Geddes, 2004). This is the logic of minimum winning coalitions: 
the more supporters who need to be satisfied with resources, the less resources there are 
to go around. Conversely, if autocrats marginalise some members of the ruling coalition, 
they can retain a greater portion of the benefits for themselves and other remaining 
members, which can be used in pursuit of further consolidation of power or for private 
consumption (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; cf. Riker, 1962). This motivation applies 
just as much to influence over decision-making and policy as it does actual monetary 
resources, as reducing the number of powerful rivals who need to be contended with 
makes it easier for the autocrat to pursue their policy objectives without the need to take 
other interests into account. 
A second reason is that delegating authority over social, political, military, and economic 
resources carries with it an inherent principal-agent problem. That is, although delegating 
authority is necessary for continued governance as well as obtaining elite support, that 
same authority could be used to build up an independent power base capable of 
challenging the autocrat’s position (Svolik, 2012). Compounding this problem is the 
‘dictator’s dilemma’: ambitious lieutenants may be plotting to overthrow the autocrat, yet 
the heavy cost of being detected—at best, demotion or imprisonment, at worst, 
execution—means that they have strong incentives to keep this hidden (Wintrobe, 1998). 
This, together with the extremely large rewards that can go to the winners of intra-regime 
power struggles, means that autocrats under conditions of power-sharing can never be 
entirely sure that subordinates are not plotting rebellion (Wintrobe, 1998; Egorov & 
Sonin, 2010). Autocrats therefore have incentives to avert this possibility by decreasing 
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this delegated authority to prevent alternative power centres from forming within the 
regime. 
Moves to acquire more power, or power grabs, can be sudden, violent, and overt, such as 
Ferdinand Marcos’s declaration of martial law and ensuing crackdown on opponents in 
1972 in the Philippines, or Saddam Hussein’s dramatic purge of the Iraqi Baath party in 
1979. In other cases, autocrats can capitalise on unexpected opportunities, such Rafael 
Trujillo’s use of emergency powers granted in response to a cyclone hitting Santo 
Domingo to later consolidate his position (Hartlyn, 1998). Overt power grabs may include 
tactics such as removing constitutional term limits or becoming ‘president for life’, gaining 
sweeping decree powers that override legislative institutions, or carrying out purges to 
remove political rivals. But just as often the consolidation of power is gradual and less 
likely to trigger resistance from the ruling coalition. Stalin’s rise to power is a classic 
example of this, as he gradually defeated potential challengers for his position and 
brought government institutions under his control in the 1920s and early 1930s. 
Although some of his allies sounded warnings, his actions were not clear enough to 
prompt the rest to remove him, until the purges of the 1930s removed any possibility of 
elite resistance (Suny, 1998). These tactics often involve what Slater (2003) labels 
‘stacking, rigging, and circumventing’; that is, filling offices and core ministries with 
supporters, modifying internal rules to serve the autocrat’s interests—without outright 
eliminating or overriding them—and creating alternative institutional channels to divert 
resources and decision-making authority away from institutions controlled by rivals 
towards loyalists. 
Why are elites not able to prevent the establishment of personal rule and maintain the 
power-sharing agreement in the first place? After all, obviously it would be preferable to 
maintain shared control over sources of revenue and influence over decision-making. 
Even for loyalists, power-grabs bring risk as autocrats have a well-known tendency to 
turn on their former allies if the need arises. The primary method elites have to prevent 
personalisation is to rebel, withdrawing their support and making a coordinated attempt 
to remove the autocrat from power via a coup d’état or other relatively limited internal 
rebellion (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011; Svolik, 2012). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, this is the 
most common way that dictators are forced from office, with around two thirds of all non-
constitutional exits from power of authoritarian leaders being due to coups.  
Yet although common, rebellion is still a drastic response to perceived power grabs, 
particularly where the autocrat’s intentions are not entirely clear (Svolik, 2012). Even 
discussing a plan to carry out a coup may bring serious consequences for those involved 
if exposed, while a failed attempt can result in penalties ranging from imprisonment to 
death. In many regimes, too, an extremely high value is placed on maintaining the outward 
appearance of unity and cohesion, even if internal struggles are rife, a factor that may be 
particularly salient when they face potential existential threats from external forces (e.g., 
Treiwes, 2001). This ‘hang together or hang separately’ mentality may also act as an 
obstacle to elite rebellion, even if there is a high estimated chance of success, because of 
the possibility that exposing internal divisions will destabilise the regime as a whole. 
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Furthermore, while successive power-grabs send increasingly clear signals of an intent to 
subvert the power-sharing agreement, they also increase the autocrat’s ability to deter 
challenges from within the ruling coalition (Svolik, 2012). There are a number of 
mechanisms involved. For example, targeted purges remove influential elites who would 
otherwise have to be bargained with, but who would also be able to act as focal points for 
coordination; circumventing rival institutions reduces the resources that they could bring 
to bear against the autocrat; and stacking rival ministries with loyalists or rotating 
ministry heads who may show signs of independence makes it more difficult for those 
institutions to be used as independent spaces for coordination (e.g., Jackson & Rosberg, 
1982; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Slater, 2003). Control over appointments and 
resource distribution within the ruling coalition, and the threat of their withdrawal, also 
increases the potential cost of expressing dissent or criticism of the autocrat and makes it 
more difficult for elites to signal to each other that there is wide support for an alternative 
to the status quo, thus increasing the difficulty of initiating a challenge (cf. Kuran, 1995). 
At the same time, autocrats also gain more control over ‘carrots’, using their increasing 
discretion over patronage flows to enrich those who support their rule. 
Particularly important is that power grabs increase the autocrat’s ability to punish 
individual members of the elite. Autocrats frequently establish separate security and 
intelligence units, which report to them personally and are often headed by family 
members or very close allies, in order to increase the likelihood that plots are detected or 
defeated. Personal control over coercive agencies as well as the ability to overcome 
institutional constraints on draconian punishments dramatically increases the potential 
consequences of attempting to initiate or taking part in a failed rebellion. Once a certain 
level of personal power has been reached, the expected cost of a failed rebellion, together 
with the difficulties in initiating one and the probability that it will be defeated, then 
becomes greater than the benefit of remaining loyal, even taking into account the 
possibility that any individual may be marginalised within the ruling coalition in the 
future (Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2012).  
The situation resembles a multiperson stag hunt in game theory: the ruling coalition 
would be better off removing the autocrat and re-establishing a power-sharing regime, 
and because of the pluralistic nature of political power and the consequent reliance of the 
autocrat on cooperation to remain in office, it can be assumed that this would be possible 
were a sufficiently high proportion of the ruling coalition to rebel. Yet individual rebels 
face extremely high costs if others do not take part, while smaller—yet non-zero—
benefits still accrue to individuals who remain loyal. As a result, because there is 
uncertainty about whether others will rebel, and because of the potentially extreme 
consequences if they do not, elites will prefer to make the safer choice of remaining loyal, 
leaving the regime in an equilibrium state where elites choose to tolerate the status quo 
distribution of power.  
Finally, it should also be noted that personalisation of power is expected to be a one-way 
street. While personalisation is possible because elites are uncertain about the autocrat’s 
intentions (Svolik, 2012), once personal autocracy has been established, it is very clear to 
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the ruling coalition that the autocrat cannot be relied on to prioritise their interests. 
Following this point, the only way for the autocrat to credibly signal a return to power-
sharing would be to give up a substantial degree of control over policy, coercion, and 
distribution of resources; however, this self-same power could be used by the ruling 
coalition—which is now very sure that the autocrat cannot be trusted—to initiate a 
rebellion. This obstacle to a return to power-sharing is similar to the dilemma faced by 
authoritarian leaders following democratisation, as highlighted by Sutter (1995): rulers 
who agree to hand over power in exchange for amnesty are then vulnerable to retaliation 
by the new power-holders, as they have lost the only means of guaranteeing their pact. 
While it is possible for outgoing leaders to overcome the dilemma of democratisation, 
particularly where they retain control over security forces (Suffer, 1995), whether it is 
possible for autocrats to negotiate the dilemma of a return to power-sharing once 
personal rule has been consolidated is less clear. Hence, it is assumed here that once 
personal autocracy is established, it remains in place until the leader dies of natural 
causes, is forced to retire or negotiate a succession due to ill health, or is removed from 
power by exogenous causes such as foreign intervention, assassination, or nonviolent 
uprising (cf. Svolik, 2012). 
 
2.3.4. Leader tenure and personal autocracy 
As mentioned above, I differentiate between the concept of personal autocracy and that of 
personalism as it is commonly used in comparative authoritarianism research due in part 
to the problems that arise from classifying regimes using multiple distinct and potentially 
incommensurable measures. An additional problem with using personalism as it is 
measured in existing typologies is that the information problems associated with 
authoritarian secrecy—typically ignored in work on comparative authoritarianism 
(Goode & Ahram, 2016)—mean that classifications of regime type based on outsiders’ 
judgments are prone to error. Barros (2001, 2002), for example, has demonstrated that 
the common classification of Augusto Pinochet’s Chile as a personalist regime misses the 
underlying power-sharing arrangement that moderated his rule, while Morgenbesser 
(2018) similarly highlights errors in the classification of the Hun Sen regime in Cambodia 
in the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) dataset. Morgenbesser notes that the problem 
of authoritarian opacity is exacerbated by the practice of using trained but non-specialist 
coders, often graduate students, to make judgement calls about governments, with which 
they have little familiarity, on the basis of limited secondary sources.12 
                                                        
 
12 Datasets with more disaggregated regime indicators also pose challenges. For example, the 
‘constraints on the executive’ variable in the Polity IV dataset suffers from consistency problems 
(Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2014, 7), while a similar index in the Varieties of Democracy dataset 
(Coppedge et al., 2017, 61) is not able to effectively distinguish between personal autocracies such 
as the Philippines under Marcos and Indonesia under Suharto and power-sharing regimes such as 
China under Deng Xiaoping (see Lee, 2015). 
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I address this second problem in two ways. The first is that I follow Art’s (2016) 
suggestion and validate the quantitative findings of Chapter 4 with in-depth case studies 
in Chapters 5 and 6. The second is that I also use an additional, indirect indicator of 
personal autocracy that can be used for cross-national comparison: the leader’s time in 
power (see Svolik, 2009; 2012, 72-76; cf. Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). As mentioned in 
Section 2.1.2, this indicator has been used in previous quantitative work on civil 
resistance but to date has not been grounded in theories of authoritarian politics, nor has 
it been treated as more than a control variable. Yet while it is perhaps less intuitively 
obvious how time in office relates to the underlying distribution of power, it has the 
advantage of being more unambiguous and clearly observable than the direct indicators 
listed above. I explain why time in power serves as an indirect indicator of personal 
autocracy as follows. 
As discussed above, it is assumed here that authoritarian regimes begin life as power-
sharing regimes, as agreeing to share power is required in order for an autocrat to take 
office in the first place. It can also be assumed that virtually all autocrats are ambitious; 
indeed, this borders on tautology, as it is hard to imagine how one could become a ruler 
in the cut-and-thrust world of authoritarian politics without being highly ambitious. Given 
this assumption, it is therefore the case that if an opportunity arises to make power grabs 
and consolidate personal rule a proportion of autocrats will attempt to do so, in order to 
both increase their personal benefit from holding power and eliminate the possibility of 
being removed from office by internal rebellion, as described above (see also Svolik, 
2012). Although in many instances this will be met with an elite rebellion, ambitious 
autocrats are motivated to take the gamble because if they get away with it, they are in a 
much stronger position vis-à-vis the ruling coalition than would otherwise be the case.  
Given these conditions, rulers have two choices that they can make.13 First, they can 
cooperate with the power-sharing agreement and not attempt to consolidate power. As 
explained above, power-sharing regimes typically feature limits on individual leader 
tenure, so autocrats who are unwilling or unable to personalise power will comply with 
these measures and step down when they are supposed to. In some cases this leads to 
relatively stable power-sharing regimes with regular leader turnover and shorter 
individual tenures, as seen in countries like Mexico during the PRI era where leadership 
changed hands every six years. Even if term limits are generous or absent, because the 
autocrat remains weaker than the ruling coalition it is also possible that elites will rebel 
and remove the autocrat for some other reason, such as economic mismanagement or a 
foreign policy disaster. While it is possible that a complying autocrat could remain in 
power for an extended period of time, especially where there are no formal or informal 
limits on their tenure, the combination of needing to maintain a balance amongst 
competing centres of power, avoid the temptation to opportunistically subvert the power-
                                                        
 
13 Svolik (2012, 63-78) develops this argument more analytically, using formal modelling, to show 
that it is more likely that authoritarian leaders with long tenures have survived in power by 
establishing personal autocracy. 
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sharing agreement for significant personal gain, and fend off ambitious lieutenants 
without having consolidated a high level of personal control, all while effectively running 
a country, would be expected to be a major obstacle to this. Hence, the tenure of autocrats 
who comply with power-sharing agreements should, on average, be relatively limited by 
the constraints on their position. 
Second, rulers can attempt to subvert the power-sharing agreement and establish a 
personal autocracy. In many cases, elites who feel threatened by personalisation will 
detect these moves and attempt to remove the autocrat by launching a coup. Indeed, as 
explained earlier, the consensus in research on comparative authoritarianism is that the 
biggest threat to the survival in power of authoritarian leaders comes from disgruntled 
ruling coalitions. Yet if autocrats are successful in avoiding detection, or survive a 
rebellion attempt, they increase their share of power relative to the ruling coalition, with 
enough successes leading to the establishment of personal autocracy. If an autocrat’s 
accumulation of personal power becomes so great that elites can no longer meaningfully 
constrain them, then the most serious threat to their continued survival in office has 
effectively been removed. This argument is illustrated by Svolik’s (2012, 77) finding that 
the likelihood of a ruler being removed by a coup decreases relative to the probability that 
they pass away naturally after the ruler has been in power for more than ten years, even 
with age-related increase in mortality risk taken into account. 
Hence, autocrats who have established a personal autocracy would in general be expected 
to survive in office for longer than those who either comply with power-sharing 
agreements or attempt to consolidate power but are removed by elite rebellion. Note that 
this argument implies that successfully overcoming the ruling coalition to establish 
personal autocracy is a cause, not a consequence, of long survival in office, as it eliminates 
the biggest threat to the autocrat’s continued stay in power. Indeed, the establishment of 
personal autocracy leading to long tenure is consistent with the empirical record of noted 
leaders of this type of regime, including: 
• Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines, 1965-1986) – 20 years 
• Mao Zedong (China, 1949-1976) – 27 years 
• Josef Stalin (U.S.S.R., 1923-1953) – 30 years 
• Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire/D.R.C., 1965-1997) – 31 years 
• Suharto (Indonesia, 1966-1998) – 32 years 
• Kim Il-Sung (North Korea, 1948-1994) – 46 years 
• Fidel Castro (Cuba, 1959-2008) – 49 years14 
In contrast, the overall average length of tenure for all authoritarian rulers who survived 
at least one year in office from 1946-2008 was approximately 10 years (Goemans, 2008; 
Svolik, 2012). Furthermore, as noted earlier, the PRI’s rule of Mexico—an exemplar of 
power-sharing—had an average leader tenure of 6 years, and Chinese leaders after Mao 
                                                        
 
14 Data from Goemans (2008) and Svolik (2012), rounded to the nearest year. 
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Zedong and before Xi Jinping averaged approximately 8.5 years, although Deng Xiaoping 
did survive 16 years in office (Svolik, 2012). Overall, very few leaders actually achieve 
lasting power, with around 25% of leaders making it past the ten year point and only just 
over 10% surviving longer than 20 years in power, consistent with the argument that 
establishing personal autocracy is both highly risky and highly rewarding.15  
 
2.3.5. Effect on civil resistance outcome 
The different incentives facing elites under power-sharing regimes compared to personal 
autocracies provide what I argue is a key link between authoritarian politics and the 
outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. Under personal autocracy, members of 
the ruling coalition would prefer to remove the autocrat and reinstall a power-sharing 
regime to ensure that their interests are protected, yet are prevented from doing so by 
the coordination problems they face as a result of the autocrat’s consolidation of power. I 
propose that the emergence of a civil resistance campaign allows the ruling coalition to 
overcome these problems by creating an exogenous crisis that alters elites’ decision-
making calculus, encouraging them to withdraw support from the autocrat in favour of an 
alternative. As a result, regimes in which the autocrat has consolidated personal power 
vis-à-vis the ruling coalition should be paradoxically more likely to break down when 
challenged by a mass uprising than those in which elites’ interests remain protected by a 
power-sharing agreement.  
There are a number of reasons why civil resistance campaigns may allow elites to 
overcome barriers to collective action. By creating an external crisis which must be 
resolved, mass protests and non-cooperation create a dilemma for the regime: whether 
to make concessions to protestors, potentially signalling weakness and encouraging 
further mobilisation, or to use violent repression, which brings the risk of further 
escalation or international condemnation (cf. Sørensen & Martin, 2014). Indeed, 
repression of nonviolent mass protests by civilians is a risky strategy, as it often backfires 
on regimes, leading to increased mobilisation, international sanctions, or internal 
rebellion—a dynamic also known as political jiu-jitsu (see, e.g., Martin, 2007; Davenport, 
2007; Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014). In particular, military units are often deeply 
reluctant to use violence against their own people, and orders to do so can result in 
defections or retaliatory coup attempts (McLauchlin, 2010; Geddes, Frantz & Wright, 
2014; Koren, 2014). Civil resistance thus forces difficult choices by autocrats and their 
allies, with the need to choose a course of action creating room for the kind of debate over 
decision-making which is otherwise suppressed by personalisation; this period of 
opening allows elites to consider alternatives to the status quo and obtain signals of how 
widely such alternatives might be supported in the ruling coalition, while framing these 
discussions as a response to the crisis rather than a signal of rebellion (cf. O’Donnell & 
                                                        
 
15 My calculations from Svolik (2012). 
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Schmitter, 1986). This instability is also likely to decrease elites’ time horizons by creating 
the perception that the autocrat may not remain in power for much longer, increasing the 
relative attractiveness of withdrawing support compared to remaining loyal (cf. Hale, 
2005). The existence of a crisis which must be responded to, one way or another, thus 
removes or reduces some of the barriers to intra-elite coordination that otherwise make 
collective action challenging under personal autocracy.  
Civil resistance campaigns further encourage elite coordination by providing a partner 
that can be overtly or tacitly allied with, reducing the need for elites to initiate a collective 
withdrawal of support themselves. Campaigns often have a clear leadership, including 
opposition figures and/or civil society, religious, or labour leaders, which can be 
negotiated with over guarantees that unrest will not escalate into violence and that elites 
will have their interests protected if they support the opposition in the event that the 
regime collapses (e.g., Karl, 1990; Cook, 2006). High levels of public participation in 
protests also give added legitimacy to alternative claims to power, as they signal that there 
is a large segment of society which dissatisfied with the current regime and provide a clear 
political resource that opportunistic elites can draw on to their benefit under a new 
regime (Lee, 2015).  
All else being equal, therefore, civil resistance in pursuit of regime change should be more 
likely to succeed against an authoritarian regime in which personal autocracy has become 
established than one in which the autocrat is still constrained by the power-sharing 
agreement, as it is able to encourage disgruntled members of the ruling coalition to 
withdraw their support from the regime. In particular, it allows elites to overcome their 
collective action problem imposed by the autocrat’s monopolisation of power to act on 
their incentive for regime change to re-establish some form of guarantee of their interests.  
Note that it is assumed here that this connection between the transition to personal 
autocracy and regime breakdown in response to an external challenge is specific to a 
nonviolent campaign. In comparison to nonviolent uprisings, armed challenges such as 
insurgencies pose a much greater existential threat to the regime as a whole as well as to 
its individual members. Armed revolutions are also often followed by violent purges of 
members of the ancien régime, aside from the obvious physical damage to infrastructure 
and property and the heavy toll on the population that these forms of conflict always 
entail. In contrast, although individual autocrats and core allies may be prosecuted 
following a change of regime, this outcome is far from certain, and other members of the 
regime generally avoid serious sanctions. Indeed, a peaceful transition from personal 
autocracy to a more competitive form of authoritarianism, if not actual democracy, often 
allows large portions of the former elite to protect their interests and retain political 
and/or economic influence, an observation that has frequently been made of post-
transition governments following major civil resistance successes (e.g., Fukuoka, 2016). 
Hence this argument only applies to uprisings that are primarily nonviolent; armed 
insurgencies or foreign invasion are instead more likely to result in regime consolidation 





This chapter has shown that, despite having clear implications for understanding how 
civil resistance campaigns challenge non-democratic regimes, the characteristics of 
authoritarian politics have remained largely absent from existing research on the topic. 
In this section I have taken a step towards filling this gap by developing a theoretical 
framework which explains how power struggles between the autocrat and political elites 
within a regime can affect the likelihood that a nonviolent civil resistance campaign 
aiming at regime change will succeed.  
I have argued that power-sharing regimes feature limits on the autocrat’s authority and 
decision-making power, and that this obliges the autocrat to share access to decision-
making and resources in order to obtain continued support from the political elite. In 
contrast, the establishment of personal autocracy means that the ruling coalition can no 
longer credibly constrain the autocrat, and hence the political elite are no longer able to 
fully ensure that their interests will be taken into account and protected within the 
current system. Yet while elites have incentives to remove the autocrat and re-establish a 
power-sharing regime, the autocrat’s consolidation of personal control imposes 
coordination barriers that make collective action within the ruling coalition prohibitively 
difficult. Under these conditions, a civil resistance campaign creates an exogenous crisis 
which improves elites’ ability to withdraw support from the regime in favour of an 
alternative. By creating a crisis which forces a regime response, civil resistance opens up 
space for debate and dissent within the ruling coalition. It also acts as a focal point for 
negotiation and coordination and a source of legitimacy for alternative claims to power. 
Thus, it is expected that the establishment of personal autocracy should, perhaps 
somewhat ironically, increase the vulnerability of the regime to nonviolent external 
challenges even while it diminishes the threat to the ruler’s position from inside the ruling 
coalition. The remainder of the thesis puts this argument to the test, using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, to examine whether the establishment of personal 







This thesis uses a mixed methods approach to inquiry, one which integrates both 
quantitative and qualitative methods to answer research questions. Although 
combinations of methods have been used throughout the history of social science, mixed 
methods as such has been developed more recently, as a distinct alternative to existing 
post-positivist or constructivist paradigms (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007; 
Onwuegbuzie, 2012; Maxwell, 2015).16 It was developed during and in response to the so-
called paradigm wars between quantitatively- and qualitatively-oriented purists who 
implicitly or explicitly accepted the incompatibility thesis, i.e., the argument that it is 
inappropriate to mix quantitative and qualitative methods due to their fundamentally 
incompatible assumptions about the world (cf. Lincoln & Guba, 1986). Mixed methods 
researchers instead contend that quantitative and qualitative methods are inherently 
compatible and appropriate for many different research questions (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2009). 
While mixed methods is becoming more common in some areas of research, particularly 
in the education and health science fields (Ivankova & Kawamura, 2010), ongoing 
methodological developments have remained largely absent from studies of politics and 
political conflict (Thaler, 2017). Methodological works in political science, in particular, 
have largely failed to engage with mixed methods, either neglecting it entirely (e.g., Box-
Steffensmeier, Brady & Collier, 2008; Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013; Johnson, Reynolds & 
Mycoff, 2015) or overlooking developments from outside political science (e.g., 
Leiberman, 2005; Rohlfing, 2008; Ahram, 2011; Goerres & Prinzin, 2012; Toshkov, 
2016).17 Hence in order to justify the approach taken in this thesis, this chapter begins 
with a description of the mixed methods approach as a distinctive research paradigm and 
sets out the rationale for collecting both quantitative and qualitative data. It then 
describes the overall explanatory sequential quan → qual design, as well as setting out the 
specific techniques that have been used in the quantitative and qualitative components of 
the study.  
 
3.1. Mixed methods approach 
There is as yet no single widely agreed-upon definition of what mixed methods is, as the 
field is still developing (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010a; Mertens et al., 2016; Fetters & 
Molina-Azorin, 2017). Nevertheless, there are three core principles that define mixed 
methods studies as distinct from other forms of inquiry. The first, as mentioned above, is 
                                                        
 
16 I have deliberately omitted the terms ‘positivist’ and ‘positivism’ here, as they are largely 
inappropriate for describing most modern quantitative research (see, e.g., Yu, 2003). 
17 This is not confined to political science; indeed, as Small (2011) points out, there has been a 
notable lack of interdisciplinary communication in the development of mixed methods in general. 
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rejection of the incompatibility thesis in favour of seeing quantitative and qualitative 
methods as compatible (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2012). The second is an emphasis on the 
integration of methods, including in the research design, data collection, and 
interpretation of results. Integration is highlighted by mixed methodologists as a key 
characteristic separating truly ‘mixed’ research from ‘multi-method’ research, which uses 
multiple methods but does not combine them (Johnson et al., 2007; Mertens et al., 2016). 
A third principle is an instrumental approach to methods (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010b; 
Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2012). Mixed methods researchers treat techniques as tools to be 
used when most appropriate for each particular topic; there is an emphasis on learning 
new techniques in order to more effectively answer existing research questions and open 
up new avenues of inquiry (Onwuegbuzie, 2012; Mertens et al., 2016). 
While mixed methods may be just one possible approach to research, no better or worse 
than quantitative or qualitative-only approaches (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009), it is being 
increasingly argued that it in fact has inherent advantages over both (Mertens et al., 
2016). At a general level, it attempts to move beyond the either/or thinking that has 
characterised methodological debates in social science over the last three decades, 
towards both/and thinking, recognising that both quantitative and qualitative methods 
are important and useful (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In opposition to the 
“paradigm-deficit” approach, which emphasises points of difference, incompatibility, and 
disagreement, mixed methods seeks to emphasise points of commonality, and allow 
scholars from a range of backgrounds to engage in meaningful communication 
(Onwuegbuzie, 2012, 197).  
In terms of research projects themselves, Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007) 
highlight two primary advantages to mixing quantitative and qualitative methods. The 
first is increased breadth, in that triangulating multiple approaches can lead to better 
understanding, greater detail, and enhanced descriptions of the phenomena under 
investigation. The second is corroboration, i.e., validating and explicating findings, 
ensuring internal consistency and validity, and increasing confidence in findings. These 
advantages can be particularly applicable where the topic of investigation is highly 
complex and involves multiple layers of action and analysis, as is the case in most areas of 
political conflict (Thaler, 2017).  
The reason for integrating both kinds of data in this particular project is twofold. First, 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches in isolation have weaknesses for studying 
the internal characteristics of authoritarian regimes. Qualitative studies of 
authoritarianism are made difficult by the fact that authoritarian regimes are secretive 
and often resist external scrutiny, although the methodological problems this entails have 
been recognised more often by area specialists than by scholars of authoritarianism (e.g., 
Heimer & Thøgersen, 2006; Barros, 2016). Yet quantitative studies are also hampered by 
the fact that the observable features of regimes are likely to be “equivocal indicators” of 
actually extant power relations (Barros, 2016, 954). As a result, quantitative datasets are 
likely to feature large amounts of ‘noise’ and relatively limited information, arising from 
high levels of aggregation in how variables are coded and mistaken judgements by 
45 
 
outsiders (e.g., Morgenbesser, 2018). Using both approaches in combination therefore 
maximises the breadth of data that can be drawn on to answer the research question, 
balancing the weaknesses that arise from using each approach in isolation and gaining a 
more complete understanding of the connection between authoritarian politics and civil 
resistance (Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989).  
Qualitative case studies are particularly useful for validating quantitative studies of 
authoritarianism which rely on aggregated data, use uncertain operationalisation of 
indicators, or produce mixed results (Art, 2016). This is relevant in this study, as the 
indirect indicator for personalisation that I use in the quantitative component, the 
autocrat’s time in power, is derived primarily from theoretical arguments, and as yet has 
relatively limited direct evidence in its favour. Hence, the qualitative component is able to 
evaluate whether it is indeed suitable, or whether and alternative needs to be developed. 
Qualitative case studies are also particularly useful for explaining outlier or deviant cases 
(Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007).18 They are able to examine whether an outlier 
is indeed an idiosyncratic case, and so can safely be ignored without challenging the 
overall validity of the theory or quantitative results, or whether these need to be revisited 
in light of new information that is revealed.  
Mixed methods is thus an ideal approach for studying authoritarian politics, as combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods can make up for weaknesses of a single-method 
approach, test the validity of existing measures, and potentially gain new information that 
can be used for theory development and testing.  
 
3.2. Research design overview 
By its nature, mixed methods features a wide variety of research designs. Design 
typologies are likewise complex and numerous, classifying types on the basis of simple 
features like the number of research phases or using complex distinctions such as the 
researcher’s position on synergy of multiple approaches (Nastasi, Hitchcock & Brown, 
2010). However, a simple distinction can be made between complex or advanced designs 
and basic designs (Creswell, 2016). Complex designs typically involve multiple stages or 
an iterative research design, and are more appropriate for large projects involving longer 
timeframes and multiple researchers. Basic designs instead consist of two stages, one 
qualitative and one quantitative, and are best suited for smaller-scale, individual projects 
(Creswell, 2016). Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) identify three main variants, as shown 
in Table 3.1 (next page). 
  
                                                        
 
18 Cf. Colaresi & Mahmood (2017), who emphasise the importance of detailed case knowledge for 
explaining outliers and highlighting likely omitted variables in order to iteratively improve 
quantitative models in the machine learning field. 
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Table 3.1: Basic mixed methods research designs 
Sequential quan → qual Qualitative data is used to explain or confirm 
initial quantitative results 
 
Sequential qual → quan Quantitative data is used to test or evaluate the 




Quantitative and qualitative phases are 
implemented interactively or in parallel 
 
Source: Plano Clark & Ivankova (2016) 
Basic designs are most appropriate for projects by graduate students, who must work 
individually and have more limited time, experience, and skills than established 
researchers. This project therefore uses a basic sequential quan → qual model, also 
referred to as an ‘explanatory’ design (Creswell, 2016). In many mixed methods projects 
one of the components is ‘weighted’, that is, given more of an emphasis than the other 
(Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Reasons to attribute greater weight to one component 
include the methodological background or inclinations of the researcher, a feature of the 
research questions itself, or a desire to reduce the total time spent on a project (Creswell, 
Plano Clark & Garrett, 2008). In this thesis, however, I have attempted to balance both the 
quantitative and qualitative components as much as possible. 
The research design thus consists of two components that each have distinct but 
complementary purposes. The initial quantitative component is a large-n analysis carried 
out on a global sample of civil resistance campaigns. It asks the question: is there a 
consistent and statistically significant correlation between personalisation of power and 
civil resistance success? Although, as is well known, correlation does not imply causation, 
establishing an association is essential as correlation is a necessary condition of causation. 
If no correlation were found, this would count as strong evidence against the theory of 
personalism increasing the vulnerability of regimes to civil resistance. The quantitative 
component also establishes the generalisability of the findings, as the use of a global 
sample shows that the connection between personal autocracy and campaign outcome is 
not restricted to a particular geographic area.  
Large-n quantitative analysis can establish the existence of a statistically significant 
correlation, but is more limited in its ability to provide evidence for the underlying 
processes connecting the independent and dependent variables (George & Bennett, 
2006). The qualitative component thus builds on the quantitative findings by filling in 
these gaps in the story, making ‘causal process observations’ (Mahoney, 2010) that 
establish the existence of the proposed mechanisms connecting personalisation to civil 
resistance success. It is thus intended to show that the correlation identified in the 
quantitative component is actually explained by the theory, and not the result of some 
other related or unrelated factors. Using two case studies, the qualitative component does 
this by first, looking for positive evidence that the independent variable (i.e., 
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personalisation) actually existed as predicted by the theory and quantitative analysis, and 
second, examining whether the processes leading from personalisation to campaign 
outcome closely match those that would be expected from the theory, or whether an 
alternative does a better job of explaining the outcome. The qualitative component also 
explores the relationship between personalisation and civil resistance in more detail to 
look for important features that have been missed in the theory building and quantitative 
testing stages or may lead to new avenues of inquiry. 
The two components are not carried out in isolation; as noted above, integration is a key 
feature of mixed methods studies (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). The first point 
at which integration occurs is in the connection of the quantitative and qualitative 
components: the cases for qualitative analysis are sampled on the basis of the quantitative 
results. This point is returned to in more detail below. The second point of integration is 
at the conclusion stage, where both sets of findings are combined to draw overall ‘meta-
inferences’ regarding the research question; a meta-inference is “an overall conclusion, 
explanation or understanding developed through and integration of the inferences 
obtained from the qualitative and quantitative strands of a mixed method study” 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2008, 101).  
The conclusion not only uses the findings to answer the research question, but also 
evaluates how well the two components ‘fit’, that is, the coherence of the quantitative and 
qualitative findings (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). There are three general outcomes: 
confirmation, where the results from both components confirm each other; expansion, 
where the findings diverge and address different—ideally, complementary—aspects of 
the focus of investigation; and discordance, where qualitative and quantitative findings 
are inconsistent or in conflict with each other (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). Although 
discordant findings may be difficult to explain, they do not necessarily undermine the 
conclusions of the study. Indeed, as Moffat et al., (2006, 28), point out, “the investigation 
of such differences may be as illuminating as their points of similarity”, by identifying new 
areas for investigation and thus offering an opportunity for more in-depth analysis of the 
phenomenon. Responses to discordant findings include gathering additional data to 
conduct further analysis, or explicitly discussing reasons for the contradictory results and 
identifying potential theoretical explanations that can be followed up in future research 
(Moffat et al., 2006; Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). 
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3.3. Quantitative component 
The purpose of the quantitative component of the study is to test whether there is a 
plausible connection between personalisation of power and the outcome of civil 
resistance campaigns, as proposed in the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. 
This section gives an explanation of the principles and techniques that are used in the 
quantitative component of the study, the results of which are presented in Chapter 4. It 
includes a definition of the relevant universe of cases for analysis; model specification, 
including issues related to uncertainty over the correct model specification due to the lack 
of existing theoretical guidance; and an explanation and justification of the specific focus 
on testing the predictive ability of the models that are presented.  
 
3.3.1. Approach to quantitative analysis 
Most quantitative research in political science is what Shmueli (2010, 291) labels 
explanatory modelling, the “application of statistical models to data for testing causal 
hypotheses about theoretical constructs”. In other words, explanatory modelling uses 
statistical analysis—typically regression models carried out on observational data—in 
order to test theoretical explanations of why phenomena occur. In this approach, 
statistical analysis follows theory building and operationalisation, and is primarily used 
to obtain estimates of the direction, size, and statistical significance of the effects of 
variables that are intended to capture underlying processes. Successful explanation is 
achieved when modelled values fit the observed data as accurately as possible. 
Explanation is not the only possibility, however, and prediction is becoming increasingly 
advocated as an alternative approach (e.g., Ward, Greenhill & Bakke, 2010; Schrodt, 2014; 
Muchlinski et al., 2015; Hegre et al., 2017; Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017). Predictive 
modelling is “the process of applying a statistical model or data mining algorithm to data 
for the purpose of predicting new or future observations” (Shmueli, 2010, 291). Predictive 
modelling is conceptually distinguishable from explanatory modelling, as although high 
explanatory power is often assumed to entail or be a necessary condition for high 
predictive power, the two are not necessarily connected (Shmueli, 2010). This has been 
clearly illustrated by Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke’s (2010) evaluation of Fearon and 
Laitin’s (2003) well-known study of the conditions which favour civil war, which shows 
that although the covariates that Fearon and Laitin identify have high statistical 
significance and explanatory power, they predict conflict onset poorly. Indeed, prediction 
using tools such as data mining and machine learning can be completely atheoretical 
(Shmueli, 2010), although in political science it is typically used as an alternative method 
of testing causal explanations as well as a goal in its own right (e.g., Cranmer & Desmarais, 
2017). As a means of testing causal explanations, in particular, predictive modelling is 
argued to avoid some of the problems that have been repeatedly highlighted with the 
more traditional use of null-hypothesis significance testing on observational data using p-
values as the primary criterion of significance (see, e.g., Achen, 2002; Ward, Greenhill & 
Bakke, 2010; Schrodt, 2014).  
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Although some remain sceptical about the utility of prediction (see Shmueli, 2010), 
prediction is held by its proponents to be an integral part of the scientific process, and as 
Schrodt (2014, 289) points out, in other areas of scientific inquiry accurate prediction is 
considered to be “the epitome of validation of a theory.” This is because prediction can be 
strongly confirmed in a way that regression cannot—outcomes are either predicted 
accurately or they are not. Predictive testing thus provides a ‘reality check’ for causal 
explanations, as well as offering the potential to provide meaningful policy guidance 
(Singer, 1973; Shmueli, 2010; Hegre et al., 2017). Even a finding that events cannot be 
predicted easily can be useful, as it can help to target researchers’ efforts into more 
productive areas and give practical notice that some events are always likely to be a 
surprise (Shmueli, 2010); Chenoweth and Ulfelder’s (2017) finding that civil resistance 
campaign onset cannot be predicted accurately using existing models is an example of this 
latter point in practice. Predictive testing is also useful for improving statistical models. 
‘Garbage can’ or ‘kitchen sink’ regressions which contain large numbers of variables are 
vulnerable to overfit, as adding additional variables nearly always improves model fit by 
capturing noise in the data without meaningfully identifying underlying processes 
(Achen, 2002; Ward, Greenhill & Bakke, 2010; Muchlinski et al., 2015). Both overfit 
models and underfit models—those which have left out important variables—will suffer 
a drop in predictive accuracy when exposed to new data caused by the same underlying 
processes (Beger, Dorf & Ward, 2014). Hence, predictive modelling can help researchers 
“steer between the rock of collinearity and the hard place of omitted variable bias” 
(Schrodt, 2014, 288; see also Cranmer & Desmarais, 2017; Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017).  
In this thesis I follow, for example, Cranmer and Desmarais (2017) in treating prediction 
as complementary to explanation, that is, as an additional test of the causal explanations 
that I have offered in Chapter 2 rather than an end in itself. Although the data I use and 
the findings that are generated could be used in forecasting the outcome of future 
nonviolent uprisings, this is less of a priority for the current research goal. The 
quantitative component thus consists of two parts. First, I use explanatory modelling to 
test the theoretical association between the establishment of personal autocracy and the 
success of nonviolent uprisings, using two measures of personal autocracy as explained 
below. In this portion of the analysis I am concerned with statistical significance and fit; I 
also use multi-model selection methods to improve the models that I have developed on 
the basis of theory. Second, I use predictive modelling to complement regression analysis 
by testing whether the models also perform well at predicting civil resistance outcomes 
on both in-sample and pseudo-out-of-sample data, as a test of whether they are capturing 
underlying causal mechanisms. 
 
3.3.2. Defining the sample 
The focus of this study is authoritarian regimes that have been challenged by mass 
campaigns using primarily nonviolent tactics. In studying dictatorships specifically I make 
the assumption that democracies and dictatorships are fundamentally different political 
systems, rather than two ends of a sliding scale. This is because in democracies popular 
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pressure can influence policy choices because regular, institutional mechanisms for 
communicating public preferences and removing policy-makers exist in the form of 
competitive elections, while in dictatorships these mechanisms serve different functions, 
as even when elections are held those in power have no intention of stepping down 
(Schedler, 2006; Morgenbesser, 2016). As a result, the causal pathways by which 
campaigns affect powerholders are likely to be different under the two forms of 
government, as public pressure which would signal voter intentions to a democratic 
government is unlikely to have the same effect on a dictatorship. As stated in the 
introduction, I therefore follow, for example, Alvarez, et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. 
(2000), Schedler (2006), Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), and Svolik (2012) in 
adopting a minimal, either/or definition of dictatorship and democracy, identifying 
authoritarian regimes as those in which the government has not been elected in free and 
competitive elections. Governments are designated as authoritarian based on Svolik 
(2012) and Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013).19  
The focus is also restricted to campaigns that aim at regime change. Other major 
nonviolent campaigns may have secessionist, anti-colonial, or anti-occupation goals, all of 
which challenge the structure of the state as a coherent entity. These campaigns are 
generally less effective than challenges to a particular government because they face 
significant barriers to attracting support from within the government and society more 
generally (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a). Territorial 
campaigns cannot usually rely on attracting support from regime elites, and do not 
necessarily require the breakdown of the ruling coalition to be successful (e.g., 
Cunningham, 2014). Like civil resistance in democracies, these campaigns are therefore 
likely to have different expected trajectories and underlying causal processes and are 
therefore excluded from this study.  
Data on campaigns is derived from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 
2.0 (NAVCO) dataset, an update of the first large-scale data project directly addressing 
nonviolent conflict (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). Although the quantitative component 
of the study does not address campaign tactics and strategies in detail, selecting 
campaigns based on criteria for inclusion in NAVCO inherently includes a substantial 
amount of information about them: campaigns are “a series of observable, continuous, 
purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” and typically have a 
name, a defined organisational structure, and a clear leadership; campaigns that involve 
a limited amount of violence, such as rock throwing or sporadic looting, are also included 
(Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013, 416).  
Campaigns are selected for the current analysis if their demands would effectively result 
in regime change. Hence, a call for free elections in a regime which relies on fraud, 
patronage, and intimidation to win, for example, is treated as a demand for regime change, 
                                                        
 
19 There are minor differences between the two datasets; designation as authoritarian by one is 
deemed sufficient for inclusion as such. See the appendix for details. 
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as meeting these requirements would necessarily result in the breakdown of the existing 
authoritarian regime (see Schedler, 2006). In order to avoid analysing so-called non-
starters, campaigns in NAVCO must involve at least 1,000 participants. NAVCO includes 
information on campaigns, both violent and nonviolent, from 1946 to 2006; in order to 
expand the sample and include important recent campaigns, such as those of the Arab 
Spring, additional campaigns from 2006 to 2013 were coded. Information sources 
including newswires from Factiva and secondary sources were used to identify events of 
anti-regime civil resistance meeting the definition used in NAVCO. A small number of 
cases recorded in NAVCO are excluded from the sample; explanations are provided in the 
appendix. In total, the dataset includes 84 cases, although three cases where outcomes 
could not unambiguously be coded were excluded from further analysis. 
One issue related to the coverage of the sample is that relatively few autocratic leaders 
survived World War II. On the other hand, there was a substantial increase in the number 
of autocrats who gained power in the years following, particularly following the 
establishment of new communist regimes during the early stages of the Cold War and new 
autocratic regimes resulting from decolonisation movements. As I discuss below in more 
detail, personalisation is associated with time in power, so ‘young’ regimes are unlikely to 
have experienced a high degree of personalisation. As a result, the unusually high 
proportion of young regimes during the initial decades following World War II is likely to 
create bias, as it is more unlikely than usual to observe personalised regimes during this 
period.20 In addition, it has been pointed out that there may be selection effects creating 
inconsistencies in the earlier part of the NAVCO data (e.g., Lehoucq, 2016). Hence, as well 
as carrying out analysis on the full sample from 1946 onwards, I also re-estimate models 
on a restricted sample from 1970-2013. Admittedly, the 1970 cut-off is somewhat 
arbitrary, but it has been chosen in an attempt to balance the importance of ensuring even 
sample coverage with the undesirable exclusion of important cases of civil resistance such 




The dependent variable is campaign outcome. This is classified as either success or failure 
in a limited sense: campaigns are labelled as successful if they result in the breakdown of 
the regime, which I operationalise as the autocrat either stepping down or initiating a 
transition away from the incumbent regime directly in response to the civil resistance 
campaign. Failures are defined as campaigns which do not meet these conditions, 
regardless of what other reforms or mid- to long-term benefits they may have achieved. 
                                                        
 
20 Thanks to participants at a seminar presenting this research project at the Department of 




The model developed here attempts to explain only the process by which mass protests 
can lead to the breakdown of an authoritarian ruling coalition, and does not speak to 
longer-term effects of campaigns, particularly post-transition outcomes. Hence 
democratisation or other normatively-desirable goals are not included as part of the 
measure of campaign outcome. 
 
Independent variables 
Two measures of the autocrat’s consolidation of personal power are included as 
independent variables. The first is the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) (GWF) typology, 
the most prominent in the comparative authoritarianism field. This identifies personalist 
regimes as those in which “control over policy, leadership selection, and the security 
apparatus is in the hands of a […] narrower group centered around an individual dictator”, 
contrasting this with rule through a monarchical ruling family, dominant party, or military 
hierarchy (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014, 318). Although the authors do not explicitly 
set out their rules for classifying hybrids, I operate here under the assumption that 
regimes classified as personalist or personalist hybrid have experienced a substantial 
degree of consolidation of power by the ruler, with hybrid regimes—such as personal-
party or personal-military—indicating that the ruler has consolidated power but 
maintains either a party structure or military hierarchy as the main institution of rule 
(see, e.g., Morgenbesser, 2018).21 Hence, I use classification as a personal or personal-
hybrid regime type in the GWF typology as an indicator of personal autocracy, with 
classification as another type an indicator of a power-sharing regime. 
The second measure is the autocrat’s time in office at the beginning of the peak campaign 
year, as explained in Chapter 2. I define the peak year as the highest level of observable, 
public civil resistance activity and code based on campaign descriptions from NAVCO and 
secondary sources, cross-referenced with newswires from Factiva. Autocrat entry and 
exit dates are taken from Svolik (2012), cross-referenced with dates available at 
http://rulers.org, and rounded to the nearest year. 
One alternative explanation for any association between time in power and civil 
resistance outcome is that time in office is in fact capturing the ruler’s advancing age. 
Aging autocrats may decrease elites’ time horizons for obtaining a return on their 
investment of support, as the spectre of ill health or succession looms.22 Thus, any positive 
association may instead be due to the inherent connection between time in office and 
advancing age, rather than personalisation of power.  
                                                        
 
21 As the relationship between personal-hybrid regimes and personalisation as described in this 
thesis is not entirely clear from the available documentation, I have also conducted robustness 
tests using only the ‘personal’ regime type; see the appendix for details. 
22 See, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. Foreign Policy, September 18, 2012. “In 
Sickness and in Health: Why Leaders Keep Their Illnesses Secret.” 
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A second competing explanation is that the relationship between time in office and 
campaign outcome is related to the length of the ruling coalition spell rather than the 
tenure of the individual autocrat. The ruling coalition spell is a period of rule where the 
same basic system of formal and informal rules governing policy decisions and 
government appointments remains in place; this is independent of the tenure of 
individual leaders. That is, there can be multiple leaders within a single ruling coalition 
spell; the ruling coalition spell can correspond with the rule of a single leader; or, as is 
shown to be the case in the Philippines under Marcos in Chapter 5, the leader can alter 
the makeup of the ruling coalition to such an extent that their tenure can cover multiple 
ruling coalition spells.23 If a relationship between ruling coalition spell duration and 
campaign outcome exists, it would substantially undermine the argument presented here, 
which focuses on the individual rather than system level.  
In order to rule out these competing explanations, I therefore include the leader’s age and 
the length of the ruling coalition’s time in power at the beginning of the campaign’s peak 
year to test whether these alternative time-related factors are also associated with 
campaign outcome. Leader age is taken from http://rulers.org, while length of ruling 
coalition spell is taken from Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013).24  
Several independent variables plausibly associated with both civil resistance campaign 
outcome and the autocrat’s time in office are included. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) 
find that civil resistance campaigns are becoming more successful over time. This may be 
due to a learning or emulation effect, as participants in successful campaigns pass on 
knowledge of tactics and strategy to other campaigners (see, e.g., Beissinger, 2007; 
Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017). For example, student leaders of the Otpor! civil resistance 
movement in Serbia such as Srdja Popovic have actively been involved in disseminating 
civil resistance knowledge to activists in other authoritarian regimes.25 Conversely, 
Cuaresma, Oberhofer, and Raschky (2011) find that from 1980 to 2004 dictators on 
average stayed in power longer than their predecessors. This may also be in part due to 
an authoritarian learning effect, as there is evidence to suggest that authoritarian leaders 
are adapting to the threat of nonviolent uprisings (e.g., Chen, 2010; Heydemann & 
Leenders, 2011) as well as becoming more sophisticated at handling dissent and retaining 
control in general (e.g., Morgenbesser, forthcoming). While the direction of the effect of 
the passage of time is therefore unclear at this stage, campaign peak year is included as 
an independent variable to account for the effect.  
In general, research on the ‘resource curse’ has found that oil production is strongly 
associated with authoritarian durability (Ross, 2015). In fact, while natural resources 
                                                        
 
23 As noted in Section 1.3, Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) 
use the term ‘regime’ here, while I instead adopt the term ‘ruling coalition spell’ to avoid 
ambiguity. 
24 Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) coding of ruling coalition spell duration is also used, but the 
substantive findings do not change; see the online appendix for details. 
25 See https://canvasopedia.org. 
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such as timber, minerals, or precious gemstones have been argued to have an impact on 
specific authoritarian regimes, oil is the only resource that is consistently found to be 
associated with authoritarian strength across regimes, and is typically the key variable in 
studies of the link between natural resources and authoritarianism (Ross, 2015). 
Cuaresma, Oberhofer, and Raschky (2011) find that oil production has a positive effect on 
leader tenure by providing an easily-exploitable source of economic rents that can be 
distributed to supporters and used to finance repression (see also Wright, Frantz, and 
Geddes, 2015). Hence oil production is included to control for this effect; the unit is 
thousands of barrels of crude oil and natural gas produced per day, with figures obtained 
from Etemad, Luciani, Bairoch, and Toutain (1991) and the United States Energy 
Information Administration.  
Legislatures may impact campaign outcome by making autocracies more stable 
regardless of whether they are power-sharing regimes or personal autocracies. For 
example, Svolik (2012, 111-112) finds that legislatures both increase the durability of 
ruling coalition spells and decrease the probability of leadership change due to all 
domestic causes, including coups d’état, popular uprisings, and assassination. This is 
likely to be because legislatures moderate intra-elite conflict by acting as a venue for 
negotiation, as well as allow elites to monitor the power-sharing agreement and thus 
decrease the likelihood of a transition to personal autocracy (Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012). 
The presence of legislatures is coded based on Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), the 
CIA World Factbook, and country reports from Freedom House, and lagged one year to 
account for possible institutional change as a result of a nonviolent uprising. 
Military regimes have been found to break down more readily than other forms of 
governments in general, and military dictators have a shorter average tenure than other 
leaders (Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2012; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014). This is argued to 
be because military leaders value the cohesion of the military as an organisation over 
holding power, preferring to withdraw from power rather than risk intra-elite conflict 
leading to the breakdown of the military hierarchy (Geddes, 1999). It may also be due to 
the military’s strong pre-existing organisational structure making it easier for the ruling 
coalition to coordinate to remove a leader who threatens the power-sharing agreement 
(e.g., Frantz & Ezrow, 2011), thus reducing the likelihood that military rulers will be able 
to establish a personal autocracy. For regression based on autocrat tenure, military 
regimes are coded based on Magaloni, Chu, and Min’s (2013) (MCM) classification of 
regime type, as unlike Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) this typology does not include 
a personalist type. 
Svensson and Lindgren (2011a) find that ethnic divisions between opposition and regime 
supporters decrease the likelihood of campaign success. Although this factor has yet to be 
addressed explicitly in cross-national studies of authoritarian durability, anecdotal 
evidence from regimes such as Syria under Bashar al-Assad and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
suggest that leaders are more resilient if their ruling coalition and core supporters are 
drawn from a particular ethnic group while others are excluded, as this increases the costs 
associated with defection (see also Nepstad, 2011). I conceive of ethnic divisions here as 
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meaning that the campaign and the regime draw on different ethnic groups as their 
primary support base, without considering more complex factors such as levels of ethnic 
fragmentation, polarisation, or otherwise. Ethnic divisions between protestors and the 
regime are coded based on Svensson and Lindgren’s (2011a) data and updated to include 
additional cases in this dataset with reference to existing case studies and other 
secondary sources.  
GDP per capita functions as a proxy measure for state administrative and coercive 
capacity across regime types (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), and so is included, logged and 
lagged one year. Although economic crises often precipitate mass protests, and might be 
assumed to play a role in explaining whether they lead to regime collapse or not, previous 
work has found that there is no consistent relationship between GDP per capita 
downturns and authoritarian regime breakdown, both in general and specifically in 
response to nonviolent uprisings (Teorell, 2010; Svolik, 2012); hence, change in GDP per 
capita is not included.  
An additional macro-social factor that is included is population size, as this has been found 
to be negatively associated with both campaign outcome (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) 
and leader tenure (Boix and Svolik, 2013). The underlying causal mechanisms explaining 
this connection are not well elucidated in existing work, although it may be related to the 
influence of the need to have stronger institutions in order to manage larger populations 
on regime stability (cf. Slater and Fenner, 2011). Nevertheless, to control for any 
systematic variation in either regime stability or the likelihood of civil resistance success 
between smaller and larger states, logged population size is recorded for the campaign 
peak year.  
International factors are often attributed a major role in influencing the outcome of civil 
resistance campaigns, particularly the support or opposition of the United States and 
other Western governments (e.g., Levitsky & Way, 2005). However, in this thesis I am 
primarily interested in domestic factors that influence regime survival or breakdown, 
especially power struggles amongst regime elites; while these may be influenced by 
international considerations, my assumption here is that they are not in themselves 
completely determined by international factors. Hence, in building the quantitative 
models I have largely excluded international factors such as cold war rivalries, the 
relationship of the government to global or regional powers, international sanctions, or 
otherwise from analysis. 
The independent variables, expected effect on campaign outcome, and data sources are 




Table 3.2: Summary of independent variables 
Variable Expected effect on 
campaign success 
Source 
Autocrat time in power Positive Svolik (2012); http://rulers.org 
Personalist regime type Positive Geddes, Wright & Frantz (2014) 
Autocrat age Positive http://rulers.org 
Duration of ruling 
coalition spell 
Unclear Magaloni, Chu & Min (2013); 
Geddes, Wright & Frantz 
Campaign peak year Unclear Chenoweth & Stephan (2011); 
my coding 
Protest size Positive Chenoweth & Stephan (2011); 
my coding 
Military regime type Positive Magaloni, Chu & Min (2013) 
Log population size Negative Gleditsch (2002) 
Log GDP per capita Negative Gleditsch (2002) 
Ethnic divisions between 
protestors and regime 
Negative Svensson & Lindgren (2011a); 
my coding 
Oil production Negative Etemad, Luciani, Bairoch, and 
Toutain (1991); U.S. EIA. 
Legislature present Negative Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland 







Separate explanatory and predictive tests are carried out, including measures of overall 
model accuracy as well as goodness-of-fit and validation tests. All of the tests were carried 
out in R (64 bit) version 3.4.1 in Windows 10.  
 
Explanatory tests 
Correlational tests are carried out to examine whether the establishment of personal 
autocracy explains the outcome of civil resistance campaigns well. Mean and median 
testing is taken as a starting point; Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U and t-tests are used to 
examine whether there is a statistically significant difference in the distribution of leader 
tenure for successful versus unsuccessful civil resistance campaigns. As Schrodt (2014) 
points out, these tests are simple yet robust and require few ancillary assumptions.  
Regression analysis is then used to control for the effect of potential confounding 
variables. Because the outcome is coded as binary—either success or failure—logistic 
regression is appropriate. Typical ordinary least squares (OLS) regression measures the 
correlation between an independent variable X and a dependent variable Y using the 
equation, 
𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋 
where β1 indicates the effect on Y of a one-unit increase in X and β0 is the intercept, i.e., 
the value of Y when X is 0. This equation can return an infinite range of values for Y, which 
would be would be difficult to translate to an outcome where there are only two 
possibilities. To deal with these kinds of categorical outcomes, logistic regression instead 
uses a mathematical function to constrain the possible output of the regression equation 
to between 0 and 1. The equation for logistic regression is,  









The result of the equation can be interpreted as the estimated probability of Y occurring, 
given the value(s) of X (Freedman, 2005, 123). The term x is the sum of the variables X1 
through XK (for K independent variables) multiplied by their estimated coefficients β1 
through βK, so can also be written,  
𝑌 =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛽0+ 𝛽1X1+⋯𝛽𝐾X𝐾)
 
As with OLS, the coefficient βi is the estimated effect of a one-unit increase in variable Xi 
on Y. These figures are calculated using maximum likelihood estimation; because of the 
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relatively small sample size (n ⪅ 200), these estimates are likely to be biased away from 
zero, so a correction based on Firth’s (1993) penalty is used.26  
While the direction and statistical significance of individual coefficients can be 
understood as per OLS regression, the value is less easy to interpret, so I also present 
these as odds ratios. The odds ratio is the probability of an outcome occurring relative to 
the probability of it not occurring; hence for example, if the probability of success is p = 
0.6 and the probability of failure is 1-p = 0.4, then the odds ratio is 0.6 / 0.4 = 1.5. In other 
words, the odds ratio is how much more likely an event is to occur than to not occur 
(Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010). It is calculated by taking the exponent of the coefficient given 
by logistic regression,  
𝑂𝑅 = 𝑒𝛽𝑖  
An odds ratio above 1 indicates that a one-unit increase in a variable increases the 
likelihood of success relative to failure, while an odds ratio below 1 indicates that a one-
unit increase in a variable decreases the likelihood of success relative to failure. Although 
it does not give a direct indication of the actual probability itself, the odds ratio can thus 
easily be interpreted as a measure of the relative size of the impact of a given variable on 
the outcome.  
In addition to individual coefficient estimates, a number of diagnostic tests are carried 
out. To check for multicollinearity, or close association between any of the independent 
variables—which can result in biased coefficient estimates and resulting distorted values 
for statistics such as p-values—I examine the correlation matrix, which gives pairwise 
correlations for the independent variables I have identified. Lower values indicate that 
multicollinearity is less likely to be an issue. I also report the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
for each variable in the models I develop, which indicates the degree to which an 
independent variable increases the variance of coefficient estimates. Values closer to 1 
indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem, while values above 10—sometimes 
lower—are generally taken to indicate that it is an issue (see, e.g., O’Brien, 2007). To aid 
readability and interpretation of Chapter 4, these tests are presented in the appendix. 
I also check model fit, or how well values predicted by the model match the actual values 
observed in the data. There are a number of possible statistics that can be used for this. In 
OLS regression, a commonly-reported measure is the R2 value, which ranges from 0 to 1 
and gives an overall indication of what proportion of the variance in the data is accounted 
for by the model. For logistic regression, however, calculating this statistic is not possible, 
and so it is more common to report pseudo-R2 values (Hilbe, 2009). However, there are a 
number of issues with this statistic. For instance, there are at least seven different pseudo-
R2 statistics, most of which measure different things, and there is little guidance as to 
which should be used for a given purpose (Hoetker, 2007). In addition, pseudo-R2 does 
not have the same meaning as R2 for OLS regression—indeed, pseudo-R2 statistics 
                                                        
 
26 This was carried out using the ‘brglm’ package in R (Kosmidis, 2017). 
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generally have no inherent meaning in themselves—yet the similar name can easily cause 
confusion for readers, who may see it as a direct indicator of model fit (Hoetker, 2007). 
As a result, some statisticians (e.g., Long, 1997; Hoetker, 2007) are sceptical about its use. 
For these reasons, I have opted to not report pseudo-R2 values. Instead, I report the area 
under the curve (AUC) score as an indicator of model fit; as this is based on predictive 
accuracy, I explain this in measure in the following section. 
Likelihood-ratio (LR) tests can be used to test whether different model specifications can 
significantly improve model fit. As with pseudo-R2 values, some are sceptical of the 
usefulness of LR tests, (e.g., Hilbe, 2009), yet they remain a commonly-reported statistic. 
Hence, I report LR test values for the models versus more restricted models consisting of 
only the intercept, indicating whether the specified models significantly improve fit. The 
related Wald test is also often used for this purpose; however, for smaller datasets (such 
as this one) the two tests can return different results, and the LR may be more appropriate 
(Long, 1997).  
An additional goodness-of-fit test that may be a better measure for logistic regression is 
the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (Hilbe, 2009). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test identifies groups 
of observations in the dataset where discrepancies between predicted and actual 
outcomes are occurring. It does this by dividing the dataset by predicted Y values—in this 
case, campaign outcome—and measures the distribution of expected outcomes against 
observed outcomes to compute a test statistic; non-significant p-values (p > 0.05) are 
considered evidence of good model fit (Hilbe, 2009).27 These values are therefore also 
reported. 
Whether model fit can be improved using a competing model or by adding or dropping 
individual variables is then measured using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
(Akaike, [1973] 1998; Burnham & Anderson, 2002, 2004). Less common in political 
science, AIC-based model selection is an approach to dealing with modelling uncertainty 
which has been widely adopted in fields such as ecology, where researchers are often 
faced with similar challenges of many plausible independent variables, relatively few 
observations, and limited theoretical guidance for building models (e.g., Burnham & 
Anderson, 2002; Arnold, 2010). AIC is based on Kullback-Leibler Divergence (K-L), a 
measure of the amount of information that is lost when we approximate an underlying 
process (in this case, ‘reality’) with a model (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). If full reality 
was known, this could be measured directly. As it is not, however, K-L can only be 
estimated. AIC does this using the following equation: 
AIC = – 2 log(?̂?) +  2𝐾 
                                                        
 
27 The default number of divisions is 10, which can cause problems when there are too few 
observations in each division; I thus also test a number of divisions for each model, with p-values 
consistently being above 0.05 considered equivalent evidence of good fit, although the specific 
figures may vary (Hilbe, 2009).  
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where L̂ is the maximum likelihood value of the model and K is the number of estimated 
parameters in the model (i.e. for y = a + bx, K = 2).28 For small samples (where n/K ⪅ 40) 
a bias correction is included which imposes an extra penalty for additional parameters.: 




AIC thus selects models that are more parsimonious, based on how much of the variation 
in the data they describe (model fit) balanced against their complexity (number of 
parameters). The AIC value itself has no intrinsic meaning, but is instead used to compare 
models that describe the data. 
In this thesis I use AIC in two ways. First, I use it to measure the relative importance of 
individual variables using the w+(j) statistic (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). This gives an 
estimate of how sure we can be that a given variable should be included in a model 
describing the data. It is obtained by summing the Akaike weight wi—that is, the evidence 
in favour of a given model on the basis of AIC—for all models which include the variable 
xj. This gives the figure 0 ≤ w+(j) ≤ 1; the closer w+(j) is to 1, the more evidence there is 
that variable j should be used to describe the data. As a general guideline, values of 0.9 or 
higher indicate strong evidence in favour of the variable, values from 0.6-0.9 moderate 
evidence, values from 0.5-0.6 only very weak evidence and anything below 0.5 essentially 
negligible (Burnham & Anderson, 2002, 75-77).  
Second, I use AIC to select the model or models that describe the data the most 
parsimoniously, that is, with the best model fit balanced against the risk of overfit. In order 
to do this, I first create a complete model consisting of all of the plausible independent 
variables listed above. This provides the set of nested ‘candidate models’, consisting of 
each unique combination of variables from the complete model.29 The AIC value for each 
candidate model is then calculated and the models ranked. Lower AIC values indicate 
comparatively stronger evidence in favour of a given model compared to other candidates 
(Burnham & Anderson, 2004). The resulting model(s) are then assessed in the same way 
as the original models. 
 
Predictive tests 
Predictive tests are then used to examine how well the models I develop here predict the 
outcome of civil resistance campaigns. The basis for evaluating predictive accuracy is the 
                                                        
 
28 The likelihood of a model is the probability of observing the actual data given a set of parameter 
values. Maximum likelihood estimation produces parameters for the model that maximises this 
value, and is the standard method of obtaining model parameters in quantitative political science. 
For an overview of the link between maximum likelihood estimation and K-L see Burnham and 
Anderson (2002, 60-61). 
29 For a given global model with k variables there are 2𝑘 possible models, hence there are 212 = 
4096 candidate models for this study (see 3.3.3.c). 
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2x2 confusion matrix (also known as a contingency table), which measures predicted 
outcomes versus actual outcomes, shown in Table 3.3: 
 
Table 3.3: Confusion matrix for evaluating predictive accuracy 
  Actual outcome 
  Positive Negative 
Predicted 
outcome 
Positive True positive 
False positive 
Type I error 
Negative 
False negative 
Type II error 
True negative 
Source: Fawcett (2006) 
 
‘Positive’ means that an outcome occurred; hence a true positive in this study is a 
nonviolent revolution which is correctly predicted by the model(s), a false positive is a 
failed campaign that is predicted as a success, and likewise for the remaining categories. 
From the confusion matrix, a number of measures of accuracy can be calculated. Of 
particular relevance are: 
• True positive rate (also called recall or sensitivity), the proportion of all positives 
cases correctly predicted as such. 
• False positive rate, the proportion of all negative cases incorrectly predicted as 
such. 
• Specificity (also called true negative rate), the proportion of all negative cases 
correctly predicted as such. 
• Precision, the proportion of positive predictions that are actually positive cases. 
 
An ideal model would have both its true positive rate and true negative rate close to 1, 
meaning that it classifies all of the observed cases into the correct category. In practice, 
however, models virtually always make at least some incorrect classifications. Thus, there 
is a need to make a trade-off between making the making models ‘liberal’ or 
‘conservative’; liberal models make positive classifications with weak evidence, thus 
capturing many true positives but also allowing in false positives, while conservative 
models have high thresholds for positive classifications, thus having few errors but also 
missing genuine positive cases (Fawcett, 2006).  
The trade-off between true and false positive rates can be visualised using a receiver 




Figure 3.2: Receiver operating characteristic graph 
 
 
The false positive rate is on the x axis, while the true positive rate is on the y axis. The top-
left point of the graph indicates perfect prediction, i.e., correct classification of every 
positive case with no incorrect positives. The bottom-right point is the inverse, i.e., where 
every prediction made by the model is incorrect. The dashed diagonal line represents 
points where the models is 50% accurate, or in other words, where the models’ 
predictions are equivalent to randomly guessing or flipping a coin. Thus, any points above 
the diagonal represent predictions that are better than random, while any points below it 
indicate predictions that are actively worse than guessing (Fawcett, 2006). 
Individual points on the ROC graph represent accuracy when a predicted value is binary 
(either positive or negative). Yet many predicted outcomes will take on continuous values, 
and thus for decision making a threshold value needs to be imposed to classify the result 
(Fawcett, 2006). In most cases, however, this threshold is necessarily arbitrary. Instead, 
an ROC curve can be plotted, showing the true positive versus false positive rate for all 
possible threshold values, indicating a model’s ability to differentiate between positive 
and negative instances without relying on an arbitrary threshold value, as shown in Figure 





Figure 3.3: Comparing ROC curves 
 
 
To compare the predictive accuracy of different curves, ROC performance can be reduced 
to the area under the curve or AUC, i.e., the area between a curve and the x axis (Fawcett, 
2006). Hence, even though curve B has a better true positive rate at some points, the 
higher AUC of curve A means that it is overall a better predictor. The AUC value is 
equivalent to the probability that the model in question will rank a randomly chosen 
positive case higher than a randomly chosen negative case (Fawcett, 2006). AUC values 
are between 0 and 1, with a score of 1 indicating that the model has a perfect ability to 
distinguish between positive and negative cases, with 0.5 equivalent to randomly 
guessing and figures below 0.5 worse than guessing (Fawcett, 2006). In studies of political 
conflict values above 0.7 can be considered good, values over 0.8 very good, and values 
over 0.9 excellent.30 The AUC thus provides a single, easy-to-interpret indicator of a 
models’ predictive ability which can be used to compare it to other candidates. 
Unlike explanatory modelling, diagnostic tests for predictive modelling are primarily 
concerned with detecting overfit (Shmueli, 2010). The first step is in-sample testing, or 
testing the model’s ability to predict the outcome of the same observations that were 
originally used to generate the model. A harder test is the ability to predict the outcome 
of new, unseen cases. As Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke (2010) argue, a model that really 
                                                        
 
30 Jay Ulfelder, “Forecasting Popular Uprisings in 2011: How Are We Doing?”, Dart-Throwing 































captures the underlying relationship between independent variables and outcome should 
perform almost as well when faced with new data of the same type, while the predictive 
ability of a model that merely describes the data will be comparatively lower.  
Genuine out-of-sample testing is less than ideal for this project given the limited size of 
the sample available. However, it is possible to perform pseudo out-of-sample tests using 
cross-validation techniques. This involves dividing the dataset into two groups: the model 
is re-estimated on the first group (the training set) and then used to predict the outcomes 
of the second group (the test set). This can then be repeated for different specifications of 
the training and testing sets. The simplest technique is the holdout method, in which 
(typically) two-thirds of the data is randomly designated as the training set and the 
remaining third is the test set. The results of repeated tests are then averaged to obtain 
an estimate of the model’s accuracy. However, this tends to generate inaccurate results, 
and a better approach is to use k-fold cross-validation (Kohavi, 1995). The observations 
are randomly assigned to one of k mutually-exclusive segments (the ‘folds’). The model is 
re-estimated on k–1 segments, with the remaining segment used as the test set. This is 
repeated so that each segment is used as a test set exactly once. Repeating the entire 
process with observations re-categorised at random into new folds acts as a Monte-Carlo 
simulation to improve the accuracy of estimates (Kohavi, 1995). More complete validation 
methods are possible, such as leave-p-out tests using every possible combination of 
variables, but are more complex and may not offer an increase in accuracy (Kohavi, 1995). 
The final step in predictive modelling is model criticism (Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017). Like 
residual analysis in regression, it involves examining the difference between predicted 
and observed values—the residuals—to identify any systematic discrepancies, which 
would indicate that an important variable has been omitted from the model or that the 
model has otherwise been misspecified. This is most commonly done using residual plots 
or other visualisations of the errors, which allow patterns to readily be identified. I 
therefore conclude the quantitative component by assessing the predicted outcomes of 
the nonviolent campaigns in the dataset against the actual outcomes, looking for 
similarities between incorrectly-predicted cases; identifying clear patterns would then 
require returning to the specification stage to try and improve model performance 
(Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017). 
 
3.4. Qualitative component 
As outlined in section one, the qualitative component of the study consists of two case 
studies which corroborate and expand on the findings of the quantitative component. The 
primary method of analysis is process tracing of the individual cases to examine the 
dynamics of personalisation and civil resistance campaign; comparative analysis of both 
cases is conducted in the integration section of the thesis. There are three main areas that 
I discuss in relation to how these studies have been carried out. The first is the overall 
design, including the specific objective of each case study and the process tracing method 
that I have employed. The second is the principles that guide case selection, including the 
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sampling scheme and how the qualitative cases relate to the quantitative data. The third 
is how data collection was carried out, particularly regarding the field research 
component. This part of the study involved a number of additional challenges, relating not 
only to how field research was positioned in the context of the overall thesis, but also the 
politically sensitive nature of the research topic. These factors resulted in some potential 
issues for information quality and participant safety, so how these were dealt with is 
addressed specifically below. 
 
3.4.1. Case study design 
The primary goal of the qualitative component is to evaluate and expand on the 
quantitative findings. Within it, the case studies each serve an individual purpose, in terms 
of their relation to the theoretical argument and quantitative results, their scope and 
limitations, and how they are carried out. George and Bennett (2005, 75-76) identify six 
possible types of case study, as shown in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: Example case study objectives.  





In-depth description that can be used in subsequent 
studies but does not contribute to theory building 
itself 
Disciplined configurative Use of existing theory to explain a case, and 
highlighting areas where theory is insufficient 
Heuristic Identification of new variables, hypotheses, causal 
mechanisms, or causal pathways 
Theory testing Assesses the validity or scope conditions of single or 
competing theories 
Plausibility probe Preliminary study to examine whether further 
analysis is warranted 
Building block Examination of types or subtypes of a phenomenon 
for the purpose of building typologies 
Source: George & Bennett (2005) 
 
Within this framework, the purpose of the first case study is theory testing, that is, 
assessing the validity of the competitive weakness argument in regard to the specific case. 
Theory testing cases can either strengthen the evidence for a proposed theory by showing 
that it explains the outcomes well in a particular case, or weaken it by showing either that 
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hypothesised causes are in fact absent or that an alternative theory more accurately 
describes the process of events (George & Bennett, 2005). Cases for theory testing can be 
most likely, least likely, or crucial cases.31 For this study, I have used the People Power 
revolution against Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines as a most likely case, where the 
statistical results strongly predict that the theory should explain the outcome well. It asks 
whether Marcos indeed personalised power, as predicted by his long term in office, by 
removing constraints on his position and excluding other members of the political elite 
from control over decision-making and access to revenue. It also asks how this 
personalisation affected elites’ choices when the regime faced an external challenge, and 
what effect this had on the outcome of the campaign.  
Despite the theory testing label, the case study does not follow strict falsificationist 
principles: existing qualitative work has already argued that personalisation resulted in 
Marcos’s downfall (Thompson, 1995; Lee, 2015) and so pretending ignorance prior to 
analysis is not appropriate.32 Rather, the benefit of using a most likely case is that it would 
cast strong doubt on the theory if it does not fit the case well (Eckstein, [1975] 2009). The 
intention is therefore to illustrate the dynamics involved by examining the processes 
involved in more detail, as well as to look for any discrepancies with the theoretical 
account and quantitative results that would challenge the theoretical account of 
personalisation and its effect on elite cohesion. 
The purpose of the second case study is both theory testing and heuristic. It analyses a 
deviant or outlier case, where the predicted outcome differs greatly from the observed 
outcome, to examine whether the theory should explain this case well, or needs to be 
revised or rejected. If it is concluded that the theory ought to explain the outcome well, 
yet does not, then this is considered strong evidence against the theory. The purpose of a 
heuristic case study is also to inductively identify new variables or factors, with a 
particular focus on searching for anomalies, factors that cannot be explained by the 
existing theory, in order to challenge previous hypotheses and open up new avenues for 
investigation (George & Bennett, 2005). Because of this, heuristic case studies are 
particularly suited to analysing deviant cases (George & Bennett, 2005). In this study, 
Cambodia is identified as a particularly prominent outlier, where previous analysis 
(Strangio, 2014; Morgenbesser, 2018) and quantitative results presented in Chapter 4 
strongly imply that there was a high level of personalisation prior to the 2013 civil 
resistance campaign, but the campaign was unsuccessful in bringing about regime change. 
Both case studies are carried out using process tracing. This consists of making causal 
process observations, that is, identifying and analysing the intervening steps that connect 
personalisation with campaign success (George & Bennett, 2005, Mahoney, 2010). The 
                                                        
 
31 George and Bennett (2005) point out that these labels are slightly misleading, as they imply that 
only a single case can be ‘most likely’ or ‘least likely’; instead, cases fall on a continuum between 
most and least likely, and are selected for their relative proximity to either ideal end. 
32 Cf. Lijphart’s (1975) perhaps somewhat unrealistic criterion that researchers should know only 
the value of the single variable in question before embarking on a theory testing case study. 
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purpose of process tracing is to see whether the theory actually worked in practice in the 
manner it is hypothesised to, and thus not only identifies intervening variables but shows 
that they causally connected in particular ways that are consistent with theoretical 
expectations (George & Bennett, 2005). As large-n statistical analysis is unable to do this, 
process tracing is essential to show that the hypothesised connection between 
independent variable and outcome in fact exists.  
As with the quantitative component, while I acknowledge the impact of international 
factors—such as the withdrawal of support for the Marcos regime by the United States in 
1986, and the continued support of the Chinese government for the Hun Sen regime in 
2013—I have largely chosen to focus on domestic factors, as I am primarily interested in 
the effect of intra-regime power struggles on the campaign outcome. Hence, while I do not 
pretend that international factors play no part in influencing regime survival in response 
to civil resistance, I would turn to these factors only if internal factors prove to be 
insufficient to explain why the regimes collapsed or remained cohesive, respectively.  
In presenting qualitative case studies, a balance needs to be struck between rich detail 
that remains faithful to source material and accurately reflects the nuances of the case, 
and a more abstract analytic structure that relates clearly to the theory guiding the study 
(George & Bennett, 2005). I have attempted to do so this by first presenting summaries of 
the civil resistance campaigns to give the required context, then providing narratives of 
the process of personalisation in each instance. For the sake of clarity I have had to leave 
out a large amount of circumstantial detail, particularly in regard to the historical events 
that allowed the respective dictators in each case to rise to power in the first place; 
secondary sources cited in the text may be consulted for additional information. 
 
3.4.2. Case selection principles 
Case selection is an area that requires care, particularly in sequential or nested designs 
(Rohlfing, 2008). At its simplest, case selection can be probabilistic, where cases are 
selected using some form of random sampling, or purposive, where individual cases are 
deliberately chosen for a specific purpose (Collins, 2010). Beyond this, there are a number 
of possibilities; Collins (2010), for example, lists five random sampling schemes and 19 
purposive schemes that can be used in mixed methods research, any of which may be 
most appropriate for a given study. For the second component specifically, I have used 
purposive sampling to select the two case studies for analysis. In line with the objectives 
of the case studies outlined above, I have used a confirming/disconfirming sampling 
scheme, in Collins’s (2010) formulation, which selects cases on their ability to validate or 
contradict the initial results of the quantitative component.33 
                                                        
 
33 ‘Confirming’ in this instance should be interpreted in the general sense of ‘providing evidence 
in favour of’, rather than decisively proving the theory. 
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There are two related points that need to be addressed before moving on. The first is the 
relationship between the case studies and the quantitative results. In Lieberman’s (2005, 
437) nested analysis model, for example, comparison of on-the-line and deviant cases is 
only warranted when the initial statistical results are not deemed to be “robust and 
satisfactory.” Yet, as Lieberman acknowledges, this advice hinges on the researcher’s 
evaluation of what robust and satisfactory means. In practice, Toshkov (2016, 320) argues 
instead that testing and extending theory is better accomplished by comparing on-the-
line and deviant cases even when the statistical model does a reasonably good job, as 
there will often be notable outliers even in models that otherwise fit the data very well, 
whereas if it performs very poorly there is no point in selecting on-the-line cases as none 
really exist. Following this advice, this study uses both an on-the-line and a deviant case 
for analysis. 
The second point is whether the qualitative component should be nested or not – that is, 
whether the case studies should be cases that have already been examined in the 
quantitative component, or whether new cases should be used. Small (2011) notes that 
nesting is primarily useful where more detail is required on cases that have been used in 
the quantitative component, while non-nested designs are useful where flexibility is 
required. In this project, the Philippines case study is nested, as the purpose is to analyse 
the dynamics of a case from the quantitative component in more detail. 
In contrast, the Cambodia case study is non-nested, meaning that it is not included in the 
quantitative dataset and was not used to obtain the results presented in Chapter 4.34 The 
motivation for using a non-nested case comes from the emphasis on prediction outlined 
earlier: a good theory should do well at predicting outcomes when exposed to new data 
or cases, as this shows that it is capturing an element of the underlying causal process(es) 
and has not simply been fit to ‘noise’ in the data. Cambodia is ideal as an out-of-sample 
case, as the only reason it is not included in the quantitative analysis is because the 
campaign had not concluded one way or the other before the end of 2013, instead ending 
in January 2014. Otherwise in all respects it is clearly a case of civil resistance that is 
compatible with the definition set out in the NAVCO project, as it consisted of a sustained, 
public series of primarily nonviolent actions in pursuit of an overtly political goal, and had 
a clear leadership and organisational structure. In comparison, out-of-sample cases that 
occurred before the beginning of the sample (i.e., 1946) could be more challenging to 
study due to the difficulty of gaining detailed data. Similarly, cases which have been 
missed from NAVCO (see, e.g., Lehoucq, 2016) or other sources which have been used to 
compile the dataset would also be problematic, as it would be difficult to disentangle the 
reasons they have been missed from the reasons why the outcomes deviate from 
theoretical and quantitative predictions, hence raising questions of comparability with 
other cases in the data.  
                                                        
 
34 The Cambodia case is displayed in a visualisation of the data in section 4.1.6, but this is for 
comparative purposes only – data from Cambodia was not used to make the original calculations. 
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Note that only the principles guiding case selection are discussed here. The actual process 
of case selection, including assessment of how well the cases fit the quantitative results, 
discussion of potential alternatives, and explanation for why these particular cases were 
chosen, is set out in section 4.2 below, following presentation of the quantitative results. 
 
3.4.3. Data collection 
Data for the case studies has been drawn from secondary academic sources, particularly 
from area studies scholars focusing on the politics of the respective countries, as well as 
newspaper accounts and ‘grey literature’, i.e., government and NGO reports. For the 
Cambodia case study, I have also drawn on interview data and personal communications 
carried out during a field visit to the country from May-June 2017.  
Much of the fieldwork methods literature in political science is intended for advanced 
liberal democracies, and has little to say about the unique challenges of doing this kind of 
work in authoritarian contexts (Rivera, Kozyreva & Saravoskii, 2002; Reny, 2016). These 
can include limited access to official data on both sensitive and non-sensitive topics, 
information control and censorship, surveillance of foreign researchers, difficulties 
accessing government officials, risk to participants and consequent reluctance to 
participate in research, potential insecurity of internet communication with research 
participants, and more (Reny, 2016). As a result, as pointed out by a number of scholars 
who have done fieldwork in authoritarian countries, prospective designs are likely to 
break down when researchers actually get to the field (e.g., Malekzadeh, 2016). Therefore 
I discuss not only what was planned, but what actually happened, both to document the 
exercise and to provide more perspective on the information that has been obtained. 
 
Purpose of field research 
Qualitative fieldwork plays a “critical role” in studying authoritarian regimes, through 
providing new insights, corroborating theoretical assumptions, and acting as a foundation 
for more abstract deductive and quantitative work (Goode & Ahram, 2016, 827). For this 
thesis, in addition, there was a more specific rationale for carrying out field research in 
Cambodia, namely, the lack of empirical data that is available on both the campaign and 
the political dynamics of the regime in secondary sources.  
The lack of data is partly due to the fact that the campaign happened relatively recently, 
and so there has been little time for detailed research to be carried out and published.35 
Indeed, in some ways the events of 2013 and their aftermath are still playing out in 
                                                        
 
35 A successful campaign, of course, would likely have resulted in much more prompt and 
widespread analysis; as it is, unsuccessful or more peripheral campaigns typically receive less 
attention than successful or more dramatic cases from academics and non-academics alike (cf. 
Martin, Varney & Vickers, 2001). 
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Cambodia, with the consequences still unclear.36 On top of that, as Strangio (2014) points 
out, there is a notable lack of detailed analysis of Cambodian politics from the 2000s 
onwards, following the decline of Western interest in the country at the end of the 1990s. 
Academic research that is available is often either excellent but focused on aspects of 
Cambodian politics that are less relevant for this study (e.g., Hughes, 2003, 2006; Springer, 
2010), or based on distressingly essentialist cultural explanations for political trends (e.g., 
Jacobsen & Stuart-Fox, 2013; see Springer, 2010, for a critique).37 Similarly, non-academic 
sources, especially NGO reports, are often extremely detailed and well-researched, but are 
focused on other issues such as corruption or human rights (e.g., Global Witness, 2009; 
CCHR, 2010).  
A further problem, which became clear during field research, is the quality of information 
that is available. Access to the regime for outsiders, especially foreigners, is now virtually 
non-existent; only those very few Westerners who were able to build strong relationships 
with government officials in the 1990s and remain in the country retain any kind of 
access, and even that is becoming more restricted.38 I was told by several journalists, for 
example, that no journalists currently operating in the country have contacts within the 
ruling party, and that news reports are instead based on a combination of official 
pronouncements, rumours, and guesswork.39 While poor information quality is likely to 
be an unavoidable problem in studying any authoritarian regime, it makes disentangling 
claims based on solid evidence from those based on speculation extremely challenging; 
this is especially the case if things that ‘everybody knows’ but are in fact specious are 
repeated in academic or credible non-academic sources. 
Given this situation, in-depth interviews serve two main of purposes. First, they provide 
new information, especially regarding ‘unknown unknowns’, i.e., factors that the 
researcher is not even aware might exist or be important. Second, they can corroborate 
or challenge existing information, both directly and through offering additional 
perspectives on the reliability of the sources of that information. On top of this, time spent 
in Cambodia offered an opportunity to access the insider perspective, allowing me to 
refine my initial ideas and conclusions through conversation with those who have far 
more in-depth knowledge of the country, including its politics, history, and culture, than I 
could gain from the outside. Through this I was able to discard a number of avenues of 
inquiry that had initially appeared to be promising, but ultimately proved to have little 
                                                        
 
36 This thesis was finalised in the months leading up to the 2018 general election, and shortly after 
the dissolution of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) by the Supreme Court, 
a move effectively ordered by prime minister Hun Sen.  
37 The shock result of the 2013 general election and the subsequent civil resistance campaign 
appear, thankfully, to have put descriptions of the inherently ‘passive’ or ‘subservient’ nature of 
‘the Khmer’ to rest. 
38 Phnom Penh-based journalist, personal communication, June 2017. Markowitz (2016, 898) 
describes a similar process in Uzbekistan, where informal barriers to access increased in the early 
2000s before escalating to full closure after a crackdown on protests in 2005; access since then 
has reduced to a “trickle.” 
39 Phnom Penh-based journalist, personal communication, June 2017. 
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explanatory leverage. As the conclusion that I reach regarding the power balance within 
Cambodia’s ruling party in some ways goes against the ‘received wisdom’ regarding prime 
minister Hun Sen’s personalisation of power, this was also important for increasing my 
confidence in the overall findings of the case study that I present in Chapter 6. 
 
Design 
Research participants were selected using a purposive rather than probabilistic sampling 
scheme. Probability sampling was not appropriate because I was not carrying out a survey 
of Cambodian political elites or otherwise interested in generalising from interview data 
to a population (Tansey, 2007). Instead, I was interested in finding out specific 
information about events that have occurred in Cambodia’s recent history. Thanks to a 
grant from the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, I was also able to hire a 
research coordinator for the project. In the lead up to arriving in Cambodia my research 
coordinator was able to arrange a number of initial interviews with specific individuals 
who met the criterion of being well-informed about Cambodian politics. Additional 
participants were identified by asking interviewees, journalists, and other researchers I 
met for recommendations, as well as drawing on names mentioned in various news 
articles as important figures in Cambodian politics.  
Interviews were planned to be open-ended rather than structured or semi-structured, 
beginning with an initial, extremely broad description of the topic but otherwise left to 
evolve as the interview continued. This was an attempt to address the heuristic purpose 
of the case study and to not shape interviewees’ responses in advance. It was also an 
attempt to keep the topic of the interviews ‘boring’, i.e., minimising the political sensitivity 
around the topic (Art, 2016). But although participants in these early interviews gave me 
extremely important pieces of information of their own accord, I felt that this occurred in 
spite of rather than because of the open-ended structure, and this information could also 
have been gained through more structured interviews that did not run the same risk of 
missing key points through failing to ask targeted questions. In addition, I found that I had 
to demonstrate clearly to participants that I was well-informed about the details of 
Cambodian politics in order to avoid overly general or uninformative answers. Hence, the 
structure of later interviews was altered to include both elements of undirected ‘chit-chat’ 
that could allow ‘unknown unknowns’ to emerge, as well as targeted questions about 
specific information that I needed.  
In general, my prior lack of experience with interview methods meant that some early 
interviews were less successful than hoped for, as I missed openings for possible 
expansion on areas that later turned out to be of great interest or tried to cover too many 
topics in too short a time. But as Sæther (2006) points out, these initial difficulties are a 
common feature of fieldwork for graduate students, which typically involves a lot of trial 
and error. To facilitate the self-learning process, I kept a research diary that included 
notes on how the interviews went, as well as the content, and set aside specific time for 
critical reflection on what went well, what did not, and what I could do better next time. 
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Through this process I felt that my interviewing skills had significantly improved towards 
the end of the fieldwork period, and much of the more important material in the case 
study resulted from these later interviews. 
An additional complication was the quan → qual structure of the study: selecting cases for 
qualitative analysis on the basis of quantitative results leaves little room for incorporating 
factors such as availability, practicality, or personal familiarity into the selection process, 
particularly when there are few options to choose from, as was the case here. This issue 
has yet to receive attention in the mixed methods literature, but meant beginning the case 
study with little background knowledge, no language skills, and no established contacts 
in the country.40  
In practice, though, carrying out fieldwork as part of a mixed design did not end up posing 
major difficulties. While prior experience in Cambodia would have been helpful in many 
areas, I was still able to collect what I consider to be adequate data. To make up for lack 
of prior familiarity with the context, I read intensively on Cambodia’s history and politics 
in the several months prior to the visit, with immersion in the literature made easier by 
the flexibility of a graduate timetable. Language did not present a serious barrier: because 
of extensive Western intervention in Cambodia, most educated and politically-engaged 
Cambodians can speak English well, and the majority of interviews were carried out 
comfortably in English. My research coordinator was also able to interpret for non-
English speaking interviewees. In fact, probably the most important factor that made field 
research possible was being able to work with an excellent research coordinator who had 
extensive networks in the country; this was an invaluable part of the project, and is a key 




Getting access to government officials in authoritarian contexts is challenging even when 
the topic of research is not sensitive. Government officials may be suspicious of the 
researcher’s motives, or worry about the consequences of divulging information that they 
later find out was not permitted. Even when interviews can be secured, officials may 
prefer to toe the party line, making it difficult to get direct answers to important questions 
even for experienced researchers (Markowitz, 2016). Indeed, I found this to be the case 
in my fieldwork, and I succeeded in interviewing only three government-aligned figures.41  
                                                        
 
40 Köker (2014) provides a descriptive case study of elite interviewing as part of a nested 
framework in a graduate research project. However, the range of countries to be selected from 
was much more restricted than for this project, and the author was able to draw on existing 
language skills, experience, and contacts in several of the countries. This may be a helpful way of 
approaching the issue of integrating field research into mixed methods studies. 
41 A further complication with pushing for information was that these interviews were secured 
through my coordinator’s personal contacts; while very direct questions may have achieved a 
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As a result, it is often easier for researchers—especially those who have had limited 
engagement with the country—to speak to opposition-aligned figures, as they are more 
likely to be interested in their claims being heard. Yet this raises the potential for bias in 
the data that is collected. While opposition figures are often doing a remarkable job under 
extremely trying circumstances, they still have an agenda, and an interest in painting the 
government in as negative a light as possible. As Goode and Ahram (2016) point out, this 
means that their claims need to be treated critically and with reflexivity, so that the 
researcher does not simply repeat one-sided accounts that may not be entirely accurate.  
While it may not be possible to eliminate these potential sources of bias completely, I 
endeavoured to minimise them as much as possible using a number of strategies. The first 
is that, although I was not able to access large numbers of government officials, I tried to 
still talk to as wide a range of participants as possible, including not only opposition 
activists but also independent analysts, civil society members who at least claimed 
political neutrality, and figures critical of the opposition itself. A second strategy was to 
cross-reference any key or controversial claims with other sources, including asking 
subsequent interviewees who were not affiliated with the initial source of the claim. I also 
asked interviewees about their source for the information, such as whether they had 
gained this directly from speaking to members of the ruling party (as was sometimes the 
case) or whether it was something that ‘everybody knows’. Where uncertainty remains, 




A final important consideration was the safety of participants in the project. Despite a 
relatively long period where overt repression had been quite uncommon, Cambodia is still 
an authoritarian state, and hence there was a non-negligible risk to anyone who elected 
to speak with me about such a politically sensitive topic. The crackdown that began some 
weeks after the end of the field visit and is ongoing at the time of writing (detailed in the 
postscript at the end of the thesis) proves that this is not just an abstract idea, but that 
real consequences for criticising the government were and are possible. Indeed, following 
the field visit, one person who I had interviewed was charged with a serious crime as a 
result of a phone conversation that had been intercepted by the government, and has had 
to go into exile to avoid imprisonment as a result.42 Data from the interview had to be 
withdrawn from the thesis in response, out of concerns for further consequences for the 
participant’s safety. A second participant had their email and social media accounts 
                                                        
 
response, as Markowitz (2016) suggests, I was concerned about possible ramifications for my 
coordinator following my departure from the field.  
42 Any more details need to be omitted for the sake of anonymity; I do wish to emphasise, however, 
that the government’s accusations were unrelated to this research project, and I have no reason 
to think that any breach of security took place regarding my field recordings or notes. 
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hacked at around the same time, although they were subsequently happy to confirm 
quotes which have been included in the case study. Hence, I will describe the ethics and 
security arrangements I had planned, as well as what happened in the field. 
The field research project underwent ethics approval through the University of Otago’s 
human research ethics committee. Participants were given copies of the project 
description and explanation of the ethics and security considerations in English or Khmer, 
as appropriate. This gave information about the general purpose of the project, although 
this description was slightly sanitised to make the project sound more politically neutral 
if it received any official attention. I had intended to bring up the more sensitive aspects 
of the research only if participants gave an indication that they would be willing to talk 
about these; in practice, however, I was surprised at how willing most participants were 
to address these topics directly.  
Participants were invited to choose a location for the interview that suited them, and 
usually this was either cafes or their offices. Because of concerns about possible 
reluctance to sign paperwork, consent was obtained verbally, as well as specific details 
about whether and how participants were willing to be quoted. With participants’ 
permission interviews were recorded for later transcription; in a few cases, permission 
was withheld, so I took notes by hand, or on one or two occasions when that was also 
unacceptable, noted down key points as soon as possible after the interview had ended. 
Participants were invited to turn off the recorder if they wished to talk about particularly 
sensitive or identifying points and I also encouraged my coordinator to bring this option 
up as appropriate during the interview; this occurred several times during the project. 
Participants were also invited to cut the interview short as required, although in the end 
this was not a problem.  
Following interviews, I transcribed the recording as soon as possible during downtime. 
Transcriptions were given an individual code and personally identifying information was 
removed; the list of codes was kept on a secure university server located in New Zealand. 
Both transcription and recording were then uploaded to the same server using the 
Syncplicity program, which was set up on my device in consultation with the university’s 
information security team. Files uploaded in this way are encrypted, so that insecure WiFi 
or 3G/4G connections are not a security risk. Locally stored copies were then deleted; 
recordings were stored on the audio recorder in a micro-SD card which also transferred 
to my device, so no separate copies were stored on the recorder. As a basic security 
precaution the device was kept on me at all times when away from my hotel room. In the 
event of unwelcome official attention it would have been possible to wipe the device 
quickly, and I also prepared its remote wiping function in case it was stolen, although 
luckily neither was required. 
Explicit permission was obtained for all direct quotations, and these were confirmed in 
context via email following the field visit. Although many of those interviewed gave 
permission for their name to be used with quotations, and even requested it at the time, 
because of the ongoing crackdown referred to earlier and described at the end of the 
thesis, I have chosen to make all quotations anonymous. Participants are instead referred 
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to using a very general, non-identifying title only, such as ‘independent political analyst’ 
or ‘former government minister’.  
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4. Quantitative analysis 
 
This chapter presents the results of the quantitative component of the study. As described 
in Chapter 3, the purpose of this component is to systematically examine whether the 
establishment of personal autocracy is associated with the outcome of nonviolent 
uprisings, consistent with the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 2. The chapter 
itself is broken into two major sections. In the first section I give the main quantitative 
results. I first give basic descriptions of the data, highlighting the correlation between the 
two measures of personal autocracy—the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) personal or 
personal-hybrid category and the ruler’s time in power—and the outcome of civil 
resistance campaigns. I then present the results of explanatory regression analysis, 
including coefficient estimates, statistical significance, and measures of model fit. 
Following this, I report the results of predictive analysis, with both in-sample and pseudo-
out-of-sample measures of predictive accuracy, and carry out model criticism by 
examining the residuals of the predictive models for any systematic discrepancies.  
The second section integrates the quantitative and qualitative components of the thesis 
by using these findings to select cases for qualitative analysis. Candidate cases are those 
where the quantitative results indicate that the regime is likely to be an established 
personal autocracy. I then identify the specific cases for analysis by comparing predicted 
with actual campaign outcomes, with on-the-line cases being those where these outcomes 
match and deviant cases being those where they diverge. Given the resulting lists of 
possible case studies, I then explain why I have chosen the Philippines 1986 and 
Cambodia 2013 cases for the qualitative component. 
 
4.1. Results 
4.1.1. Descriptive results 
84 cases of civil resistance campaigns seeking the overthrow of authoritarian regimes 
between 1946 and 2013 are identified, including 47 successes, 34 failures, and three cases 
which could not be unambiguously classified into either category. Figure 4.1 (next page) 
shows the distribution of cases over time, revealing two clear peaks in campaign activity. 
The first consists primarily of the movements that led to and followed the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the second consists of the events of 
the Arab Spring beginning in 2011. Successes peaked during the decade from 1985, but 
have declined since then. There has been an especially noticeable drop since the mid-
2000s, with approximately 75% of campaigns between 2005 and 2013 failing to succeed 





Figure 4.1: Frequency of campaigns over time by outcome, 1946-2013 
 
Note: 5-yearly increments. No campaigns are recorded for the periods 1946-1950 and 1961-1965 
 
Figure 4.2: Campaign outcome by GWF regime type 
 




Figure 4.2 (previous page) illustrates the relationship between campaign outcome and 
personal autocracy based on the GWF typology.43 Regimes in the GWF typology that have 
experienced a substantial degree of consolidation of power by the autocrat—those 
labelled ‘personal’ or ‘personal-hybrid’ types—are combined into the category 
‘personalist’, while others are designated ‘non-personalist’. Consistent with the 
theoretical argument, the chart shows that civil resistance has been more successful 
against personalist regimes, with more than twice as many campaigns succeeding as 
failing, while outcomes against non-personalist regimes are much more evenly 
balanced.44 Pearson’s chi-squared test indicates that the observed difference would be 
unlikely if campaign outcome and the GWF measure of personal autocracy were in fact 
unrelated (p = 0.076). 
Figure 4.3 (next page) presents a visualisation of the relationship between the ruler’s time 
in power and campaign outcome. Campaigns are divided into ‘high’ and ‘low’ participation 
campaigns for illustrative purposes; as would be expected given the central importance 
of participation in campaign success highlighted by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), none 
of the successful cases were ‘low participation’ campaigns involving fewer than 10,000 
participants. In terms of failed campaigns, a group of cases are clustered around the 
sample mean of 11.25 years, including Belarus in 2006, Poland in 1968, and the Arab 
Spring cases of Bahrain, Morocco, and Syria in 2011. The Saffron revolution in Myanmar 
in 2007 stands out slightly, with the ruler, General Than Shwe, having been in office at the 
time for 15 years. Three small campaigns failed to overthrow long-tenure incumbents in 
Egypt in 2004, Yugoslavia in 1968, and Sudan in 2011; due to their low participation, 
however, these would not be expected to succeed regardless of the regime’s internal 
power dynamics. Campaigns also failed to unseat Iranian leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali 
Khamenei in 2009 and Guinea’s Lansana Conte in 2007, who had been in power for 20 
and 23 years prior to the onset of the campaigns, respectively. As these were relatively 
large campaigns (at least 10,000 participants) but were unsuccessful against leaders who, 
based on the theoretical argument, would be expected to have consolidated personal 
power, these cases stand out as notable outliers. Otherwise, the remainder of the failed 
cases were against leaders who had been in power for less than around a decade or so, 
where power-sharing agreements within the respective regimes are more likely to have 
remained in place. 
 
  
                                                        
 
43 A small number of cases in the dataset are not included because the country falls under the 
1,000,000 population threshold for inclusion in the GWF data, such as the campaign against the 
Hoyte regime in Guyana from 1990-1991. 
 
44 Substantively the same relationship is obtained if regimes labelled solely as ‘personal’ are 
compared with all other regime types; see the appendix for more details. 
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Figure 4.3: Autocrat tenure by campaign outcome, 1946-2013 
 
Note: High participation 10,000 and low participation <10,000 active participants in a single 
or closely-related series of protest events  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics, autocrat’s time in power at campaign peak year 
Campaign 
outcome 
Time in power (years) 
 Mean Median SD Max Min 
Success (n=47) 13.1 10 9.9 35 1 
Failure (n=34) 8.7 7 7.1 24 0 
Note: campaigns which cannot be unambiguously classified excluded 
 
In contrast, there have been far more successes against long-serving autocrats: 21 
campaigns succeeded against autocrats who had been in power longer than the sample 
mean, with autocrat tenure in eight cases exceeding the maximum for the failed cases. 
Examples include prominent instances of successful civil resistance, such as campaigns 
against Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Ben Ali in 2011, Indonesia’s Suharto in 1999, 
Iran’s Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, and Haiti’s Jean-Claude Duvalier and the 
Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos in 1986.45 Notably, a number of these long-tenure cases 
have been highlighted in previous work as examples of highly personalised regimes (e.g., 
Thompson, 1995; Chehabi & Linz, 1998; Lee, 2015). While there are also successful cases 
                                                        
 
45 Refer to the appendix for a full case list. 
81 
 
against regimes with shorter leader tenure—I do not argue that civil resistance can only 
succeed against personal autocracies—the average leader tenure in cases where civil 
resistance succeeded is approximately 4.5 years longer than for those where it failed. 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U and t-tests both indicate that the observed difference would 
be highly unlikely if there were in fact no relationship between tenure and campaign 
outcome (p = 0.028 and 0.022, respectively).  
 
4.1.2. Explanatory results 
Table 4.2 (next page) gives the result of logistic regression on the full sample of cases from 
1946-2013 with campaign outcome as the dependent variable.46 Model 1 is the main 
model developed in Section 3.3.3, including both measures of personal autocracy as well 
as the control variables. As expected, GWF personalist regime type and leader tenure are 
both statistically significant and positively associated with campaign success. Each 
additional year that a leader is in power is found to increase the odds of campaign success 
by approximately 9%, which I have argued to be caused by the increasing likelihood that 
the regime has become an established personal autocracy. Similarly, the odds of success 
versus failure for campaigns against regimes classified as personal or personal-hybrid are 
more than three times higher than those against non-personalist regimes. Campaign size 
is statistically significant and positively associated with success, mirroring Chenoweth 
and Stephan’s (2011) central finding about the role of participation in civil resistance 
success. Population size also is found to be statistically significant but negatively 
associated with campaign success, while the effect of the other independent variables 
cannot confidently be distinguished from zero. 
Model 1a is re-estimated with leader age and ruling coalition spell duration included as 
independent variables in order to test whether time in power is actually capturing 
leaders’ increasing age and the corresponding decrease in elites’ time horizons or 
structural declines in autocratic stability, respectively. Although the p-values for leader 
tenure and personalist regime type both increase—which is not surprising, given the 
increased ratio of variables to observations and the relatively small sample size—age and 
ruling coalition spell duration are both statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the 
likelihood-ratio test against the more restricted Model 1 indicates that adding the two 
additional variables does not significantly improve model fit (p = 0.886), and so they 
should not be included in a model describing the data.  
  
                                                        
 
46 In addition to the standard use of asterisks to indicate p-values below typical alpha levels, I have 
also opted to report the full p-values for each variable to aid in accurate interpretation of the 
variables’ statistical significance (see, e.g., Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). 
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Table 4.2: Regression results, full sample (1946-2013) 
 Model 1 Model 1a  
β OR p  β OR p  
Leader tenure 0.088 
0.042 
1.091 0.038 ** 0.087 
0.046 






























Peak year -0.020 
0.019 












Ethnic divide -0.029 
0.872 





Oil production -0.001 
0.000 



















Campaign size 0.949 
0.288 





n 74 74 
AUC 0.857 0.855 
Hosmer-








Note: Logit regression using penalised MLE, standard errors in italics, intercept not reported. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Likelihood-ratio test for Model 1 against intercept-only model; for 
Model 1a against Model 1. 
 
Table 4.3 (p. 84) gives the results for the same models re-estimated on the restricted 
sample from 1970-2013, intended to account for possible selection bias in the earlier part 
of the NAVCO data as explained in Chapter 3. Model 2 shows that leader tenure remains 
statistically significant and positive. In the restricted sample peak year is also significant 
and negative, matching the observation that success rates have been declining since 
around the 1980s, as indicated in Figure 4.1. Oil production is similarly significant and 
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negative, while campaign participation remains significant and positive. Unlike Model 1, 
population size in the restricted sample does not reach typical thresholds for statistical 
significance. Interestingly, personalist regime type loses statistical significance, with a 
likelihood-ratio test indicating that its addition does not significantly improve fit for 
Model 2 (p = 0.405). This suggests that there is indeed some inconsistency in the data, 
although it may also be due to the fact that both measures of personal autocracy capture 
aspects of the same underlying concept. Indeed, tests for collinearity indicate that tenure 
and GWF personalist regime type are correlated, although the association is not strong 
enough to cause problems for regression (see the appendix for details). Furthermore, 
when tenure is dropped from the model, the p-value for personalist regime type decreases 
substantially, suggesting that the connection between time in power and probability that 
personal autocracy has been established may be accounting for the discrepancy. I return 
to this point below with the AIC-based model selection results.  
As before, Model 2a includes leader age and ruling coalition spell duration to rule out 
competing explanations for the connection between the leader’s time in office and 
campaign outcome. Again, the p-value of leader tenure rises (but remains low), but 
neither variable is found to be statistically significant. Also as before, the addition of the 
two variables is not found to improve model fit. Hence, I conclude that the leader’s age 
and the length of time the particular ruling coalition has held power do not adequately 
explain the relationship between leader tenure and campaign outcome identified in either 





Table 4.3: Regression results, temporally-restricted sample (1970-2013) 
 Model 2 Model 2a  
β OR p  β OR p  
Leader tenure 0.116 
0.049 
1.123 0.018 ** 0.102 
0.054 





1.860 0.435  0.208 
0.857 
1.231 0.808  
Leader age     0.031 
0.047 




    -0.027 
0.024 
0.973 0.255  
Military -0.464 
0.817 
0.629 0.570  -0.032 
0.818 
0.968 0.969  
Peak year -0.078 
0.036 
0.925 0.029 ** -0.075 
0.035 
0.928 0.032 ** 
Legislature -0.513 
0.999 
0.599 0.608  0.008 
1.043 
1.008 0.994  
Ethnic divide 0.866 
1.252 
2.377 0.489  1.419 
1.422 





0.999 0.033 ** -0.001 
0.000 
0.999 0.101  
GDP 0.123 
0.402 
1.131 0.760  0.155 
0.406 
1.167 0.704  
Population -0.339 
0.279 
0.713 0.224  -0.472 
0.334 





2.383 0.010 *** 0.773 
0.323 
2.167 0.017 ** 
n 64 64 
AUC 0.902 0.905 
Hosmer-





Note: Logit regression using penalised MLE, standard errors in italics, intercept not reported. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Likelihood-ratio test for Model 1 against intercept-only model; for 
Model 1a against Model 1. 
 
Given the relatively limited theoretical and empirical guidance for model specification in 
this area, together with the changing standard error on the personalist regime type 
variable on the two different samples, I also carry out post-analysis model selection using 
AIC as described in Chapter 3. This is intended both to assess the evidence in favour of 
inclusion for the independent variables I have identified and to select the best model(s) 
for describing the data, balancing model fit against the likelihood of overfit. Given the 
evidence that there may indeed be selection biases in the earlier part of the sample, I limit 
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this to the restricted sample from 1970-2013.47 Results are presented in Table 4.4 (next 
page). 
Exhaustive screening of every possible combination of independent variables gives the 
relative importance w+(j) of each; as mentioned earlier, values closer to 1 indicate stronger 
evidence for inclusion in a model describing the data, with values above 0.9 considered 
strong evidence, values from 0.6-0.9 moderate evidence, values from 0.5-0.6 only weak 
evidence and anything below 0.5 essentially negligible (Burnham & Anderson, 2002, 75-
77). Participation (0.983), personalist regime type (0.952), peak year (0.939), and leader 
tenure (0.918) all have strong evidence in favour of inclusion, while oil production (0.807) 
and population size (0.694) have moderate evidence in favour. There is no evidence on 
the basis of AIC for using the remaining independent variables.  
AIC values indicates that there are two ‘best’ models for describing the data, shown in 
Table 4.4 as Model 3 and 4.48 Both include campaign size, leader tenure, peak year, and oil 
production, while Model 3 also include population size. Although personalist regime type 
is given high variable importance on the basis of AIC, its addition to either model increases 
AIC by ~2, indicating that it does not provide meaningful additional explanatory value 
(see Arnold, 2010). Likelihood-ratio tests for the models with and without the regime type 
variable also indicate that its addition does not significantly improve model fit, while AUC 
values indicate that predictive accuracy actually decreases slightly when it is added. As a 
result, I drop the GWF personalist regime type variable from these models.  
With the exception of population size, all variables in Models 3 and 4 are highly 
statistically significant, with the coefficients in the expected direction. Higher 
participation in campaigns increases the probability of success, while civil resistance in 
larger or oil-producing countries is less likely to succeed. In general, civil resistance is 
becoming less successful as time goes on, possibly due to the authoritarian learning effect 
discussed in Chapter 3. Most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, however, civil 
resistance is more likely to succeed the longer an individual ruler is in power, which I 
argue indicates the underlying probability of personal autocracy having been established. 
This variable is not only statistically but also substantively significant: with other 
variables held at their means, the predicted probability of campaign success from 1970-
2013, averaged across the two models, rises from 27% in the ruler’s first year in power to 
97.7% at the sample maximum of 35 years in office.  
 
  
                                                        
 
47 Results regarding the measures of personal autocracy are substantively the same when AIC 
model selection is performed on the full sample, although in-sample predictive performance is 
poorer, likely due to the aforementioned inconsistencies in the data (see the appendix). 
48 See the appendix for a list of the top models with AIC values.  
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Table 4.4: AIC-based model selection results for restricted sample (1970-2013)  
  Model 3 Model 4  
w+(j) β  OR p  β OR p  
Campaign size 0.983 0.883 
0.321 
2.418 0.006 *** 0.790 
0.306 
2.204 0.010 ** 
Peak year 0.939 -0.087 
0.030 
0.917 0.004 *** -0.088 
0.030 
0.916 0.004 *** 
Leader tenure 0.918 0.133 
0.047 
1.142 0.005 *** 0.138 
0.048 
1.148 0.004 *** 
Oil production 0.807 -0.001 
0.000 
0.999 0.012 ** -0.001 
0.000 
0.999 0.003 *** 
Population 0.694 -0.330 
0.233 
0.719 0.157      
GWF 
personalist 
0.952         
Ruling coalition 
spell duration 
0.409         
Ethnic divide 0.335         
GDP 0.247         
Leader age 0.244         
Legislature 0.215         
Military 0.214         
n 64 64 
AUC 0.898 0.890 
Hosmer-Lemeshow X2 2.154 6.907 
Likelihood-ratio  -27.684*** -28.613 
Note: Logit regression using penalised MLE, standard errors in italics, intercept not reported. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Likelihood-ratio tests against intercept-only models. 
 
The possible presence of a selection effect on these results needs to be considered. It could 
be the case that activists become more discriminating in their choice to initiate civil 
resistance the longer a given leader is in power, choosing to launch an uprising against 
only those autocrats who are weakest. Yet I find that there is little evidence for this. Figure 
4.4 (next page) shows that the proportion of authoritarian regimes experiencing 
campaign onset does not substantially vary with leader tenure. Although a slight positive 
trend is observed, the 95% confidence intervals are broad and the relationship is not 
found to be statistically significant (p = 0.241). There is therefore insufficient evidence to 
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conclude that the observed relationship between autocrat tenure and campaign outcome 
is due to a selection effect.49 
 
Figure 4.4: Autocratic regimes experiencing campaign onset by tenure, 1946-2008 
 
Note: Black line is a locally-weighted estimate of the average proportion with shaded 95% 
confidence intervals 
 
4.1.3. Predictive results 
I next assess the predictive accuracy of the models developed above. The measure for this 
is AUC, which as explained earlier is a single-figure evaluation of the models’ overall 
ability to discriminate between successful and failed campaigns. An AUC value of 0.5 is 
equivalent to randomly guessing—hence this is the baseline, rather than 0—with figures 
above 0.7 considered good, above 0.8 very good, and above 0.9 excellent in comparative 
political science.50 Table 4.5 shows that Model 1, estimated on the full sample, performs 
very well at 0.857, while Model 2, estimated on the restricted sample, achieves an 
                                                        
 
49 Similarly, as mentioned earlier, Braithwaite, Braithwaite, and Kucik (2015) and Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder (2017) find that leader tenure is not related to campaign onset, further evidence against 
the results being driven by a selection effect. 
 
50 Jay Ulfelder, “Forecasting Popular Uprisings in 2011: How Are We Doing?”, Dart-Throwing 




excellent 0.902. Models 3 and 4 also achieve very good AUC scores, which is particularly 
notable given the small number of predictors they contain and the general 
unpredictability of other areas of civil resistance (cf. Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017).  
 








Loss of  
accuracy 
Model 1 0.857 0.725 -0.132 
Model 2 0.902 0.778 -0.124 
Model 3 0.898 0.863 -0.035 
Model 4 0.890 0.861 -0.029 
 
 I then repeat this test on pseudo-out-of-sample data to check whether the models may 
suffer from overfit. This is done using a 4-fold cross-validation. Cases are randomly 
assigned to one of four subsets (the ‘folds’), the relevant model is re-estimated on three 
of these, and its performance then scored on how well it predicts the outcome of the 
remaining subset (Kohavi, 1995). This is repeated once for each remaining subset, then 
the entire process repeated 10 times and the results averaged. The predictive metric is 
the AUC; as mentioned earlier, models that are overfit to the data are likely to suffer from 
a notable drop in AUC when cross-validated (Ward, Greenhill & Bakke, 2010). 
The larger models 1 and 2 both suffer a fairly sizeable drop in predictive accuracy when 
cross-validated, decreasing by 13.2 and 12.4 percentage points respectively. This suggests 
that overfit may be a problem; indeed, the inclusion of several extra variables in these 
models that are not statistically significant makes this unsurprising, as adding parameters 
to regression models nearly always improves accuracy on in-sample data even if they are 
not actually relevant. The AIC-selected models perform much better, with AUC decreasing 
by only 3.5 and 2.9 percentage points respectively. As Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke (2010) 
have argued, small decreases in predictive ability on out-of-sample data compared to in-
sample data constitute stronger evidence that a model captures some element of a real 
causal process (Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke, 2010). These two models thus perform very 
well at predicting campaign outcomes while having a minimal risk of overfit. As a result, 
the findings about the direction, size, and significance of leader tenure, campaign size, oil 
production, campaign peak year, and to a lesser extent population can be treated with a 




4.1.4. Model criticism 
The final part of this analysis involves carrying out model criticism by evaluating the 
results of prediction to look for systematic discrepancies that might indicate that 
important factors have been missed in the model development process (Colaresi & 
Mahmood, 2017). An average predicted outcome for each case is calculated using the 
coefficients of the three models (2, 3, and 4) that are estimated on the restricted sample 
from 1970-2013; simple averaging of multiple models has been shown to improve 
accuracy in predictions, while more complex averaging methods may not offer a 
substantial improvement in accuracy (Graefe et al., 2015; cf. Montgomery, Hollenbach & 
Ward, 2012).  
Figure 4.5 (p. 91) gives a visual representation of the accuracy of these predictions.51 The 
y axis is the absolute difference between the predicted outcome and the observed 
outcome for each case; higher values mean more inaccurate predictions, while lower 
values mean that the predicted outcome was close to the actual outcome. Given the issues 
highlighted earlier with the use of authoritarian regime typologies, and the mixed results 
I have found in this chapter for the GWF typology, I use leader tenure as the measure of 
personal autocracy along the x axis. Thus as well as allowing for the identification of 
patterns in all mispredicted cases, Figure 4.5 also highlights cases where the expected 
relationship between personal autocracy and campaign outcome has broken down. 
To aid interpretation, I have added visual guides to the chart. The horizontal line at y = 0.5 
represents a basic classification threshold between ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ predictions; 
in other words, points below the line are closer to being right than they are wrong 
(‘correct’), while points above the line are closer to being wrong than they are right 
(‘incorrect’). The vertical line at x = 10 is an approximate boundary between those cases 
that are unlikely to feature high levels of personalisation and those where the leader’s 
long tenure would be expected to have resulted from personalisation of power. This point 
is derived from Svolik’s (2012) finding that the proportion of autocrats suffering coups 
d’état declines after the first decade in power as a result of the successfully consolidation 
of personal autocracy, but is intended primarily for visual reference and should not be 
taken too literally. 
The chart can therefore be approximately divided into four quadrants. The lower-left 
quadrant contains cases where the models have predicted the outcome accurately, but 
factors other than the establishment of personal autocracy are likely to have played a 
more important role, as the autocrat’s short time in office is suggestive of a power-sharing 
regime being in place. Examples include Greece in 1974, Uruguay in 1984, and Mongolia 
in 1990. The top-left quadrant similarly contains cases where personal autocracy is not 
expected to have played a major role, but where the predicted outcome is inaccurate, 
                                                        
 
51 For visual clarity, not all of the points in Figure 4.5 are labelled; a complete list of all cases with 
the difference between predicted and actual outcome is provided in the appendix. 
90 
 
indicating that the models have not captured the factors explaining the outcome. These 
include Panama in 1989, where General Manuel Noriega was removed from power by a 
United States invasion of the country in the context of an ongoing campaign, and Nepal in 
2006, where a civil resistance campaign opposed the constitutional monarch King 








Note to Figure 4.5 (previous page): Point size indicates outlier status with regard to theoretical 
relationship between tenure and outcome. ‘Cambodia 2013’ case is not in the original data used to 
generate predicted outcomes, but is included for visual comparison. 
 
More relevant in terms of the causal explanation advanced in this thesis are the right-hand 
quadrants. The lower-right quadrant indicates cases that match the theory well, in other 
words, where autocrat tenure implies a high level of personalisation and the predicted 
campaign outcomes (mostly successes) closely fit the actual outcomes. These cases 
include the campaign against Suharto in Indonesia in 1998, the 2005 campaign in the 
Maldives against Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, and the 1986 overthrow of Jean-Claude “Baby 
Doc” Duvalier in Haiti. The upper-right quadrant includes cases that are outliers in 
regards to the relationship between autocrat tenure and outcome. Most notable is the 
failed campaign against Guinea’s Lansana Conté in 2007 (the out-of-sample Cambodia 
case from 2013 is included as a reference point). Other cases such as the Saffron 
Revolution in Myanmar in 2007 and the campaign in Belarus in 2006 are also outliers, but 
to a lesser extent than Guinea 2007. 
In total 12 cases are predicted ‘inaccurately’, with the estimated probability of success 
more than 0.5 away from the actual outcome. These cases do not appear to show any 
obvious geographical or temporal grouping. The coding scheme used to classify outcomes 
as successes or failures appear to be responsible for a portion of these; a dichotomous 
classification is difficult to apply in cases where campaigns ended after obtaining 
concessions, such as Poland 1976, and Guinea 2007, or where the effects of the campaign 
were substantially delayed, such as (perhaps) Myanmar 2007. In other cases, a 
conjunction of multiple events makes it difficult to clearly classify outcomes. For example, 
the Panama 1989 campaign is predicted to have had a high chance of success (0.86) but 
the outcome is coded as a ‘failure’ because the leader, Manuel Noriega, was removed from 
power by a United States invasion of the country rather than due to the direct effect of 
protests. Syria 2011 is a similar example, where the nonviolent uprising was replaced by 
armed insurgency and the breakdown of central government control over large portions 
of the country. Otherwise, it is not obvious that there are any other variables that would 
explain the discrepancy between predicted and actual outcomes for a significant number 
of these cases that could be included in the regression models. Hence, I conclude that there 
are no systematic features of the cases themselves that explain why they succeeded or 




The purpose of this component of the thesis has been to test statistically whether personal 
autocracies are more likely to collapse in response to civil resistance than power-sharing 
regimes. Overall, I find strong support for the argument. Basic description of the data 
shows that campaigns against regimes classified as personal or personal hybrid by 
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Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) are more than twice as likely to succeed as to fail. 
Similarly, campaigns against leaders who have been in power for more than around a 
decade—and, as I have argued, are likely to have done so by establishing a personal 
autocracy to minimise the main threat to their survival in power, elite rebellion—show 
much higher rates of success than failure. Indeed, only three major civil resistance 
campaigns failed to unseat an autocrat who had been in office for longer than the sample 
mean of 11.25 years, while 21 succeeded, an extraordinary relationship given that these 
cases cut across markedly different countries in terms of time, culture, geography, and 
international context. 
Regression analysis shows that these relationships largely hold when other factors are 
taken into account. Results for the GWF regime typology are somewhat mixed, but given 
the more general issues surrounding regime typologies discussed earlier in Chapters 2 
and 3, this was not entirely unexpected. More importantly, the alternative measure of 
personal autocracy that I develop in this thesis, the autocrat’s time in power, is 
significantly and consistently associated with campaign outcome. I am further able to 
dismiss alternative explanations for this relationship by showing that age and more 
general factors related to the wider structure of the regime do not adequately account for 
the observed outcomes. As a result, I conclude that the increasing likelihood that a ruler 
has survived in office by establishing a personal autocracy the longer they are in power is 
the best explanation for this relationship.  
Further support for the relationship between time in power and campaign outcome is 
provided using AIC-based model selection and predictive analysis. AIC values indicate 
that leader tenure, as well as campaign size and peak year, oil production, and to a lesser 
extent population size, are strong explanatory variables for campaign outcome. 
Parsimonious models consisting of only these variables indicate that the association is 
statistically significant and that the models have high levels of predictive accuracy. Leader 
tenure in particular is also substantively significant, with the estimated probability of 
success rising from 27% in the ruler’s first year to 97.7% at the sample maximum of 35 
years in power, with other factors held at their means.  
Pseudo-out-of-sample testing shows that the initial larger models may suffer from a 
degree of overfit, but the AIC-selected models perform well when faced with new data, 
strongly implying that they are in fact capturing an element of the underlying causal 
processes. Indeed, using 0.5 as a basic decision-making threshold, the models I have 
developed are able to correctly predict the outcome of 84% of civil resistance campaigns 
that occurred between 1970 and 2013. This degree of accuracy is particularly notable 
given both the small number of predictors involved and the apparent unpredictability of 
campaign onset (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Analysis of the errors suggests that these 
are mostly due to either the difficulty of forcing complex political phenomena into 
restrictive coding schemes or idiosyncratic features of individual cases, rather than the 
omission of important independent variables. 
One final point to note from these findings is that, while the importance of campaign 
participation and changing success rates over time has been highlighted in previous work 
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(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), the importance of the autocrat’s time in office—and its 
implications for the likelihood of personalisation—has not been identified in civil 
resistance research to date. Indeed, I argue that the strong and consistent association 
between tenure and campaign outcome only makes sense in the light of theories of 
authoritarian politics which relate time in office to intra-regime power struggles. These 
results therefore highlight the benefits of incorporating insights from both the civil 
resistance and authoritarianism literatures when studying the outcome of nonviolent 
uprisings. 
 
4.2. Case selection 
Evaluation of the quantitative results forms the basis for case selection in the qualitative 
component of this study. As explained in Chapter 3, two cases are selected: one on-the-
line, i.e., one that fits the theoretical expectations closely, and one deviant, where the 
predicted outcome and actual outcome differ markedly.  
 
4.2.1. On-the-line case 
The on-the-line case should be one in which, with other factors controlled for, the 
expected establishment of personal autocracy is associated with a successful civil 
resistance campaign outcome. As can be seen from the lower right-hand quadrant of 
Figure 4.5, there is a substantial number of cases that fit this description. Specific values 
for the cases with the lowest difference between predicted and actual outcome are given 
in Table 4.6. 
 








Myanmar 1988 26 1 0.993 0.007 
Bulgaria 1989 35 1 0.991 0.009 
Philippines 1986 20 1 0.989 0.011 
Zambia 1991 26 1 0.985 0.015 
East Germany 1989 18 1 0.984 0.016 
Mali 1991 22 1 0.945 0.055 
Malawi 1993 28 1 0.940 0.060 
Egypt 2011 29 1 0.931 0.069 
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Haiti 1986 14 1 0.926 0.074 
… … … … … 
 
Given these options, I have used a purposive sampling scheme to select the Philippines 
1986 campaign for further analysis, based on its expected ability to provide evidence in 
favour of the theoretical model. There are several reasons why this case is appropriate. 
First, the nonviolent uprising that overthrew Ferdinand Marcos is well known and is seen 
as an exemplary case of civil resistance, so has received a substantial amount of scholarly 
attention (Sutton, 2012). As a result, there is a large quantity of material that can be drawn 
on to carry out the case study. Some other cases on the list, in comparison, have less 
secondary information available, whether because they are less prominent, have occurred 
more recently, or because much of the information available would require specific 
language skills to access, something that is a particular challenge for mixed methods 
research in comparative politics. Furthermore, existing work already suggests that 
Marcos’s concentration of personal power contributed to his downfall (Thompson, 1995; 
Lee, 2015), making this a very likely case to show the dynamics expected on the basis of 
the theoretical model developed here. Chapter 5 thus describes the personalisation of 
power in the Philippines, and analyses the effect this had on the outcome of the 1986 civil 
resistance campaign. 
 
4.2.2. Deviant case 
Inversely, the deviant case should be one in which personal autocracy is expected to have 
been established, yet the civil resistance campaign was not successful. Only the cases 
where the autocrat was in power longer than about a decade, and where other factors 
identified in the regression models did not outweigh the influence of this, would be 
expected to show the kind of personalisation dynamics that are of interest. Specific values 













Cambodia 2013* 28 0 0.837 0.837 
Guinea 2007 23 0 0.722 0.722 
Myanmar 2007 15 0 0.550 0.550 
Bahrain 2011 12 0 0.546 0.546 
… … … … … 
* Not in the original sample 
 
The clearest deviant case in the sample is the campaign in Guinea in 2007, when long-
term autocrat Lansana Conté was challenged by strikes and protests involving hundreds 
of thousands of people. However this case is somewhat problematic to use for further 
analysis. Although Conté refused to resign as president, the opposition agreed to a 
negotiated solution whereby he would appoint a new, independent prime minister, and 
make a number of other concessions. Following this agreement, the campaign ended, 
seemingly considered a success by its participants.52 The inaccuracy of the predicted 
outcome may therefore be a result of the coding criteria used in the quantitative study 
being too strict about what constitutes ‘success’. Further complicating the picture, the 
nature of the agreement—whether it amounted to real moves towards regime change or 
whether it was simply a sop to opponents—was contested at the time (ICG, 2007; Engeler, 
2008). Conté’s death in December 2008 means that this ambiguity may be irresolvable 
even in retrospect, as his true intentions were never revealed. Thus, although the Guinea 
case is an outlier, the difficulty in clearly assessing the outcome compounded by the 
natural death of the leader during what may or may not have turned out to be the political 
opening of the regime makes it less suitable for the purposes of this study.  
Two other in-sample deviant cases are Myanmar 2007 and Bahrain 2011. Like Guinea, the 
Myanmar case is somewhat problematic for qualitative analysis. The lack of predictive 
accuracy is likely to be due to coding difficulties. The campaign is coded as ‘failed’ because 
it did not result in leader overthrow or lead to the initiation of a transition away from 
authoritarian rule. Yet it does appear to have had a substantial impact on the subsequent 
liberalisation of the regime, including the dissolution of the ruling junta in 2011, which 
paved the way for the election of the opposition National League for Democracy party in 
                                                        
 
52 BBC News, 27 February 2007, “Guineans back to work after deal.”  
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2015.53 Furthermore, Lee (2015) has already argued that in 2007 a power-sharing 
agreement remained in place at the top of the military regime. Based on this analysis, it is 
not well suited for the purposes of the deviant case study. 
Bahrain would potentially be a better case for analysis, as it represents a clearer example 
of a failed civil resistance campaign when the Arab Spring protests in the country—which 
had high levels of participation, involving more than 100,000 at their peak—were 
violently crushed in February 2011.54 Sheikh Hamad ibn `Isa Al Khalifah, who remains in 
power, has ruled since 1999, putting his tenure at 12 years in 2011. While in principle this 
is consistent with personalisation having taken place, it is close enough to the decade 
mark at which I assume the establishment of personal autocracy becomes more likely that 
it is hard to be confident that this case should be very likely to show the dynamics that I 
am trying to capture in the case study. In addition, other factors may have accounted for 
failure: although it is in the Persian Gulf, Bahrain produces only limited amounts of oil, 
and its population is small at approximately 1.3 million in 2011. Further, Herb (1999) 
identifies Bahrain as one of the ‘dynastic monarchies’ in the MENA region, in which large 
and influential royal families act as stable power-sharing institutions, maintaining a 
significant degree of power over the monarch and limiting any attempts to personalise 
the regime. Although Herb’s analysis concerns the regime of the current king’s father, the 
Al Khalifa ruling family remains influential in Bahrain, and an initial plausibility probe of 
secondary literature on the regime did not find any evidence that the power-sharing 
arrangement has changed since the accession of the current Sheikh. Hence, while there 
are several characteristics of this case that would make it suitable for further analysis—
perhaps in future research—for this thesis it is less than ideal as a deviant case study. 
The alternative, as highlighted in Table 4.7, is to use an out of sample case, in this instance 
Cambodia 2013. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are theoretical benefits to carrying out 
analysis on cases that have not been used to derive the original model(s). More practically, 
it is also suitable as a disconfirming case. Both the results of the quantitative study and 
other qualitative research (e.g., Un, 2005; Strangio, 2014; Morgenbesser, 2018) has 
highlighted leader Hun Sen’s apparently consolidation of personal control since he first 
took power in 1985. With the consequent very high predicted probability of success, the 
2013 campaign’s failure to overthrow the regime or force a transition away from 
authoritarianism thus represents a significant challenge to the theoretical model 
developed here. As a result, Cambodia is selected as the deviant case for further analysis, 
the results of which are presented below in Chapter 6.  
  
                                                        
 
53 Whether Myanmar has really transitioned to democracy is an open question, however, as the 
military still controls 25% of parliamentary seats and retains substantial constitutional powers, 
including an effective veto over constitutional amendments (see, e.g., Economist, 29 October 2015, 
“Still the generals’ election”). 
54 Al Jazeera, 17 February 2011, “Clashes rock Bahraini capital.” 
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5. The Philippines 
 
5.1. Introduction 
5.1.1. 1986 People Power revolution 
At the beginning of 1986, the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, leader of the Philippines 
since 1965, was in crisis. The economy was struggling: since 1984 GDP had decreased by 
9.25%—a “catastrophic” per capita decline of about 15% in two years—and inflation had 
peaked at more than 50%, while in 1985 unemployment reached 12.5% (Hill, 1986, 240; 
Sanchez, 1987). Hundreds of businesses had gone bankrupt, tens or hundreds of 
thousands of manufacturing workers had lost their jobs, and major export industries such 
as sugar and coconut had been crippled by international conditions and government 
interventions (Hill, 1986). Ongoing insurgencies were also creating difficulties for the 
military, particularly the rapidly-growing communist New People’s Army (NPA) and 
various Muslim separatist forces in Mindanao (Youngblood, 1986). 
Politically, the government was being challenged on a number of fronts. A broad range of 
‘moderate’ opposition parties and organisations supported by the elite and middle class, 
including the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) alliance and the PDP-
Laban (Partido Demokratiko Pilipino–Lakas ng Bayan) party, were becoming more 
unified. This was thanks in large part to the assassination of influential opposition leader 
Benigno Aquino Jr. at Manila Airport on August 21, 1983, an act which had shocked the 
country and resulted in mobilisation of influential sectors of Filipino society (Aquino, 
1984; Youngblood, 1986; Celoza, 1997). Further nonviolent opposition came from the 
more left-leaning ‘cause-oriented’ civil society organisations and the leadership of the 
Catholic church, particularly from Archbishop of Manila Jaime Cardinal Sin.  
In an attempt to delay further calls from the United States for reform and to reinforce the 
appearance of legitimacy to external observers, Marcos called a snap election for February 
1986 (Thompson, 1995). Despite the widespread challenges, the KBL at this stage 
controlled two-thirds of the legislature and the overwhelming majority of local offices 
(Timberman, 1987; Thompson, 1995). The KBL mobilised its electoral machine, 
distributing bribes to voters and patronage to its own members, coordinating with the 
military to violently intimidate oppositionists, manipulating voter lists, and changing the 
location of polling booths and electoral boundaries in areas which could not be relied on 
to vote for Marcos (Thompson, 1995). Confident that his domination of the government 
structure together with a seemingly-divided opposition would give him an overwhelming 
victory, Marcos gave independent election watchdog NAMFREL (National Citizens' 
Movement for Free Elections) permission to field an army of 400,000 volunteer monitors 
across 90% of the country to conduct an independent count of the vote (Laxalt, 1986; 
Timberman, 1987). 
On election day NAMFREL estimated that the KBL’s manipulation of the election had 
resulted in approximately 3.3 million people, an eighth of the total 26.1 million registered 
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voters, being unable to vote, mostly in areas expected to support the opposition 
(Timberman, 1987). Despite these efforts, after polls closed NAMFREL reported that 
Marcos had still lost, receiving only 47.3% of the vote (Timberman, 1987). The 
government’s COMELEC (Commission on Elections) responded by padding vote counts in 
areas where NAMFREL observers had not been permitted to operate, declaring Marcos 
the winner with 53.8% of the final vote (Timberman, 1987; Thompson, 1995). Yet the 
election had already been thoroughly discredited. A decisive blow was the walk-out 
staged by a group of COMELEC computer programmers in protest at its role in the 
fraudulent count, covered by live television.  
In the days that followed it became clear that Marcos’s rival, Corazon ‘Cory’ Aquino, had 
won the moral victory. Aquino called for a nationwide boycott of ‘crony establishments’ 
and further civil resistance in front of a crowd of up to 2 million people at Rizal Park in 
Manila. Yet Marcos refused to step down, bringing things to a deadlock. At the same time, 
the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), a right-wing group of junior officers 
which had been trying to build support for a coup since the early 1980s, began mobilising 
(Davide et al., 1990). On the morning of February 22nd RAM, led by Defence Minister Juan 
Ponce Enrile launched a coup attempt. Marcos loyalists had gained advance warning due 
to the rebels’ widespread recruitment efforts, however, and the putsch was repulsed 
(Abinales & Amoroso, 2005).  
Amidst rumours that Marcos was about to reimpose martial law, the rebels, joined by 
armed forces Vice Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos, retreated to two large military 
camps on the Epifanio de los Santos Avenua (EDSA), surrounded and protected by more 
than a million opposition supporters. A cascade of defections in the military ensued, 
including almost all of the Metropolitan Police Force and large segments of the air force, 
as military units ordered to clear EDSA refused to fire on unarmed civilians who were 
offering them prayers, cigarettes, food, drink, and flowers (Davide et al., 1990).  
Clinging to power, Marcos tried to reassert control from his residence at Malacañang 
Palace, announcing a curfew on February 24 and urging supporters to fight against the 
rebel forces (Timberman, 1987). In reaction to the rebellion and the mass display of public 
dissatisfaction with Marcos’s rule, however, the United States government—which had 
pressured Marcos to carry out reforms but continued to support his position until the last 
moment—finally withdrew its support, unwilling to sanction a civil war to protect its 
interests in the Philippines (Laxalt, 1986). Informally, United States president Ronald 
Regan signalled to Marcos that he should step down peacefully and accept the transfer of 
power (Laxalt, 1986); with few supporters left, Marcos finally decided to flee Manila, and 
on the evening of 25 February he boarded a United States Air Force transport for exile in 




5.1.2. Summary: Personal autocracy and civil resistance success  
Based on the argument that lengthy leader tenure is likely to be driven by the successful 
establishment of personal autocracy, Chapter 4 identifies the Marcos regime as a ‘most 
likely’ case for personalisation of power leading to the success of civil resistance, with 
Marcos having been in office for 20 years at the time of the People Power revolution—
also known, especially in the Philippines, as the EDSA revolution. And indeed, I argue that 
Marcos established personal autocracy around the mid-1970s. First, he closed the 
national legislature after declaring martial law in 1972, thus removing the most important 
autonomous decision-making institution in the regime and eliminating his need to gain 
the support of influential elites and work through entrenched patronage networks to pass 
legislation. Even once the assembly was re-opened in 1976 it was only as a temporary, 
‘rubber-stamp’ body with no real independence. Second, Marcos undercut the economic 
and coercive strength of the wealthy landowning families which had dominated Filipino 
politics, particularly targeting those that opposed his personalisation of power, thus 
severely weakening his main elite rivals in the regime. Third, he took personal control 
over appointments in all areas of the government, replacing supporters of rivals with his 
own clients and undercutting or eliminating areas of the bureaucracy that he did not have 
direct control over. Finally, he overrode constitutional term limits that would have forced 
him to step down at the end of his second term in 1973, subsequently gaining the ability 
to directly amend the constitution in order to continue to extend his stay in power in 1976. 
With these measures, which I detail below, Marcos effectively removed the ruling 
coalition’s ability to limit his decision-making authority and control over government, 
thus successfully establishing his personal autocracy. Following this point, he was able to 
act largely unconstrained by the need to balance entrenched interests or preferences of 
influential rivals, aside from what was necessary to maintain support from the United 
States and deal with ongoing challenges in the country. 
Marcos’s consolidation of personal control over the regime in the Philippines therefore 
closely matches the concept of personal autocracy developed in the theoretical 
framework. I argue that this led to regime breakdown in the face of civil resistance by 
generating opposition amongst members of the ruling coalition who could no longer 
protect their interests against his virtually unlimited power. In the absence of a mass civil 
resistance campaign, however, these figures were unable to coordinate to seriously 
threaten the regime. Instead, those who were marginalised either remained loyal and 
hoped for the best or left the ruling coalition altogether to join an elite-led opposition 
movement, although this struggled to unite and mount a serious challenge through the 
early 1980s. The central conclusion that I draw is that the emergence of a more unified 
opposition to challenge the 1986 snap election enabled disgruntled members of the ruling 
coalition to overcome their barriers to action against Marcos, prompting an elite 
rebellion—particularly, as will be seen below, by Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and 
the second in command of the armed forces, General Fidel Ramos—that led directly to 
Marcos’s loss of power. Hence I conclude that Marcos’s establishment of personal 
autocracy and the effect that this had on the incentives of the political elite played an 
important role in determining the outcome of the 1986 nonviolent uprising.  
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In order to show how I have reached this conclusion, the next section traces the history of 
the political elite in the Philippines up to Marcos’s ascent to power in order to highlight 
the power-sharing agreement that was in place during his first two terms in office. I then 
examine key power grabs, including the declaration of martial law in 1972, to show how 
Marcos personalised power during his tenure and the effect this had on the ruling 
coalition. I then examine how the establishment of personal autocracy led to the creation 
of a subversive coalition in the regime, as figures who had had their interests threatened 
by Marcos’s consolidation of personal rule began to look for alternatives to the status quo 
distribution of power. I conclude with a summary of the case and a brief discussion of how 
it relates to the quantitative component, before moving on to the second case study in 
Chapter 6.  
 
5.2. Authoritarian politics in the Philippines 
5.2.1. Background 
The Philippines were first conquered by Spain in 1521. Without the resources to control 
the entire archipelago directly, the Spanish relied on indigenous leaders, the principalia, 
to govern in exchange for tax exemptions and land titles (Larkin, 1972). In the mid-18th 
century the economy, which had remained largely undeveloped, become oriented 
towards agricultural production for export (Hawes, 1987). This shift was accompanied by 
the rise of a new social class, the mestizos, the offspring of Chinese entrepreneurs and local 
Filipinos. Acting as intermediaries in the booming export trade, they accumulated wealth 
and land holdings, gradually supplanting the earlier principalia class (Larkin, 1972).  
The invasion and capture of the Philippines from Spain by the United States in 1898 first 
allowed the mestizos to become a genuinely national elite (Anderson, 1988). The 
Americans brutally subjugated opposition to their rule, eliminating the independent areas 
that the Spanish had been unable to bring under their control and centralising force and 
authority in Manila (Wolff, 1961; Anderson, 1988). The most important factor in 
establishing the political elite was the importation of American government institutions, 
including municipal and provincial elections in 1901 and 1902, the election of a national 
assembly in 1907, and the creation of a presidency with the writing of the 1935 
constitution. Despite their democratic origins, these institutions were co-opted to act as 
vehicles for intra-elite contestation over control of the state apparatus, which effectively 
became subordinated to elite interests (Wolff, 1961; Anderson, 1988; Sidel, 1999). It was 
the wealthy mestizo elite who had the economic resources to spend on public works 
projects and outright bribery who were able to mobilise enough support to be elected 
(Wurfel, 1988). Once elected, further extensive control over the institutions of 
government enabled officials to reinforce their support networks and shut out 
competition (Anderson, 1988; Sidel, 1999).  
Following World War II and official recognition of its independence by the United States, 
the Philippine government suffered a severe balance of payments and foreign exchange 
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crisis (Doronila, 1992). In response, it embarked on an ad hoc import-substitution 
industrialisation process, creating substantial windfall profits for entrepreneurs who 
were capable of capitalising on the opportunity (Payer, 1973; Doronila, 1992). This 
created a newer elite group, those who had gained most of their wealth through industrial 
production and had limited or no land holdings in the countryside. These industrial 
entrepreneurs originated overwhelmingly from Manila and its immediate environs, and 
were highly educated and often upwardly mobile (Payer, 1973). Yet they also largely had 
strong ties to the older landed elite. A 1961 survey provides evidence for this point: while 
the post-war period did show a higher degree of social mobility than had existed in the 
past, the old land-owning families were still tremendously over-represented amongst the 
new economic elite, with 35% of the new entrepreneurs coming from families with 
extensive land holdings, a group making up an estimated 0.1% of the total Philippine 
population (Carroll, 1962). 
By the 1960s, manufacturing came to be a major source of both wealth and influence for 
the elite. Wurfel (1979) notes that at this point families which had only land holdings had 
largely disappeared from the political scene, while those which had both land and 
industrial investments had become the primary political elite (see also Makil, 1975). 
Although there was some conflict between elites who had the political connections to 
benefit the most from industrialisation and those who did not (Payer, 1973), these 
divisions were largely muted, often because they existed within single families with 
interests in both areas of the economy (Hawes, 1987). As a whole the elite remained, as 
Fast (1973, 9) puts it, “remarkable in its homogeneity.” 
 
5.2.2. Leader-elite relations prior to Marcos 
Politics in the Philippines in the pre-Marcos period from independence to the declaration 
of martial law has been labelled as the “heyday of cacique democracy” (Anderson, 1988, 
16): despite the challenge posed by the peasant-led Hukbalahap guerrilla movement, the 
elite’s hold on power was firm, private militias were endemic and unable to be contained 
by the central government, policy was manipulated to elites’ advantage, government 
revenues were routinely plundered to pay for election campaigns, and electoral success 
was based on a combination of patronage and coercion. Despite strict rules regarding 
electioneering, electoral monitors were essentially toothless (Kiunisala, 1969); at a time 
when 95% of families in the Philippines earned less than P5,000 a year—and the average 
family in a rural village earned P500-P750 a year—it is estimated that a senatorial seat 
would require spending on average P250,000, while the office of the president would cost 
from P5 to P10 million in vote buying, patronage, and distribution of pork barrel (Abueva, 
1969; CDD/USOM/AID, 1969; Kiunisala, 1969). The clear advantage this gave to 
independently-wealthy candidates highlights the interconnection of money and political 
power in the Philippines during this period. The two major political parties, the Liberals 
and the Nacionalistas, were based solely on a desire to gain access to power, and did not 
have any clear ideological programme (Lande, 1965). Indeed, intra-party solidarity was 
largely non-existent and defection to one side or the other commonplace. Politics itself 
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was restricted to intra-elite competition, with the two parties arguably best conceived of 
as two factions of the same elite group, which continued to maintain high barriers to non-
elite interests (Lande, 1965; Sidel, 1999). 
The 1935 constitution institutionalised a powerful presidency. The president had direct 
personal authority over all executive departments, bureaus, or offices, including extensive 
powers of appointment in the civil service and the military. He was also the commander-
in-chief of the armed forces and given the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
and place the Philippines under martial law if deemed necessary (Philippines Const. 
[1935], art. VII, § 10). Even before Marcos, the president’s influence was spread 
throughout government and he was seen as the central figure of government; personal 
ties to the president were the best method of obtaining desired political outcomes for 
anyone in the country (Sison, 1969). Presidents dominated the legislative process, with 
Wurfel (1988) noting that legislative bills almost always contained the exact wording of 
the original draft written by Malacañang. The president had extensive veto powers over 
bills introduced by members of the legislature. The president also had a very large ‘public 
works’ fund, amounting to P500 million by 1969, which in reality was a discretionary pork 
barrel fund (Wurfel, 1988). Because distributing pork amongst the local constituency was 
so important for politicians to succeed at the polls, they were then reliant on the president 
to release funds in a timely manner, giving him substantial leverage (Wurfel, 1988). 
Yet, as is intended in any constitutional presidential system, the president’s powers were 
not absolute. The constitution limited tenure to two consecutive four-year terms, 
although additional terms after a rotation in the presidency were not explicitly forbidden 
(Philippines Const. [1935],, art. VII, § 5). Likewise, despite the influence of the executive 
over policy and government funds, the legislature was still able to constrain the 
president’s power in several ways. Pork or patronage was required for legislators to pass 
bills that the president favoured. Where insufficient incentives were provided for voting 
the right way—or indeed even showing up to vote at all—the legislature was able to 
thwart executive initiatives through rejection, in some cases, or forcing the watering-
down of key provisions (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). Committee chairs were powerful 
figures, able to block initiatives that they did not wish to see discussed and exercising 
influence over the shape of final pieces of legislation (Wurfel, 1988). A particularly strong 
bargaining chip was the necessity for appropriations by executive branch agencies to be 
approved by the House speaker; given that appropriations were the sole source of funding 
for government agencies, threats to withhold approval were serious indeed. Similar 
reliance on the release of appropriations in exchange for personal favours—particularly 
the appointment of relatives and friends to comfortable jobs—rendered the civil service 
completely subordinate to the legislature (Wurfel, 1988). While constraints on the 
president in this period were perhaps more often informal than institutional, they thus 




5.3. The Marcos regime 
As the previous section shows, when Marcos first took power, he did so in the context of 
established interests and powerful rivals that imposed considerable constraints on his 
authority. I describe in this section how he worked to overcome these limits by politicising 
and gaining the support of the military, which allowed him to reduce his dependence on 
these entrenched political figures, as well as pushing for reform of the constitutional term 
limits that would have forced him to step down in 1972. Yet, warned by his initial moves 
to consolidate power, many members of the elite refused to support revisions to the 
constitution, forcing Marcos to declare martial law instead. During the martial law period 
in the mid to late 1970s the power-sharing agreement degenerated fully into personal 
autocracy, as Marcos eliminated or cowed major political rivals, undermined economic 
interest groups, and took complete personal control over decision-making authority 
within the regime.  
 
5.3.1. Power-sharing, 1965-197155 
Under the previous president, Diosdado Macapagal, economic growth from 
industrialisation had slowed, prices for food staples were increasing, and wages were 
depressed as rural unemployed increasingly flocked to the cities looking for work 
(Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). Marcos campaigned against Macapagal on a promise of 
making the country ‘great’ again, assuring voters that he would root out corruption and 
inefficiency. In keeping with previous patterns of turncoatism, he switched from 
Macapagal’s Liberal party to the Nacionalistas, attracting the support of politicians 
currently locked out of the president’s patronage network, and gained popular support 
with nationalist slogans while still maintaining a close relationship with the United States 
government, and subsequently won the 1965 election.  
Marcos took power with the support of a large portion of the elite, including extremely 
powerful land-owning families such as the Lopezes of Iloilo (Wurfel, 1988). Although the 
presidency was powerful in many areas, decision-making was substantially constrained 
by the need to satisfy their interests. As Canoy (1980, 121) describes,  
Rich landowners, sugar barons and the millionaire land speculators…these ‘villains’ 
of land reform delighted in fancying themselves as the kingmakers of the country – 
                                                        
 
55 A note on dates: the ‘Marcos dictatorship’ is often identified as the period following the 
declaration of martial law in 1972 (e.g., Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014). However, the sources I 
use for defining governments as authoritarian in this thesis, Svolik (2012) and Magaloni, Chu, and 
Min (2013), both put the start of Marcos’s authoritarian rule at 1965, as following this point he 
was no longer effectively constrained by genuinely competitive elections. This date is supported 
by, for example, Anderson (1988), who notes that Marcos began entrenching his regime before 
declaring martial law, and Canoy (1980), who alleges that the plan to implement martial law was 




as indeed they were. No politician of national stature, no President whether 
incumbent or aspiring, dared to antagonize this entrenched and privileged group 
unless he desired to commit political suicide. 
He was also limited by the legislature, which Canoy (1980, 154) describes as an “unruly 
crowd” of “old political pros” who were experts at political blackmail and other 
noninstitutional forms of politics, and who could not easily be dominated. Compounding 
this, during Marcos’s first term the legislature was controlled by members of the Liberal 
party, which he had defected from to gain the presidential nomination (Abinales & 
Amoroso, 2005). Thus, it is clear that the initial period of the Marcos regime began with a 
de facto power-sharing agreement, resulting from the pre-existing distribution of power 
within the system, firmly in place.  
Yet Marcos was already making moves to undermine these constraints and increase his 
personal power. As soon as he took office he began hinting that he would revise 
constitutional term limits, and in 1968 his wife, Imelda, denounced major political 
families as oligarchs who controlled the country at the expense of the common people 
(Canoy, 1980). He also began working towards gaining the support of the military. Prior 
to the Marcos presidency the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had had no political 
influence as a body and was effectively under civilian control. Appropriations for the 
military also depended on political approval, further cementing the dependent role of the 
military hierarchy on the political elite (Wurfel, 1988).  
Marcos expanded the military’s sphere of responsibilities and began moving it towards 
taking an active role in politics. From 1965 onwards, he began appointing officers from 
his home region of Ilocos to key positions within the military (Canoy, 1980). Plans for the 
declaration of martial law were already in development during this period at high levels 
within the military, with the cooperation of the United States (Canoy, 1980; Wurfel, 1988). 
The military’s role was expanded to include economic development projects, particularly 
through the use of the AFP’s engineering capabilities (Hernandez, 1984). The military was 
also given an expanded internal security role. Marcos set up the Philippine Constabulary 
Metropolitan Command [METROCOM] in 1968. This was a rapid-response special forces 
unit based in central Manila and tasked with dealing with urban unrest, particularly the 
student and labour activism that was increasing around the time of Marcos’s second 
election campaign. In conjunction with the Presidential Security Command, METROCOM 
was also responsible for providing security for Marcos and his family from 1969 onwards 
(Hernandez, 1984).  
Marcos’s first major power grab came in 1969 when he ran for re-election. Having already 
run severe budget deficits to pay for pork barrel projects during his first term (Thompson, 
1995), he spent as much as US$50 million—most of it misappropriated from the public 
purse—on electioneering, which amounted to a substantial increase on previous 
campaigns and strained the government’s resources to such an extent that it led to an 
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economic crisis and rapidly rising inflation (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005).56 This was 
accompanied by extensive corruption, fraud, and violence, seen by many as the worst 
since 1949, when Liberal candidate Elpidio Quirino’s campaign had held areas of the 
Philippines in a “virtual reign of terror” to ensure election (Hedman & Sidel, 2000, 20). 
Marcos’s 1969 campaign was seen by other elites as violating norms of political 
behaviour; as one commentator put it, he ignored “with impunity the ground rules of our 
kind of politics” (cited in Thompson, 1995, 37). His opponent, Sergio Osmeña Jr., famously 
complained that he had “won the election but lost in the counting”, having everywhere 
been “out-gunned, out-gooned and out-gold.”57 Yet the gamble paid off, and Marcos 
became the first Philippine president to win re-election for a full second term. 
Marcos’s re-election proved to be the strongest challenge to the cohesion of the elite to 
date. In the aftermath of the election, those who had not benefited from his success began 
to mistrust his intentions and suspect that his accumulation of personal power—
evidenced by his unprecedented re-election—indicated a lack of commitment to the 
interests of the elite as a whole (Wurfel, 1988; Thompson, 1995). Prominent figures, 
including the Lopez family, began to withdraw their support in favour of potential 
competitors (Wurfel, 1988). Attacks on Marcos from the elite-controlled Manila press 
began to increase, at the same time as student and labour protests grew in intensity. 
 
5.3.2. Martial law and establishment of personal autocracy 
Marcos’s second term began with the so-called First Quarter Storm, a period of protest 
from January to March of 1970. The late 1960s had seen the formation of a number of 
student groups, including leftists drawing from Marxist or Maoist ideologies as well as 
activist Catholic groups. Initially espousing a range of demands including land reform and 
an end to American neo-colonial involvement in the Philippines, after the 1969 demands 
escalated and became openly anti-Marcos, with many thousands taking part in protests at 
his re-election (Wurfel, 1988). A campaign of teach-ins, demonstrations, burning of 
effigies, and riots gained momentum after the initial rounds of protests, as student 
organisations began building networks with teachers, workers, and activist farmers. 
Clashes with police and the armed forces led to the deaths of nearly two dozen students 
between 1970 and 1972 (Wurfel, 1988; Celoza, 1997). At the same time, a new insurgency 
emerged out of a split within the previously-dormant Communist Party of the Philippines: 
the NPA was founded in March 1969 and quickly became active in a large number of 
provinces (Thompson, 1995). The NPA were blamed by the president for the Plaza 
                                                        
 
56 Estimates of election spending in this campaign by Marcos vary widely; Thompson (1995) cites 
figures of up to US$250 million. 
57 Durdin, Tillman. New York Times, 16 November 1969. “Charges of fraud and violence follow 




Miranda bombing in August of 1971, when a grenade attack on a Liberal Party rally 
maimed several senior Liberal politicians and killed several other attendees. 
The Plaza Miranda bombing, in the context of widespread unrest, was the reason given 
for the declaration of martial law. Yet this was only a pretext: Wurfel (1988) points out 
that the military command had reported only three days prior to martial law being 
announced that internal security conditions were only slightly worse than ‘normal’, 
indicating the degree to which Marcos was exaggerating the threat of student radicals and 
the NPA for political purposes. A more important factor was that Marcos was reaching the 
end of his constitutionally-mandate term in office. In order to extend his tenure, he 
strongly supported a shift to a parliamentary system in the national Constitutional 
Convention, which had begun in 1971 for the purpose of replacing the outdated 1935 
constitution (Canoy, 1980). This would have allowed him to stay on as prime minister 
rather than president. The majority of the delegates approved the move to a 
parliamentary system. But more than half of the delegates had also signed a petition to 
include a provision blocking Marcos or any of his relatives from holding office in the 
future. Although the motion was not included in the subsequent constitution, and despite 
extensive behind-the-scenes manipulation, it became apparent to Marcos that he would 
not be able to override the constitutional constraints on his tenure in time to secure a 
further term (Celoza, 1997).  
Forced to make a bolder and riskier move to retain power, on the September 23, 1972, 
Marcos announced Proclamation no. 1081 instituting martial law. The military 
immediately raided and closed schools, religious institutions, communications networks, 
and newspapers, and arrested opposition figures including student, labour, and peasant 
leaders and organisers, journalists, and businesspeople. The political elite were not 
exempt, and major figures such as Benigno Aquino Jr. and several members of the 
offending Constitutional Convention were arrested and imprisoned, while others fled the 
country in order to avoid imprisonment (Wurfel, 1988).  
The military was used to disarm the private armies that had served to secure the position 
of powerful families in the countryside, with official figures announcing that 145 separate 
militias had been forcibly demobilised and half a million firearms seized.58 An additional 
move to undermine elites’ local power was the incorporation of local police—which had 
until then been largely under the control of local-level political leaders—into a national 
organisation under the command of the AFP (Hernandez, 1984). A land reform process 
was implemented, intended the break up some of the largest plantations belonging to the 
largest landed families which retained political influence (Sidel, 1989).  
In conjunction with these measures, Marcos also acted against the elite by closing 
Congress in December 1972. This had been a bastion of support for elite families with 
                                                        
 
58 McBeth, John, Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 September 1989 “The Boss System: Manila’s 
disarray leaves countryside under local barons.” 
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agricultural interests, and there is a consensus that its closure was the most severe blow 
to their ability to prevent the president from acting against their interests (e.g., Hawes, 
1987; Wurfel, 1988). During the early phases of the implementation of martial law Marcos 
especially moved against some of the largest families which were in opposition to his rule. 
Three major families were initially targeted: the Lopezes, the Osmeñas, and the Aquino-
Cojuangcos, all of them large landholders with extensive business interests (Wurfel, 
1979).  
The Lopezes in particular were singled out for destruction. Both Fernando and Eugenio 
Lopez had been extremely influential in pre-martial law politics, with Fernando being a 
key ally of Marcos during his first term and the beginning of his second (Roces, 2000). 
Eugenio Lopez was out of the country when martial law was announced but dared not 
return; Marcos imprisoned his son, Eugenio Jr., for use as a bargaining chip instead. With 
a hostage Marcos was able to force the Lopez family to sell their ‘crown jewel’, their 
monopoly over electricity supply to Manila, for a pittance (Roces, 2000). Other firms were 
similarly ‘sold’ to the Marcos Foundation or seized outright by the military.  
But such open moves against political families generated widespread fear amongst the 
elite that the Marcos regime threatened private fortunes more generally. To avoid 
provoking outright elite rebellion, after 1973 seizures of private firms were curtailed, and 
by 1978 it was announced that some businesses which had been seized would be returned 
(Wurfel, 1979). Yet the point had been made: Marcos had demonstrated publicly and 
effectively that he was capable of destroying even one of the most prominent families in 
the country if they went against him, thus simultaneously undermining the political clan 
most capable of opposing him and setting an example for those watching (Hawes, 1987). 
Marcos challenged not only the industrial bases of families’ wealth and political influence 
but also moved against their agricultural wealth. His did this by centralising agricultural 
industries and then siphoning off the surplus that would have gone to the wealthy 
landowners (Hawes, 1987). While this undoubtedly made Marcos and his inner circle of 
cronies very rich, it also undermined the elites’ ability to mobilise local political support, 
given the importance of money and patronage networks outlined above.  
An illustrative example is the sugar industry. Sugar production was characterised by 
extreme levels of income inequality and heavy concentration of wealth in the hands of 
landowners (Cherniguin, 1988), and a large proportion of the political elite came from 
sugar producing regions, including the Lopezes and the Cojuangcos. The sugar bloc had 
been important in electing Macapagal in 1961, and as their profits increased due to 
favourable trade conditions with the United States they became increasingly assertive on 
the political scene. In 1974, however, the United States re-imposed import duties on 
Philippine sugar, forcing the previously-protected producers to compete on the world 
market and denying them market protection and subsidies which had made up a large 
portion of their economic and political power.  
Marcos took advantage of the opportunity and issued a decree giving the government 
monopoly control over sugar exports, including the setting of purchase prices, a decree 
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which Hawes (1987, 94) labels “every bit as important as the abolition of Congress two 
years earlier in President Marcos’s continuing effort to reshape the Philippine political 
economy.” Central control over the sugar trade left producers completely dependent on 
the state for their continued survival and removed the economic resources that had made 
them the most powerful political bloc in the country. By 1980 an estimated 95% of sugar 
growers had been unable to repay bank loans on time and only half were able to make a 
profit in the subsequent year, and the ability of the elites who relied on profits from sugar 
to unite in order challenge Marcos had been severely constrained (Hawes, 1987).  
The same pattern of centralisation and siphoning of profits was also seen in the coconut 
industry. In both cases, elites with substantial agricultural interests were attacked by 
having their wealth expropriated at the same time as Congress, their institutional access 
to the presidency, was closed. As Hawes (1987, 82) concludes,  
The losers were the landlord politicians. Ultimately their defeat was to prove important, 
because in the countryside these were the people who provided leadership in the elite 
opposition movement that developed after the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino 
in 1983. 
With regard to the industrial entrepreneurs, the majority of influential business leaders 
either lost political influence or were excluded from the ruling coalition entirely between 
1969 and 1975 (Makil, 1975); observers noted that the influence of those who survived 
qualitatively changed, and was largely subordinated by Marcos. The core support group 
almost without exception owed their positions entirely to Marcos’s continued favour, 
making it impossible for them to constrain him. However, open moves against the 
powerful families declined after Marcos had neutralised the Lopezes, especially, as these 
were generating a lot of fear amongst the economic elite that the martial law regime was 
threatening the security of their private fortunes (Wurfel, 1979). As a result, government 
takeovers after 1973 slowed markedly, and after 1978 it was announced that some 
government-expropriated businesses would be returned to their former owners. 
After 1972, Marcos took personal control of appointments in all areas of government (Lee, 
2015). The military’s budget was greatly expanded, increasing tenfold in the five years 
from 1972 to 1977 (Wurfel, 1988) and the number of personnel grew from about 55,000 
in 1972 to approximately 200,000 by 1984 (Hernandez, 1985). Much of this expansion 
was paid for with aid from the United States; in comparison with Indonesia, for example, 
Wurfel (1988) points out that relatively little of the military’s institutional funding came 
from areas outside the government budget such as military-owned corporations. 
Privately, however, officers benefited greatly from the martial law regime, and often came 
to supplant the role of patron that had previously been held by politicians and land-
owners; they could, for example, speed up applications and cut red tape for their friends 
and family. As well as material benefits, Marcos ensured the military’s loyalty by 
occasionally purging its leadership and encouraging factional rivalries (Wurfel, 1988). 
After the declaration of martial law, the process of drafting a constitution was “speeded 
up” and a draft version was approved by November of 1972 (Celoza, 1997, 48). This draft 
gave Marcos an extended stay in power as head of the ‘interim’ National Assembly, with 
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no time limit for this body. It also retrospectively justified and legalised the declaration of 
martial law and the orders that Marcos had issued in the initial phases. In addition, the 
new constitution gave the president extensive legislative powers. The process of ratifying 
the constitution was manipulated by the executive branch, despite some public 
opposition; in particular, the consultation process involved an apparently clearly 
manipulated process of counting hands in barangay meetings without any oversight or 
independent monitoring (Wurfel, 1988). 
Throughout the 1970s Marcos continued to expand his patronage network while 
removing anyone who did not have direct ties to him through patron-client relationships. 
A large part of this consisted of cutting out the intermediaries in the patronage game, 
especially members of Congress, and centralising both decision-making and the 
distribution of pork-barrel funds in the office of the President (Wurfel, 1988). For 
example, the Executive Secretary had been an extremely powerful position in the pre-
martial law years, due to the office’s ability to control the flow of paperwork to and from 
Malacañang; whoever held the position was widely referred to as the ‘little president’. In 
December 1975 Marcos eliminated the position, effectively putting decision-making in 
the executive branch directly in his own hands (Celoza, 1997, 69). It was also 
accomplished by carrying out purges of the bureaucracy, ostensibly in the name of rooting 
out corruption. In actuality, of course, those who were purged were those without ties to 
the president; the same tactic was used with success again in the run-up to the 1980 
election (Wurfel, 1988). Those who remained were kept on a tight reign: a 1975 
referendum extended the term of local officials beyond what was constitutionally 
mandated, effectively tying their ongoing position and livelihood to Marcos’s continuation 
in power (Celoza, 1997).  
Constitutional amendments in 1976 consolidated presidential power even further by, for 
example, enabling Marcos to personally nominate changes to the constitution. Previously, 
such suggestions would have had to have come from a constitutional convention or the 
National Assembly, making future amendments even easier to pass (Canoy, 1980). He also 
gained almost unlimited abilities to make legislation, including the ability to rule by 
decree even after martial law had been lifted when, “in the judgement of the President 
(Prime Minister)”, a state of emergency or threat thereof existed or whenever the National 
Assembly failed “to act adequately on any matter for any reason” (1973 Constitution of 
the Republic of the Philippines, Amend. 5 & 6 [1976]). 
By the mid-1970s Marcos had effectively succeeded in creating a personal autocracy, in 
which he no longer needed to balance his own goals against competing interests within 
the regime. Political influence, which had once involved give and take between clients who 
needed patronage and patrons who needed support, shifted to become much more 
unidirectional. A contemporary observer notes that “a person’s influence [in 1975] 
depended on how much he was listened to by the man on top, specifically, the President. 
The crucial direction is upward, and only upward” (Makil, 1975, 32-33, emphasis 
original). An anonymous panellist in Makil’s study puts it more bluntly: 
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Unlike in 1969-1970, when power was broadly based, there is only one power now. There 
is a polarization—no, not even that—a monopoly of power and influence by the President 
and his wife. The others have disappeared. (Makil, 1975, 33, emphasis original) 
 
5.3.3. Opposition to the Marcos regime 
Following his establishment of a personal autocracy, Marcos began easing restrictions on 
politics, allowing a degree of superficial competition. In September 1976 he instituted a 
temporary Legislative Advisory Council, the Batasang Bayan, dominated by his family and 
close allies, which was to be replaced by an elected interim National Assembly, the 
Batasang Pambansa, in April 1978 as an attempt to legitimise the regime in the eyes of the 
nation and of the international community (Wurfel, 1988). In order to coordinate his 
patronage networks and more efficiently manipulate the election to ensure victory, 
Marcos then established the New Society Movement (Kilusan Bagong Lipunan, KBL) party 
in February that year, while allowing a small opposition to campaign under heavy 
restrictions. Despite the KBL’s best efforts, the opposition—led by Benigno Aquino from 
jail—gained a higher degree of public support than anticipated, with public rallies and a 
widespread noise campaign in Manila demonstrating that the great majority of the city’s 
population opposed the regime. In response to this undesired show of opposition Marcos 
ensured his victory by transparently rigging the results, with the KBL sweeping to victory 
(Celoza, 1997). As expected, the interim National Assembly was a rubber-stamp 
legislature, referred to in the popular press as “an expensive Xerox copying machine” and 
acknowledged as a façade even by its own membership (cited in Celoza, 1997, 65).  
By the end of the 1970s, nonviolent opposition to Marcos could be divided into three 
groups: students and labour, who were in loose alliance with one another, church and 
middle-class civic groups, and Marcos’s elite rivals for power, most notably former 
Nacionalista and Liberal party members who had been marginalised during the martial 
law period (Corsino, 1981). Despite an apparent level of support, the elite opposition was 
not able to seriously challenge Marcos for several reasons in addition to the ‘incumbency 
advantage’ exercised by the regime. Most of the political elite had joined the KBL party 
quickly in order to ensure their continued positions and access to patronage. At this early 
stage there were few incentives to defect from the party, as the opposition remained small 
and divided over the decision made by various factions to either boycott or participate in 
the 1978 sham elections (Wurfel, 1988). After the majority of politicians had already 
joined the KBL Marcos also made ‘turncoatism’ illegal through a combination of decrees, 
raising a substantial barrier to defection (Canoy, 1980). Perhaps most importantly, there 
was also a widespread belief at the elite level that the martial law situation would be only 
temporary, and that once it was lifted Marcos would not be able to retain control. The 
possibility of “anyone but Marcos” winning the presidency in a subsequent campaign thus 
prevented the most prominent elites from uniting behind a single opposition leader 
(Canoy, 1980, 56). 
112 
 
Against elites’ expectations, however, when Marcos did lift martial law in 1981 the 
balance of power remained unaffected, and he retained his personal control of the regime. 
In particular, constitutional amendments passed in 1976 meant that Marcos effectively 
retained a presidential veto over parliamentary legislation, an ability to make legislation 
himself, and the right to detain anyone he considered to be subversive, while all of the 
decrees made under martial law remained in place (Sodusta & Palongpalong, 1982). 
Although political space increased somewhat, with an uptick in student and labour 
protests in 1981-82, Marcos was able to win the presidential election of 1981 with 88% 
of the vote while keeping the opposition divided (Sodusta & Palongpalong, 1981; Wurfel, 
1988). By the end of 1982 Marcos was judged by observers to be “fully in control of the 
situation”, and this period has since been cited as the height of his personal power 
(Solidum, 1983, 244; Celoza, 1997).  
Perhaps compounded by the revelation that Marcos would not willingly stand down after 
all, elite opposition was growing, as figures who had been passed over for success in the 
KBL began to defect from the regime. Two of the most significant of these were the Laurel 
brothers, House Speaker Jose Jr. and former Senator Salvador. Although they had 
challenged Marcos from within the Nacionalista party prior to 1972—as has already been 
pointed out, a common occurrence in Filipino politics—they had cooperated with Marcos 
during the during the martial law period, with Salvador Laurel running for parliament as 
a member of KBL. The reason for their defection from Marcos was stated most clearly by 
Jose Jr.: “I am fighting Marcos because I have an investment in him. I was hoping to collect 
but I have waited long enough” (cited in Thompson, 1995, 103). The Laurel family had 
one of the best-maintained political machines outside the Marcos’s own regional bases, 
and their defection was a major blow to the regime. They revived the hitherto-defunct 
Nacionalista party, attracting other defectors and opportunists from the KBL, and were 
able to achieve a measure of success in the 1980 local elections (Wurfel, 1988; Thompson, 
1995). 
A number of political parties formed a loose association called the United Democratic 
Opposition (UNIDO) in August 1980. Weakened by personal feuds amongst its members, 
it was initially ineffective. In 1982 it was re-formed as a more cohesive alliance of 12 
parties and renamed the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (Solidum, 1983). 
Notably, UNIDO included a “Who’s Who” of pre-martial law Liberal and Nacionalista 
politicians, representing a number of powerful factions from both parties, all of whom had 
lost political influence during the martial law period (Thompson, 1995, 104). Its leaders 
were a potent force, bringing political skills, financial resources, old patronage networks 
and organisational ability to the growing opposition movement (Wurfel, 1988). Another 
organisation outside the UNIDO umbrella was the PDP-Laban party, which had resulted 
from a merger of the Philippine Democracy Party, formed in 1982, and the Laban (“Fight”) 
Party, formed by popular former senator Benigno Aquino Jr. in 1978 (Kessler, 1984).  
However, although the nonviolent opposition, broadly put, was attracting high-level 
defections, it remained heavily divided and had great difficulty coordinating against 
Marcos. Opposition politics was highly individualistic and polarised along ideological 
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lines (Solidum, 1983). For example, a conference in January 1984 gathered 2,400 anti-
Marcos political figures under one roof, but the atmosphere was “heated” and unity at this 
point “extremely fragile”, as even the recognition of a common problem and a need to 
work together marked “major concessions” from all sides.59 Even by 1984 UNIDO 
remained a broad alliance rather than a cohesive opposition organisation. It also lacked 
local-level organisational reach and an ability to mobilise mass support (Wurfel, 1985).  
 
5.3.4. The Aquino assassination 
Perhaps the most serious threat to Marcos from the elite opposition was Benigno Aquino 
Jr., who was widely popular despite having been incarcerated since 1972 and possibly a 
figure capable of uniting the opposition (Aquino, 1984). Recognising this, Marcos allowed 
Aquino to travel to the United States for medical treatment in 1980; a military death 
sentence that had been passed on him in 1977 made it clear that he had been sent into 
exile (Wurfel, 1988).  
Despite the threat to his life, by 1983 Aquino believed that he would be able to safely 
return to the Philippines (Aquino, 1984). He also apparently intended to negotiate the 
presidential succession with Marcos, who was beginning to show signs of ill-health 
(Wurfel, 1988). But upon landing at Manila International Airport on August 21, 1983, he 
was shot dead by an assassin, an act which shocked the country and led immediately to 
the widespread politicisation of large sectors of the population, many of whom believed 
Marcos to be ultimately responsible (Aquino, 1984). Protests broke out across the 
country, involving well over one million participants, while United States president 
Ronald Reagan cancelled a scheduled trip to the Philippines (Aquino, 1984).  
Aquino’s assassination prompted a marked increase in the diversity of the opposition. One 
of the most important consequences was the mobilisation of business groups from the 
Makati financial district against Marcos, many of which were led by figures associated 
with the ‘old wealth’ of the political elite (Wurfel, 1988). In frequent large protests over 
the following months, these formerly “sedate and conservative” groups began explicitly 
calling for Marcos’s resignation over his authoritarian rule and mismanagement of the 
economy (Aquino, 1984, 267). The Catholic church also lent its informal support to 
UNIDO, expanding the elite opposition’s ability to mobilise mass support through its 
extensive organisational and communication networks including Radio Veritas, which 
would play a key role in the events of the People Power revolution itself (Aquino, 1984). 
Wurfel argues that the support of these two groups for the elite opposition had profound 
consequences, particularly by making it “easier for United States policymakers to think 
about alternatives to Marcos” (1988, 278). The United States government, in response to 
Marcos’s public loss of legitimacy as well as the worsening economic situation, 
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increasingly began putting pressure on him to carry out at least some measure of reform 
(Wurfel, 1988). 
Despite mounting protests against Marcos and the defection of supporters from his 
regime, it soon became clear that the president would not resign or offer meaningful 
reforms (Thompson, 1995). Bowing to calls from the United States government, however, 
he did agree to allow parliamentary elections in May 1984. Most of the opposition and 
external observers agreed that the only purpose of this was to offer a semblance of 
legitimacy to the regime; however, UNIDO and some other smaller political parties 
thought that it might be possible to bring about a change in leadership, and contested the 
election, although more radical leftist organisations boycotted (Wurfel, 1988). As 
expected, Marcos and the KBL resorted to outright fraud as well as ballot stuffing and 
bribery to ensure victory, including spending approximately 10% of all government tax 
revenue for the previous year on patronage (Wurfel, 1988). The KBL also had control over 
most of the mass media, while UNIDO had to rely on Radio Veritas and campaign rallies, 
particularly by Benigno’s widow Corazon Aquino, to spread their message. Mass outrage 
at the assassination of Aquino and frustration with years of dictatorship was not enough 
to unseat Marcos; the opposition, however, did secure a third of the seats in the National 
Assembly. 
The 1984 to 1985 period saw intense negotiation amongst the leadership of UNIDO, as 
they tried to settle on a presidential candidate who would be capable of defeating Marcos. 
While Salvador Laurel—the younger of the two defectors from the KBL—was the leader 
of the coalition, he was deeply distrusted by much of the business and church community 
for his earlier cooperation with Marcos and his family’s historical connections to the 
Marcoses (Thompson, 1995). He also had an image as too much of a trapo (traditional 
politician) who was “too much like the guy we’re trying to get rid of”, one who would not 
bring about any real change if he were to be elected (cited in Thompson, 1995, 133).  
An alternative was Corazon Aquino, Benigno Aquino Jr.’s widow. She had widespread 
popular appeal due to her moral stature in the aftermath of her husband’s assassination 
and her image as a “simple housewife” (Anderson, 1988, 4).60 Aquino had an apparently 
genuine preference not to be nominated, but was pressured to accept it by opposition 
politicians, friends, and family, and a 1 million-signature petition organised by Joaquin 
Roces, another member of the old elite (Roces, 2000). Initially she intended to run as the 
nominee of the PDP-Laban party, which had to this point remained stubbornly separate 
from UNIDO (Kessler, 1984). But in December 1985 Jaime Cardinal Sin negotiated an 
agreement whereby Aquino would run for president under the UNIDO banner, while 
Laurel would run as vice president instead (Timberman, 1987). 
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5.3.5. Civil resistance and regime breakdown 
In the lead up to 1986, dissent began to surface within Marcos’s ruling coalition. In 1983 
the KBL was characterised by polarisation and competing factions which were “just 
waiting for Marcos to leave the scene before manoeuvring for power” (Aquino, 1984, 
275). Minister of Defence Juan Ponce Enrile and another close ally, Eduardo Cojuangco, 
were noted as showing signs of ambition for Marcos’s position, with both seen as possible 
challengers for the presidency.61 Divisions became more prominent in 1985 as Marcos’s 
health problems led to jockeying for power at the top of the KBL. Minister of Labour Bias 
Ople, Enrile, and Marcos’s wife Imelda were all seen as having presidential ambitions, and 
began trying to distance themselves from the regime by articulating independent 
positions on key issues (Youngblood, 1986). Arturo Tolentino, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, openly criticised Marcos’s continued decree powers, while Enrile and Imelda 
Marcos clashed at a KBL leadership gathering in an open sign of disunity (Youngblood, 
1986). By the end of 1985 divisions in the KBL were “barely concealed”, with a 
presidential spokesman acknowledging that there were “‘fissures’” in the party centred 
on the three main candidates for the presidency (Youngblood, 1986, 226). However, none 
of the three major potential rivals for Marcos’s position within the ruling coalition were 
willing to sacrifice their own chances of taking the presidency in order to support one of 
the others. They preferred instead to stay loyal and wait it out rather than initiate a 
rebellion; this was demonstrated by Marcos’s easy defeat of an impeachment bid from the 
National Assembly in August 1985, for example (Youngblood, 1986). 
Although divisions in the civilian side of the KBL were primarily driven by opportunism 
over Marcos’s apparent ill health, personalisation more directly contributed to divisions 
amongst the military members of the ruling coalition, as Lee (2015) has shown. During 
martial law the AFP had become heavily involved in politics, acting as a major part of 
Marcos’s patronage network (Davide et al., 1990, II.C.1.h.). In order to increase his level 
of control over the military, Marcos took sole charge of promotions, with personal loyalty 
being the primary criterion for advancement (Davide et al., 1990, II.D). Organisational 
cohesion as a whole suffered from politicised jockeying for position, resulting in a 
substantial loss of professionalism and consequent inefficiency in the face of ongoing 
insurgencies (Aquino, 1984; Youngblood, 1986).  
Marcos particularly favoured a faction of the military centred on General Fabian Ver, who 
had been made AFP Chief of Staff in 1981 over a non-loyalist alternative, General Fidel 
Ramos (Aquino, 1984). Ver, Ramos, and Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, amongst 
others, had all been part of a group of military officers who had been in consultation with 
Marcos over the implementation of martial law (Davide et al., 1990, II.C), but Ramos and 
Enrile had been marginalised within the ruling coalition relative to Ver following the 
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establishment of personal rule. Officers loyal to Ver had benefited substantially from 
martial law and were prominent in areas such as intelligence, police, special combat, 
home defence, and other units (Aquino, 1984). They were, however, often more familiar 
with civilian than military affairs, and as a result were seen as ‘civilians in uniform’ and 
resented by the career officers who had been blocked from promotion to higher ranks 
(Aquino, 1984; Davide et al., 1990, II.D).  
As Ver expanded his influence within the military, a number of subversive organisations 
emerged, most notably RAM, which was formed around 1982 (Davide et al., 1990, II.C). At 
the time it cited discontent over corruption, favouritism, lack of professionalism in the 
military, and the scandal caused by the military’s alleged involvement in the Aquino 
assassination. Yet the Davide commission found that it was largely organised by Enrile 
due to persistent rumours that he was to be eliminated or that he wouldn’t have a chance 
at gaining the presidency if Marcos were to die or step down (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A). 
According to Enrile’s own account, while the movement tapped into genuinely-held 
grievances and did aim at reforming the military, it also existed to provide protection for 
his own personal safety and political interests against Ver and the Marcoses (Davide et al., 
1990, IV.A).  
RAM organising increased in 1985 as its members began actively preparing for a coup 
attempt (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A). Before initiating the attempt, however, its leaders 
needed to assess that there were the appropriate political and economic conditions for a 
coup to be successful, including widespread support for a change of government at both 
the popular and elite level. Military involvement in the 1986 election campaign—secretly 
funded by anti-Marcos businesspeople—gave RAM officers a clear signal that there was 
widespread public discontent with Marcos (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A). The organisation 
also met repeatedly with prominent opposition figures in 1985 and early 1986, including 
Corazon Aquino and Cardinal Jaime Sin as well as organisations representing business, 
media, and civil society (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A). The RAM was thus able to judge that 
there were favourable political conditions for coup success. The relationship between the 
effect that the establishment of personal autocracy had had on the ruling elite, the 
expression of popular discontent with the Marcos regime, and the decision to attempt a 
coup are summed up in the testimony of a senior RAM member given after the fact:  
The signal and encouragement from the different sectors of society to unite and move 
against the dictatorship of Mr. Marcos were too loud and strong to be ignored. 
Eventually, we were subtly encouraged, if not practically pushed, by the Opposition 
[sic] groups . . . to either stage a coup or start a revolution (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A, 
¶13) 
It is thus clear from the evidence gathered by the Davide Commission that the presence 
of an opposition movement with mass support enabled potentially rebellious elites within 
the ruling coalition, namely Enrile and Ramos, to overcome the barriers to action that had 
been imposed by Marcos’s personalisation of power. This involved an informal survey of 
public opinion through the military’s involvement in the 1986 election campaign as well 
as direct negotiation with leaders of the opposition movement, which allowed the plotters 
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to gain enough information to be confident that a coup attempt would receive popular 
support – as indeed turned out to be the case during the events of February 22-25. 
Although the coup itself was not successful, it was the direct proximate cause of both the 
mass protest along EDSA and the widespread defections within the regime’s security 
forces that ultimately forced Marcos to step down. 
 
5.4. Case study conclusion  
This first part of the qualitative component builds on the quantitative findings presented 
in Chapter 4 by examining Ferdinand Marcos’s rule of the Philippines from 1965 to 1986 
as a ‘most likely’ case for the establishment of personal autocracy leading to civil 
resistance success. Indeed, the analysis presented here shows that the regime matches 
the concept of personal autocracy well from the mid-1970s onwards, with 1976 probably 
marking the latest point at which power-sharing can be said to have decisively broken 
down. As anticipated, Marcos took office under conditions of power-sharing, being limited 
by the need to work through existing patronage networks and an ‘unruly’ legislature. This 
obliged him to take into account the interests of competing centres of power within the 
regime, particularly those of wealthy political families with backgrounds in agricultural 
production and industrial manufacturing. Although Marcos began making moves to 
consolidate power almost immediately upon taking office, I conclude that the Philippines 
was certainly a power-sharing regime during his first two terms in office, from 1965 to 
1972, and perhaps remained so—despite the closure of the legislature—for one or two 
years after the declaration of martial law, while the landowning families still retained 
some influence. After this point, however, Marcos thoroughly subverted power-sharing 
by undermining his rivals’ economic and coercive resources, stacking the ruling coalition 
with members of the military—whom he was able to more reliably control than the old 
political elite—and purging the bureaucracy of rivals’ supporters. Marcos’s personal 
authority was cemented in 1976 with revisions to the constitution granting him, amongst 
other powers, the authority to rule by decree and to personally make further changes to 
the constitution. His political dominance was clearly demonstrated when he created a 
new, compliant national assembly and political party and then lifted martial law without 
giving up his personal control of the regime.  
The connection between the establishment of personal autocracy and the extension of 
leader tenure is also displayed in this case. Notably, the declaration of martial law not only 
allowed Marcos to remove one of the main constraints on his position—the need to work 
through the legislature—it also allowed him to overcome the constitutional eight year 
limit on his time in office. An outright refusal to step down at the end of his term could 
easily have been met with a strong challenge from the ruling coalition, as it would have 
clearly signalled an intention to consolidate personal power. Declaring martial law not 
only allowed Marcos to delay the formal requirement to step down, as well as giving him 
the opportunity to dominate the constitutional revision process that was initiated shortly 
afterwards, it also introduced an element of uncertainty regarding his intentions. This 
caused the political elite to mistakenly believe that the situation would be only temporary, 
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and that Marcos would surrender power after martial law was lifted, thus limiting their 
willingness to take risky actions to remove him once he began acting against their 
interests. This case is thus exemplifies why lengthy time in office is a suitable indirect 
indicator of personal autocracy, as Marcos’s 20 years in power would have been 
impossible to achieve without breaching the power-sharing agreement.  
Once personal autocracy had been established, Marcos deterred rebellion from within the 
ruling coalition through discretionary distribution of patronage, carrying out periodic 
purges, undermining independent centres of power, and carrying out limited but high 
profile attacks on targeted rivals, as well as disguising his intentions to remain in office. 
This did generate grievances amongst members of the ruling coalition, particularly those 
who were passed over for promotion as a result of internal jockeying for position or were 
marginalised from patronage flows. In the absence of a strong, unified opposition 
movement with mass support, however, this did not lead those who had lost out in intra-
regime struggles to launch a coordinated attempt to remove Marcos, with those losing out 
from personalisation either defecting individually or choosing to remain within the 
system to collect continued, if reduced, benefits from supporting Marcos.  
With the onset of civil resistance, though, these grievances led to Marcos’s downfall. In 
particular, Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile created the RAM organisation within the 
armed forces to defend his personal safety and political interests from the Marcoses and 
his main rival, AFP Chief of Staff Fabian Ver. The process by which RAM decided to launch 
a coup attempt, which acted as the trigger for mass protests along EDSA and led directly 
to the cascade of defections in the regime’s security forces and Marcos’s decision to flee, 
illustrates how civil resistance can overcome barriers to elite coordination imposed by 
personal autocracy. The organisers themselves stated very clearly that it was the signal 
from the opposition that there was widespread support for an alternative to Marcos that 
prompted them to initiate the challenge, something that was facilitated by direct 
observation of the election campaign and close communication with the leadership of the 
movement. As mentioned earlier, while the loss of support from the United States played 
an important role in Marcos’s final downfall—particularly influencing the manner in 
which it took place—it was this prior loss of support from within the ruling coalition that, 
I argue, crucially undermined his ability to survive in office through the mass protest 
campaign. This case study thus illustrates how the creation of a personal autocracy, while 
increasing the benefits of rule to the autocrat and deterring challenges from inside the 









6.1.1. 2013 election protest campaign 
In mid-July 2013 Cambodia’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), led by Hun Sen since 
1985, allowed exiled opposition leader Sam Rainsy to return to the country to compete in 
the upcoming general election. Intended to deflect international criticism by granting a 
degree of legitimacy to the election while also improving Hun Sen’s image as a 
magnanimous leader, the move backfired, as Sam Rainsy was met by crowds numbering 
in the tens of thousands (Strangio, 2014, 259).62 Supported by Rainsy’s popularity, a shift 
in demographics towards a younger population, and increased access to information, the 
opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) shocked the CPP by securing 44.5% 
of the vote against the CPP’s 48.8% (Strangio, 2014, 259-260).  
The election itself was tainted by accusations of widespread electoral fraud, with the 
number of suspect ballots much greater than the margin of victory claimed by the CPP.63 
Immediately, Sam Rainsy called for the creation of a special committee to investigate, and 
demanded either new polls in the worst-affected provinces or a complete rerun of the 
election.64 The first major rally took place on August 6, with at least 10,000 participants 
gathering at Phnom Penh’s so-called Freedom Park, a designated space for protest near 
the city centre; troops and tanks were deployed throughout the city in response.65 Initial 
protests involved training sessions emphasising nonviolent tactics and discipline, and 
attracted up to 20,000 participants in early September.66 After the national electoral 
commission confirmed the CPP’s victory, the CNRP boycotted parliament and called for 
further protests; during September the first major violence occurred, as one protestor 
was killed while trying to remove barricades erected by security forces around Freedom 
Park.67 As rolling protests continued, regularly attracting 20,000 participants or more, a 
                                                        
 
62 A note on names: Cambodian names consist of a family name followed by a given name(s), so 
Hun Sen’s family name is ‘Hun’ and his given name ‘Sen’. However, usage is inconsistent in 
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occurring in the source material is used to avoid confusion. 
63 Economist, 29 July 2013, “Cambodia’s election: Feeling cheated”; Wall Street Journal, 2 August 
2013, “Cambodia’s tainted election.” 
64 Al Jazeera, 30 July 2013, “Cambodia opposition claims massive poll fraud.” 
65 Reuters, 6 August 2013, “Thousands protest in Cambodia as opposition rejects poll result.” 
66 Vong Sokheng & Kevin Ponniah, Phnom Penh Post, 5 September 2013, “A lesson in non-violence”; 
Xinhua News Agency, 7 September 2013, “Cambodia’s mass protest over poll results ends 
peacefully.” 
67 Al Jazeera, 16 September 2013, “Clashes erupt at Cambodia opposition rally.” 
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petition calling for an impartial investigation into the election results gathered more than 
2 million thumbprints and was delivered to the embassies of the United States and other 
foreign countries in October.68 The largest protest, on December 22, attracted at a 
minimum 100,000 participants, and possibly as many as 300,000 or more.69 
The campaign was centred on CNRP activists but also included a wide range of social 
groups, including young Buddhist monks, members of teachers’ and workers’ unions, and 
large numbers of ordinary Cambodians.70 Claims rapidly escalated from demands for an 
election inquiry to calls for broader political change, including the resignation of Hun 
Sen.71 In Phnom Penh many residents stockpiled food and stayed home, fearful of armed 
conflict breaking out.72 The CPP itself had been stunned by the election result and for 
several months was unable to coordinate an effective response to the campaign, as 
moderates and hard-liners within the ruling coalition debated the best course of action.73 
Prompted by growing mobilisation and increasingly radical demands, it launched a 
crackdown in January 2014, using the army to disperse protestors and clear Freedom 
Park (with the use of live rounds by security forces also resulting in the deaths of several 
striking garment factory workers) and banning public demonstrations.74 In February the 
ban was lifted and sporadic protests occurred over the next few months.75 However, they 
failed to generate the same momentum seen prior to the January crackdown, and open 
civil resistance has since then largely subsided. 
 
6.1.2. Summary: Power-sharing and civil resistance failure 
Why did the 2013 civil resistance campaign fail to bring about regime change in 
Cambodia? As with the Marcos regime in the Philippines, Chapter 4 indicates that the civil 
resistance campaign in Cambodia had a high probability of success, in part due to Hun 
Sen’s long tenure at the time of the campaign indicating a high probability that the regime 
was a personal autocracy. Indeed, previous research has emphasised Hun Sen’s 
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dominance of Cambodian politics, characterising his rule as personalist for years prior to 
the 2013 uprising (e.g., Un, 2005; Strangio, 2014; Morgenbesser, 2018). This position was 
expressed clearly by one research participant in Cambodia: 
There’s no political system. It’s rule according to the will of the one man, according 
to which way he wakes up. […] He’s basically the centre of all things.76 
Some of the empirical indicators of personal autocracy developed in Chapter 2 point 
towards Hun Sen’s high levels of personal power at the time. First, he was not constrained 
by autonomous institutions outside the CPP, as there have been few other figures or 
institutions within Cambodia that have been able to meaningfully check Hun Sen’s power. 
The monarchy under King Norodom Sihanouk played a major role in the regime, 
particularly during the 1990s, but following his abdication in 2004 lost all political 
influence, with his successor, Norodom Sihamoni, widely seen as apolitical.77 The 
leadership of the Buddhist sangha, or monastic community, is dominated by the CPP and 
does not overtly interfere in politics, while other institutions such as the judiciary have 
virtually no independence.78 Second, Hun Sen is not constrained by limits on his stay in 
office, formal or informal; for example, there is no evidence to suggest that there have ever 
been measures to ensure leadership rotation within the CPP, while the 1993 Cambodian 
constitution does not include formal term limits on the prime minister’s position 
(Cambodia Const. [1993], ch. X). 
Yet in the face of sustained civil resistance involving hundreds of thousands of 
Cambodians, the ruling party remained cohesive, supporting the repression of protests 
and—at least on the surface—remaining loyal to Hun Sen. Hence this case poses a puzzle: 
Why, given the apparent establishment of personal autocracy by Hun Sen, was the 
nonviolent uprising not successful? The conclusion I reach regarding this question is that, 
despite Hun Sen’s public prominence in Cambodian politics, he had in fact not established 
personal autocracy at the time of the 2013 campaign. Most importantly, he was 
constrained by the need to balance his personal interests with the interests of a competing 
elite coalition, in the form of the rival faction within the CPP centred on Senate president 
Chea Sim. This internal competition obliged Hun Sen to work through established 
decision-making processes in the party and to maintain a balance of factional interests in 
state, party, and military appointments, limiting his ability to consolidate personal rule. 
Therefore, despite some increases in his personal power during his nearly 30 years in 
office prior to 2013, the Hun Sen regime more closely reflected the concept of power-
sharing developed in the theoretical framework of this thesis, with the power balance 
primarily being a pragmatic response to the conflictual factional divide within the CPP. 
                                                        
 
76 Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017. 
77 Indeed, his selection as heir may have been supported by the CPP for precisely this reason 
(interviews with political analysts, former government officials, and members of civil society, 
Phnom Penh, June 2017). 
78 Interviews, political analysts, Phnom Penh, June 2017. On relationship between the sangha and 
Cambodian politics see also Harris (2001) and Soeung and Lee (2017). 
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Following the passing of Chea Sim in 2015, and the consequent breakup of the rival 
coalition, however, I argue that the regime has now fully transitioned to personal 
autocracy. 
When the civil resistance campaign emerged, the CPP remained cohesive, and although 
the response to the uprising was debated, eventually supported a repressive response and 
the co-optation of the opposition leadership. I conclude that this cohesion was encouraged 
by the continued power-sharing arrangement at the top level, which helped the political 
elite to insure that their interests would be protected under the status quo. I therefore 
find that the 2013 uprising in Cambodia is a deviant case with respect to the quantitative 
findings in Chapter 4 not because it is inconsistent with the theoretical framework, but 
because of the unexpectedly long duration of the power-sharing agreement at the elite 
level. 
 In line with the secondary heuristic purpose of the case study, I also highlight aspects of 
the campaign itself as additional explanation for its failure. Although the protest 
movement fits the criteria used in this study to identify civil resistance campaigns, it had 
a number of weaknesses that decreased its ability to effectively challenge the regime, 
including specific strategic and tactical failures of the campaign itself as well as 
characteristics of the CNRP leadership. In combination with the cohesive effect of the 
power-sharing agreement, these issues meant that the campaign was unable to 
sufficiently alter elites’ decision-making calculus to encourage them to support an 
alternative to the status quo distribution of power.  
To explain how I have reached these conclusions, which challenge the common view that 
Hun Sen had become a personalist dictator prior to 2013, I first trace the history of 
Cambodia’s current ruling elite. I then analyse the evidence for and against 
interpretations of several key episodes as power grabs by Hun Sen in order to determine 
whether the Cambodian regime in 2013 was a personal autocracy. I also describe a 
number of additional factors that weakened the campaign’s ability to undermine Hun 
Sen’s support base and bring about regime change. 
 
6.2. Authoritarian politics in Cambodia 
6.2.1. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
On January 7, 1979, Vietnamese troops drove Khmer Rouge forces out of Phnom Penh. 
The next day the formation of a Vietnamese-style communist government was 
announced, consisting of the state, named the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), and 
the communist party, the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP). Members of 
the government included both revolutionaries who had left Cambodia for Vietnam in 
1954 and defectors from the Khmer Rouge who had fled in response to purges carried out 
by Pol Pot’s leadership from 1977 onwards (Vickery, 1994; Gottesman, 2004). Amongst 
the latter group were Chea Sim, the most influential of the former Khmer Rouge cadres at 
the time, Heng Samrin, who was selected by the Vietnamese to be president for his 
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ideological reliability, and a young Hun Sen, who stood out for his ambition and 
intelligence (Gottesman, 2004). Despite its Cambodian face, however, the Vietnamese 
kept tight control over the new government. General Le Duc Tho, who had led the invading 
force, dictated all of the initial policy and internal decisions (Duc, 2012, 380-381). So-
called advisors were stationed in almost every ministry; a contemporary United States 
intelligence report notes that “virtually no significant action or major policy decisions can 
be taken […] without Vietnamese agreement”, and that Vietnamese ‘advice’ “has the 
impact of a direct order” (CIA, 1982, 1).  
The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was complicated by the fact that the Khmer 
Rouge had not been decisively defeated. From bases on the Thai border, along with two 
other armed groups, the royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, 
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the anti-communist Khmer 
People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), their forces launched a guerrilla civil war 
against the PRK government. Supported by foreign powers including China, the United 
States, Thailand, ASEAN and others, the armed groups were able to sustain insurgency 
throughout the 1980s, inflicting heavy losses on the Vietnamese and PRK armies (Brown 
& Zasloff, 1998; Duc, 2012).  
On top of this challenge, the PRK had to rebuild party and government organisations from 
the ground up, as the Khmer Rouge had completely destroyed the pre-existing state 
structure during its time in power (Gottesman, 2004). In particular, the persecution of 
Cambodians who were educated or in any way associated with the previous Lon Nol or 
Norodom Sihanouk regimes had left the country with a severe shortage of potential 
recruits for government positions. Communists who had fled to Vietnam from repression 
by the earlier Norodom Sihanouk regime and had been trained in Hanoi formed the basis 
of the central government in Phnom Penh, as they were ideologically compliant, 
trustworthy, and capable of running an administration (Vickery, 1994; Gottesman, 2004, 
53). The regime’s first prime minister, Pen Sovan, for example, was drawn from this 
group, although he was soon removed from office for showing too much independence 
from the Vietnamese and abusing his position for personal gain (Duc, 2012, 382). Outside 
Phnom Penh the PRK was made up primarily of Khmer Rouge defectors, as these were 
seen to be the only figures with both the communist credentials and local support 
required to run the state (Gottesman, 2004, 75). By the mid-1980s as the Vietnamese 
began looking seriously for ways to extricate themselves from Cambodia the communist 
party came to be dominated by former Khmer Rouge cadres, centred on Hun Sen, Chea 
Sim, and Heng Samrin (Gottesman, 2004, 215; Duc, 2012, 394). Pen Sovan’s successor, 
Chan Sy, passed away in 1984, and Hun Sen was appointed in his place in January 1985. 
 
6.2.2. End of the civil war and international involvement 
Diplomatic efforts to end the armed conflict began to bear fruit in the late 1980s, leading 
to the official withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in 1989 and the signing of the 
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comprehensive Paris Peace Agreements on 23 October 1991.79 The agreement involved a 
UN-supervised interim administration followed by multi-party elections (Strangio, 2014). 
It also established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and a 
13-member Supreme National Council (SNC), consisting of delegates from each of the four 
armed factions plus Norodom Sihanouk, to hold sovereign authority. 
The Cambodian government was not passive during this period, and from 1989 onwards 
began to assert its independence from Vietnam. In April 1989 it rebranded itself the “State 
of Cambodia” (SOC) and adopted policies opposed to the Vietnamese brand of 
communism, including reinstating Buddhism as the national religion and officially 
reintroducing private property rights (Gottesman, 2004, 271-276; Strangio, 2014, 40). 
The communist party was renamed the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). References to 
Marxism-Leninism were scrubbed from official documents, and those referring to the 
government’s relationship with Vietnam were destroyed. Ambassadors from communist 
countries were quietly ejected from Phnom Penh, and diplomatic channels with Vietnam 
reduced (Duc, 2012, 396, 396n605).  
At the same time, the CPP, which still dominated the state structure, was using foot-
dragging and ‘devious consent’ to resist international pressure to create an even playing 
field for the elections that would end the UNTAC administration (Lee, 2011). UNTAC 
administrators—most of whom did not speak Khmer and had no experience of the 
country—were denied control of key areas of government, including defence, finance, 
foreign affairs, information, and internal security (Shawcross, 1994; Strangio, 2014). 
Orders from UNTAC were ignored, UNTAC contingents were attacked, and necessary 
facilities were refused to the authority (Lee, 2011, 188-189), while failure to secure 
cooperation from the remainder of the Khmer Rouge was used as a pretext for refusing to 
demobilise CPP forces (Strangio, 2014, 53-54). The SNC became a “nominal consultative 
council” with no real power to enforce its policies (Lee, 2011, 280). 
Having failed to carry out much of its mandate, the UNTAC leadership made its top priority 
the holding of elections in May 1993 (Strangio, 2014). The three largest parties registering 
for the election were the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party 
(BLDP), the political successor to the KPNLF. The continuation of its pre-existing party 
structure gave the CPP a huge advantage over its rivals. Its competitors had little time to 
build mass support, while the CPP coerced enrolment and votes and assassinated political 
opponents (Ledgerwood, 1996; Frieson, 1996; Hughes, 2003). Yet in the end the CPP’s 
tactics proved ineffective against the popularity that the association with Norodom 
Sihanouk brought to FUNCINPEC: with voter turnout at nearly 90%, FUNCINPEC won 
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45.5% of the vote, followed by the CPP at 38.2% and BLDP at 3.8% (Widyono, 2008, 124, 
127).  
The result was unacceptable to the CPP, which had no intention of relinquishing power. It 
immediately began protesting claimed irregularities in the election, announcing that the 
results would not be accepted unless new elections were held in at least four major 
provinces. Chea Sim and Hun Sen petitioned Norodom Sihanouk to assume full power and 
demanded an equal power-sharing arrangement with FUNCINPEC in the new government 
(Widyono, 2008, 124). A short stand-off ensued, during which time a number of senior 
CPP members announced the secession of several eastern provinces. After Hun Sen 
negotiated the end of the attempt—although he was widely believed to be behind it—
Norodom Sihanouk was reinstalled as head of state and agreed to the CPP’s power-
sharing proposal.80 The office of ‘first prime minister’ went to the head of FUNCINPEC, 
Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and that of ‘second prime minister’ was given to the CPP, 
while ministries were divided between the two parties, with one also going to the BLDP.  
During this time King Norodom Sihanouk was the nominal head of state, but under the 
newly drafted constitution did not have the right to govern, holding only constitutional 
powers.81 Neither did the so-called power-sharing arrangement represent a true division 
of power between the CPP and FUNCINPEC. While the CPP retained its organisational 
structure and control over the bureaucracy and security forces, FUNCINPEC’s authority 
existed “mostly on paper” (Strangio, 2014, 63). Norodom Ranariddh had little 
involvement in the actual running of government, while the first priority of FUNCINPEC 
ministers was personal gain from office. Sam Rainsy, FUNCINPEC’s finance minister, was 
one of the only government members to speak out on corruption, and in response lost his 
cabinet position in October 1994 before being stripped of his parliamentary seat and 
ejected from the party in May 1995.  
Following the purge of Sam Rainsy, the National Assembly became a rubber stamp for 
CPP-tabled legislation, confirming where the true balance of power lay (Strangio, 2014, 
71). FUNCINPEC ministers were left out of the policy-making process and the majority of 
government positions were reserved for distribution by CPP ministers. At a meeting in 
January 1996 the leadership responded by resolving to push for a larger share of political 
power and to build up a military wing capable of challenging the CPP (Widyono, 2008, 
213-214). Tension built as the CPP and FUNCINPEC competed to attract the allegiance of 
defecting Khmer Rouge forces, and an alliance between FUNCINPEC, Sam Rainsy’s newly-
created Khmer Nation Party (KNP), and remnants of the BLDP potentially capable of 
defeating the CPP in the upcoming 1998 elections was announced (Strangio, 2014, 76-
77). On March 30, 1997, grenades were thrown at a KNP rally at which Sam Rainsy was 
speaking, killing 16 and injuring 100; a resulting United States government investigation 
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implicated Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit in the attack.82 Open fighting broke out in Phnom 
Penh on July 5, 1997, resulting in the swift defeat of FUNCINPEC and the destruction of its 
military forces.83 The party was severely weakened as scores of its members fled the 
country, and Norodom Ranariddh was replaced by a more compliant figure, Ung Huot, 
who would not challenge the CPP’s dominance (ICG, 1998a).  
 
6.2.3. Continued CPP control 
After months of negotiation, a deal was struck whereby Norodom Ranariddh would be 
convicted in absentia and then given a royal pardon, which, although a “charade of justice”, 
would allow him return to Cambodia in order to legitimise the July 1998 general election 
(ICG, 1998a, 8). In a pattern that has been repeated in subsequent elections, the short 
campaigning period and election day itself were relatively free and fair. Most of the CPP’s 
efforts instead focused on the period before official campaigning began, using a strategy 
of low-level but pervasive intimidation and distribution of “gifts” by local officials to 
secure votes (ICG, 1998b, 11; cf. Hughes, 2006). Opposition parties suffered from a lack of 
resources and facilities, and were barred from accessing broadcast media (ICG, 1998a). 
The CPP also manipulated vote-counting formulas to its advantage and resisted re-counts 
afterwards, while the national electoral commission refused to investigate virtually all of 
the complaints of electoral irregularities (ICG, 1998b; Peou, 2000).  
In August 1998 opposition supporters, lead by Sam Rainsy, began a protest campaign in 
Phnom Penh, attracting in excess of 10,000 participants. Many activists in the renamed 
Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) who had been ejected from their home villages and fled to Phnom 
Penh in the aftermath of the election found themselves surrounded by like-minded figures 
and in the presence of politicians and international observers for the first time, making 
this a major moment for the opposition as a movement in Cambodia (Hughes, 2006). 
Protests continued for several weeks, challenging the CPP and proving to be resilient in 
the face of police repression (ICG, 1999, 4). Ongoing violence, however, prompted 
opposition leaders to scale back their demands and call for an end to protests by the end 
of September that year (ICG, 1999, 5). Talks between the political parties remained 
deadlocked until early November, when Norodom Sihanouk offered to host talks. After 
two days of negotiation the opposition was split by Norodom Ranariddh agreeing once 
again to join a coalition government with the CPP. Chea Sim, who had to give up his 
position as head of the National Assembly for Norodom Ranariddh, was placated with the 
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creation of a Senate, which he would chair and could fill with his supporters, while Sam 
Rainsy was excluded from power (ICG, 1999; Strangio, 2014, 86). 
Two more episodes need to be mentioned before the internal power dynamics of the CPP 
are examined. In the 2003 election FUNCINPEC, discredited by Norodom Ranariddh’s 
cooperation with Hun Sen in 1998, performed poorly, obtaining only 20.8% of the vote 
against the SRP’s 21.9% and the CPP’s 47.3%. Although the CPP dominated, Norodom 
Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy formed a coalition named the Alliance of Democrats (AD) and 
were able to deny the CPP the 2/3rds majority it needed to form a government by 
boycotting the National Assembly (Heder, 2005, 115-116). The CPP responded by 
exploiting rivalries and ambitions behind the AD’s façade of unity, as senior FUNCINPEC 
members suspected that Sam Rainsy wanted to take control away from Norodom 
Ranariddh. Many of them had also been funded in their electoral campaigns by 
government-affiliated businesspeople, and thus urgently needed to secure lucrative 
government positions to pay back their debts (Heder, 2005, 117-118). In the period after 
the election there were also a number of high profile killings of FUNCINPEC and other 
opposition figures, widely believed to have been ordered by Hun Sen (Heder, 2005, 117-
118). Alongside pressure and threats were inducements: Hun Sen created more than 160 
new cabinet positions and hundreds more positions at lower levels of government to 
provide FUNCINPEC members with jobs if they cooperated (Strangio, 2014, 101). In July 
2004, Norodom Ranariddh once again folded and agreed to cooperate with the CPP, while 
Sam Rainsy was excluded. FUNCINPEC was assimilated into the CPP’s patronage network 
and effectively ceased to function as an opposition movement, its leadership accepting a 
relationship with the CPP that was “subordinate, subservient, and lucrative” (Heder, 
2005, 121). Norodom Sihanouk, proclaiming himself disgusted with the whole affair, had 
withdrawn from negotiations in early 2004; shortly after the deal was made, he 
announced his abdication, marking the end of his role in Cambodian politics (Strangio, 
2014, 103). 
Threatened with a defamation charge, Sam Rainsy went into a short period of self-
imposed exile in the wake of the CPP-FUNCINPEC deal. In February 2006 he was pardoned 
and allowed to return to the country. During Sam Rainsy and Hun Sen’s short 
rapprochement, the SRP sponsored a constitutional amendment which would reduce the 
necessary share of seats to form a government from 2/3rds to a simple majority; while 
this made electoral victory a more realistic target for the SRP, the amendment also suited 
Hun Sen, who would no longer need to keep FUNCINPEC in the government. Upon the 
amendment’s passage senior FUNCINPEC ministers were immediately purged, while the 
party itself devolved into in-fighting. Norodom Ranariddh was ousted as party leader, 
stripped of his parliamentary immunity, and sued by his former subordinates. Like Sam 
Rainsy, he chose to go into exile rather than be jailed (Strangio, 2014, 113-114). With 
FUNCINPEC rendered impotent, the CPP won 58.1% of the vote in the 2008 general 





6.3. The Hun Sen regime 
Despite its attempts to project an image of unity, the CPP’s appearance of cohesion is an 
illusion which conceals deep divisions within the party. At the grassroots the party is 
strong and cohesive, due to its now well-established structure and possibly the shared 
military backgrounds of many of the party officials who work at the local level.84 At the 
top, however, there are extremely low levels of trust, with elite cohesion resulting from 
personal interest and a desire to stay in power rather than being a product of a unifying 
ideology or principle.85 Even the families of rival leaders are known to be unable to work 
together publicly.86 Hun Sen himself is unpopular in many parts of the CPP, and has been 
for much of his career, and both Hun Sen and Chea Sim have maintained bodyguards much 
larger than would be required simply for personal protection. A former government 
minister, when asked whether senior figures are loyal to Hun Sen, emphatically stated 
that they are not, but merely—using a Khmer expression—‘swallow the hard stone’, 
cooperating unhappily for the sake of their positions.87 
As alluded to earlier, conflicts within the CPP have often—although not always—run 
along factional lines. Hun Sen’s faction has included central figures such as Hok Lundy, the 
late head of national police, late deputy prime minister Sok An, and Pol Saroeun, the 
current head of the armed forces. The rival faction was centred on Chea Sim until his death 
in June 2015, and included figures such as Minister of the Interior Sar Kheng and senate 
president Say Chhum. The influence of the latter faction has substantially declined, as 
noted by Cambodia watchers.88 Yet much of this decline has occurred after the death of 
Chea Sim, 18 months after the civil resistance campaign ended. The central argument of 
this section is that prior to the civil resistance campaign, Chea Sim and his factional allies 
were still able to constrain Hun Sen, thus leading to the conclusion that Hun Sen had not, 
at that point, fully established a personal autocracy in Cambodia.  
 
6.3.1. Origin of intra-party divisions 
The factional divide in the current CPP originated in the PRK period. Khmer Rouge cadres 
who had defected to Vietnam in 1977 and who formed a major part of the new 
government took advantage of their positions to construct patron-client networks in the 
areas under their control. In doing so they supplanted the Hanoi-trained communists, 
who were ill-placed to compete due to their long absence from the country (Gottesman, 
2004, 212-213). Chea Sim was particularly adept at building and promoting his patronage 
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network, and by 1981 had appointed hundreds of former Khmer Rouge cadres to 
government positions, effectively clearing them of any wrongdoing under the previous 
regime and building a loyal force of his “children and grandchildren”, as they were 
referred to (Gottesman, 2004, 122). Concerned by his accumulation of independent 
power, the Vietnamese removed him as Minister of the Interior in June 1981 and assigned 
him to the primarily ceremonial role of president of the National Assembly (Gottesman, 
2004, 122). Despite this, however, he remained extremely powerful throughout the 
1980s, exercising his influence through both formal and informal channels and being 
treated with substantial deference by the rest of the Cambodian leadership (Gottesman, 
2004, 133, 333). 
Hun Sen was likewise opportunistic and ambitious in building a personal power base in 
the Foreign Ministry, which he headed from 1979 to 1984. Although he accepted the 
tutelage of the Vietnamese, when it came to selecting ministry members and resolving 
internal disputes he always made his own decisions (Duc, 2012, 381n574). He was highly 
pragmatic in doing so, choosing those with talent above those with the right ideology; the 
two were usually mutually exclusive, as Cambodians with technical expertise and 
administrative experience were hardly ever communists, most having worked instead 
under Lon Nol or Norodom Sihanouk (Gottesman, 2004, 211).  
By the end of the 1980s the two largest factions were headed by Chea Sim, with the 
support of Heng Samrin, and Hun Sen. Although factional boundaries are not always easy 
to define, even Vickery (1994, 104), who otherwise disparages such “Kremlinology”, 
acknowledges that most influential figures in the party could be credibly identified with 
either Chea Sim or Hun Sen. Yet a relatively even balance of power was maintained at first 
as both figures avoided challenging each other directly, and struggles within the regime 
focused more on ideology versus pragmatism in rebuilding the state and the economy 
(Gottesman, 2004). 
 
6.3.2. Hun Sen dominant? 
A number of key episodes from the 1990s onwards are cited by scholars and other 
Cambodia observers as evidence of Hun Sen’s personalisation of power. Most notable are 
Hun Sen’s use of a coup attempt in 1994 as a pretext to gain control of the national police; 
his armed conflict with FUNCINPEC over the objection of much of the ruling coalition in 
1997; and the resolution of a political deadlock in 2003 and 2004 over the formation of a 
coalition government in his favour. Yet in all of these instances accounts of events are 
contested or lack adequate evidence, and questions still remain about the substantive 




1994 coup attempt and control of national police 
Despite the initial balance of power, by the end of the UNTAC administration the Hun Sen 
faction was becoming more prominent, and Hun Sen himself had grown in influence 
within the party (Vickery, 1994). During the negotiations following the 1993 deadlock, for 
example, Chea Sim had initially proposed the power-sharing arrangement to Norodom 
Sihanouk with himself as prime minister, but in the final deal the position went to Hun 
Sen.89 This increase in personal power first provoked rebellion from within the ruling 
coalition in 1994. National Security Minister General Sin Song, supported by senior 
Interior Ministry official General Sin Sen and Prince Norodom Chakrapong, launched a 
poorly-organised coup attempt on July 2.90 It has subsequently been claimed that senior 
members of the Chea Sim faction were aware of and supported the coup attempt.91 Hun 
Sen at least seems to have believed this to be the case: he did not notify the Ministry of 
Interior, headed by Sar Kheng, about the attempt until several hours after he had begun 
moving against the ringleaders, and relied on FUNCINPEC instead of CPP forces to block 
Sin Song’s forces from entering Phnom Penh.92 More importantly, the coup is reported to 
have been used as a pretext for Hun Sen to make what has been labelled “a crucial power 
grab” to take control of the national police away from Sar Kheng and Chea Sim 
(Morgenbesser, 2018, 9). Aware of their likely complicity in the coup plot, Hun Sen 
allegedly pressured them to accept the appointment of a close ally, Hok Lundy, to head of 
the police in exchange for not pursuing the issue, thus gaining control over the most 
powerful coercive agency in the country at the time.93  
This interpretation, however, somewhat oversimplifies the circumstances and 
consequences of Hok Lundy’s appointment. The assertion that Hun Sen forced the 
appointment of Hok Lundy over the opposition of Chea Sim and Sar Kheng is made only 
in one article, which was written twenty years after the event and does not provide 
sources or further evidence to support the claim.94 In contrast, a former personal advisor 
to Hun Sen, for example, states instead that Chea Sim and Sar Kheng supported Hok 
Lundy’s appointment thinking that they could control him.95 The view of Hok Lundy’s 
appointment as a power grab is also challenged by subsequent problems that Hun Sen 
had in controlling Hok Lundy himself. Initially, Hok Lundy indeed worked to undermine 
Sar Kheng’s control of the National Police, one of three departments at the Ministry of 
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Interior. However, he soon became powerful enough to pose a potential threat to Hun Sen 
himself, becoming defiant and refusing to listen to the prime minister.96 Hun Sen relied 
on rivals of Hok Lundy’s to constrain him, particularly Heng Pov, head of the Phnom Penh 
municipal police department, and Ke Kim Yan, head of the armed forces and a Chea Sim 
loyalist.97 While Hok Lundy was able to out-manoeuvre and arrest Heng Pov—despite 
advanced warnings from Hun Sen to Heng Pov himself98—by 2008 he had become a 
liability for his alleged involvement in killings, corruption, and the drug trade, and was 
being seen as harbouring ambitions for Hun Sen’s position.99 He died in a helicopter crash 
on November 9 that year, with rumours of foul play believed to be credible by many in 
Cambodia, foreigners and Khmers alike. CPP members reportedly celebrated for days 
afterwards, as Hok Lundy was widely hated within the party.100  
Shortly after Hok Lundy’s death, Ke Kim Yan was replaced as head of the armed forces by 
a Hun-Sen aligned figure. Although it is only speculation, the implication appears to be 
that with Hok Lundy gone, Ke Kim Yan’s control of the armed forces was no longer needed 
to constrain him. The upshot of all of this is that the argument that Hun Sen was able to 
gain control over the national police by appointing an obedient loyalist mischaracterises 
the contested nature of that control. 
 
1997 conflict – reassertion of power-sharing 
By far the most prominent apparent power grab was the 1997 armed conflict in Phnom 
Penh. Widely denounced as a coup by Hun Sen, in reality it represented the result of 
months of mutual antagonism and provocation between FUNCINPEC and the CPP 
(Strangio, 2014, 82).101 There was also, however, a factional element to the conflict. In 
response to the 1994 coup attempt and the build-up of FUNCINPEC military strength, Hun 
Sen had increased the size of his bodyguard unit to 1500 troops equipped with heavy 
weaponry in the lead-up to the conflict (Strangio, 2014, 82). Hun Sen had also been losing 
popularity within the CPP, with many party members wanting to replace him with 
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someone more palatable to voters.102 When the possibility of military action against 
FUNCINPEC was raised it was opposed by Chea Sim and his allies, including Defence 
Minister Tea Banh and head of the armed forces General Ke Kim Yan. During the conflict 
itself they refused to mobilise the forces under their command in support, with Hun Sen 
relying instead on his own bodyguard unit and the forces of the few figures who supported 
military action, including General Pol Saroeun and Kandal Deputy Governor Kun Kim, 
both of whom have subsequently become prominent figures in the regime. After Hun Sen’s 
victory it is reported that the CPP officials who had not cooperated sandbagged their 
houses and put their personal bodyguards on alert, allegedly in the expectation that they 
might be attacked next.103 
This 1997 conflict is portrayed in most accounts as having been a major turning point in 
Hun Sen’s personalisation of power, after which he dominated the CPP and secured the 
position of powerful loyalists in prominent government positions.104 Yet subsequent 
intra-party negotiations, not mentioned in these sources, suggest that the conflict may 
have had a more limited effect on the power-sharing agreement. In October 1997 the CPP 
held its fifth party congress. In the lead-up there was widespread speculation that Hun 
Sen would use the congress to strengthen his position against Chea Sim or attempt to 
challenge him for control of the party.105 However, reported events strongly imply that 
the congress instead resulted in a reassertion of high-level power-sharing. While the CPP 
endorsed Hun Sen’s actions in July, his proposal to add several loyalists to the party’s 
standing committee was blocked by the objections of Chea Sim. He also had to withdraw 
proposed amendments to an electoral law, drafted by Sar Kheng, that would have altered 
it to strengthen his loyalist-dominated Council of Ministers against Sar Kheng’s 
stronghold in the Ministry of Interior. Most significantly, the plenum agreed to return to 
“the classical way of managing the party”, which was interpreted by observers as meaning 
collective decision-making by the standing committee.106 The re-assertion of collective 
decision-making and constraints exercised on moves by Hun Sen to strengthen his faction 
against Chea Sim hence strongly imply that the July 1997 conflict did not constitute a 
breakdown of the CPP’s power-sharing agreement. 
 
2003-2004 deadlock 
A third key episode mentioned by observers is when Hun Sen forced Chea Sim out of the 
country in order to pass legislation favourable to his own position in 2004 (Morgenbesser, 
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2018). After the 2003 election, the AD, which had the overt or tacit support of Sihanouk, 
the Chea Sim faction, and civil society in Phnom Penh, posed a serious threat to Hun Sen’s 
position, demanding substantial concessions that would have amounted to a “political 
death warrant” if he had agreed (Heder, 2005, 116-117). Hun Sen instead proposed a deal 
to create new government positions for FUNCINPEC if they split the AD. The deal required 
a constitutional amendment, which needed the signature of Chea Sim as acting head of 
state while Norodom Sihanouk was out of the country. However, on the day he was due 
to sign the deal he was ‘escorted’ to the airport by police—led by Hok Lundy—and flown 
to Thailand. It was also reported that the night before members of Hun Sen’s bodyguard 
unit had been posted outside Chea Sim’s residence.107 FUNCINPEC minister Nhek Bun 
Chhay, next in line as acting head of state, signed the amendment instead, before Chea Sim 
returned to Cambodia the following week.  
The event is considered to have been humiliating to Chea Sim (Strangio, 2014, 102), 
although several days later the CPP broadcast a clip of an informal and apparently friendly 
meeting between Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and other leading members of the party on state TV 
as a show of unity.108 Indeed, it stands out in retrospect as a remarkable rupture in the 
CPP’s façade of cohesion, with no comparable public conflicts occurring in the years since 
That Hun Sen was willing to make such an overt display of party disunity suggests that 
the move was a last-resort response to the severe threat that Chea Sim’s support for the 
opposition alliance posed to his political survival; from a more dominant position, it 
seems more plausible that Hun Sen would have simply forced Chea Sim to sign the 
amendment, avoiding the public spectacle. 
The ensuing effect on the balance of power is less clear than some subsequent reports 
have suggested (e.g., Morgenbesser, 2018). Notably, Sar Kheng retained his post in the 
new government, although Hun Sen’s ‘crony’ Sok An was also promoted to deputy prime 
minister (Heder, 2005). Furthermore, there are only conflicting reports about whether 
appointments to the party’s standing committee in January 2005 were dominated by Hun 
Sen or whether they reflected a balance of interests.109 Indeed, despite Hun Sen’s attempts 
to stack the central committee with his core loyalists in subsequent years, Chea Sim was 
able to block him from doing so.110 Thus, although the episode was an unusually public 
display of disharmony within the CPP, and may indeed have been a blow to the Chea Sim 
faction, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that it resulted in Hun Sen being able to 
effectively remove constraints on his position in regard to high-level appointments or the 
passage of legislation within the regime. Similarly, other attacks on Chea Sim supporters, 
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such as the arrest and imprisonment of his bodyguard head in 2011, had a relatively 
limited effect on the fortunes of his faction.111 
 
6.3.3. Indicators of power-sharing 
Conflicting information and interpretations of episodes commonly highlighted as power 
grabs by Hun Sen thus throw into question the conclusion that they in fact represented 
substantive moves towards personal autocracy. In addition to the relatively limited effect 
of these episodes on the influence of the rival CPP faction, there are also a number of areas 
where Hun Sen was obliged to make concessions to competing interests within the regime 
shortly before 2013.  
The first area is control over appointments in the military. After the numbers of senior 
officers had rapidly expanded in the 2000s, Hun Sen temporarily called a halt to 
promotions around 2010.112 When, in spite of this, he tried to promote his son Hun 
Manet—who had only received his first command in 2008—to the third-highest rank of 
Lieutenant General, other high-ranking officials objected, accusing him of favouritism and 
demanding that their children be promoted as well. Hun Sen was reportedly unhappy 
about this, but complied.113 For example, Sar Sokha, Sar Kheng’s son, was promoted at the 
same time as Hun Manet.114 In a similar vein, Chea Sim and Heng Samrin were both 
promoted to 5-star generals at the same time as Hun Sen in 2009.115 Similarly, Chea Sim’s 
ally Ke Kim Yan was widely popular within the armed forces. Although he was removed 
as head of the armed forces in 2009, several weeks after the death of Hok Lundy, he was 
shortly afterwards appointed to the post of deputy prime minister.116 This was possibly 
intended to deter the threat of rebellion from his supporters; indeed, when rumours had 
emerged that Ke Kim Yan was going to be removed, loyalist troops—who are alleged to 
still make up the bulk of the armed forces—deliberated whether to launch an armed 
rebellion in response.117 
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A second area where Hun Sen faced constraints was in determining policy, where he had 
to operate through a consensus-based decision-making system that is reported to have 
existed between the ‘three samdechs [lords]’ Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and Heng Samrin: 
In the old days, before his [Chea Sim’s] death, there was a triumvirate, as in Vietnam 
these days. Checks and balance. Each of the three can veto any big decisions. Then, 
one died, and the other [is weak] vis-à-vis Hun Sen. Hun Sen, Chea Sim, Heng Samrin. 
The same as in Vietnam. The communist party leadership, a triumvirate. Three. Any 
big decisions must have the consensus of the three. Each can veto. The Soviet system, 
following Stalin.118 
Such collective decision-making mechanisms are a common feature of power-sharing 
autocracies, although they may not be easily observable from the outside. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, tools like vetoes allow members of the ruling coalition to block unfavourable 
legislative or administrative decisions while providing clear signals of the autocrat’s 
intention to further consolidate power if they are breached or ignored. In contrast, in 
personal autocracies vetoes over the ruler’s decisions by definition do not exist.  
Third, although Hun Sen has been the most influential single figure in the regime since the 
early 1990s, he was not able to gain outright control of the CPP until 2015, with Chea Sim 
retaining the role of president until his death. Chea Sim’s position prevented Hun Sen from 
being able to remove entrenched political elites, introduce reform policy that would 
impact their interests, or otherwise exercise discretionary control over the party.119 
Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that Hun Sen was able to achieve the kind of 
dominance over the CPP that would be expected of a personalist dictator prior to the 2013 
campaign. For example, as pointed out above, he was prevented from stacking the party 
leadership with loyalists in 1997 and there is no solid evidence that he did so in 2005, 
with no further major changes occurring until 2016 as discussed below. Indeed, other 
Chea Sim allies retained—and continue to retain—key government posts, including Sar 
Kheng as head of the Ministry of Interior and deputy prime minister and Say Chhum in a 
number of prominent posts.  
Further evidence for classifying Cambodia as a power-sharing regime at the time of the 
2013 protests comes from Hun Sen’s much more clear consolidation of personal 
autocracy following the death of Chea Sim in 2015. His faction has now become 
significantly less influential, as no-one has been able to effectively take over as its leader, 
including Chea Sim’s children:120 
In our culture, in our history, there is a strong cult of personality, a rule of men. So 
without any leader it falls apart. And when one leader stays so long it’s very difficult 
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to have a comparable leader, with comparable support and all that. So now, Hun 
Sen.121 
The main constraint on Hun Sen’s power, the continued presence of a strong rival elite 
coalition, has therefore been removed following this point: 
We are starting to see some of the old guard, some of the top elites starting to leave 
the political scene. Chea Sim was definitely a big character, definitely left a big 
shadow, a big vacuum now. […] In the old days there was a lot more balance within 
the ruling party. Before Chea Sim – I mean now basically Hun Sen has consolidated 
all of the power.122 
The Cambodian government has hence more closely resembled the concept of personal 
autocracy I have developed here since Chea Sim’s death in 2015, with Hun Sen now the 
only meaningful centre of power within the regime.  
A symbolic example of this transition can be seen in the CPP’s election campaigns. In the 
past, campaign posters had always featured images of Hun Sen, Chea Sim and Heng 
Samrin together. During the 2013 campaign, Hun Sen pushed to have these posters show 
only himself, or to have his portrait placed more prominently than the other two, but was 
prevented from doing so.123 During the 2017 commune election campaign, however, Heng 
Samrin’s portrait was notably absent from CPP posters, with Hun Sen’s image shown 
alone.124 Another symbolic example is the hagiographic documentary “Marching Towards 
National Salvation”, released by the CPP in early 2018, which chronicles Hun Sen’s 
defection from the Khmer Rouge and involvement in Vietnam’s 1979 invasion of 
Cambodia.125 While Hun Sen is given the most prominence, influential defectors like Chea 
Sim and Heng Samrin are mentioned only in passing, and others who remain high-ranking 
members of the CPP, such as Men Sam On and Tea Banh, are not mentioned at all.126 This 
rewriting of history is suggestive of initial attempts at building the kind of personality cult 
seen in other personal autocracies such as North Korea or China under Mao, as it creates 
a narrative lionizing Hun Sen as the most important figure in the “rescue” of the 
Cambodian nation from the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, personality cults are endemic to 
personal autocracies, as they reinforce the leader’s paramount political standing and send 
a clear message to potential challengers in the ruling coalition—as well as broader 
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society—that there is only one person who counts, and they are firmly in control (Svolik, 
2012). 
More concretely, after Chea Sim’s passing Hun Sen immediately took over as party 
president, which, in conjunction with his role as prime minister, gave him personal 
control over both government and party for the first time in his tenure. Observers at the 
time noted that gaining direct control of the party gave Hun Sen much greater leverage 
and more freedom to speed up the generational transition in the party by ‘easing out’ 
party veterans and introducing younger, ‘reform-minded’ figures into key institutions;127 
in other words, eliminating entrenched elites and replacing them with younger, less 
independent, more easily controlled party members. In March 2016, a few months after 
Chea Sim’s passing, Hun Sen carried out a major reshuffle of the CPP cabinet, making a 
total of 24 changes to leadership and senior positions in a number of ministries.128 
External observers have attributed the reshuffle to the CPP’s poor performance in the 
2013 election, with some criticising it as being ‘cosmetic’ rather than reflective of genuine 
government reform because many figures were simply moved into different positions 
rather than removed altogether.129 But such ‘superficial’ rotation of senior officials serves 
a distinct purpose in personal autocracies, as it prevents government ministers building 
up independent bases of loyalists in their ministries which could be used to mount a 
challenge while simultaneously demonstrating the autocrat’s personal authority. 
Tellingly, the changes are alleged to have not gone through the normal CPP decision-
making processes, but were instead pushed by Hun Sen himself.130  
Other recent moves similarly reflect the kinds of actions typically taken by personalist 
autocrats to consolidate their position. For example, Hun Sen has recently announced 
plans to establish a separate intelligence agency—with a training institute for its 
members run by his own son—that could be used not only to monitor potential 
opposition, but also to spy on Cambodia’s military and security forces to detect or deter 
potential subversive factions forming.131 He has also announced his intention to take 
personal discretionary control of appointments to the executive branch, reducing its 
excessive size (and consequent need for patronage) while also bypassing the National 
Assembly, which currently needs to approve appointments.132 These moves, and more, 
are ongoing at the time of writing. 
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6.3.4. Cambodia in 2013: A power-sharing regime  
In 2016, CPP spokesman Sok Eysan, in response to speculation about the impact of the 
death of Chea Sim on the balance of power within the regime, stated: 
The analysers could not know what is in the minds of both the samdechs. They’ve 
raised [the idea of CPP factions] since after the national election in 1993. You can see 
until now that the CPP has not split up. It’s been 25 years already. Has it split up like 
they said? Since the past, people have said ‘This is Samdech Hun Sen’s bloc, this is 
Samdech Chea Sim’s bloc, this is Samdech Heng Samrin’s bloc.’ But in fact, the 
samdechs often eat together.133 
Despite the obviously self-serving purpose of these comments, the evidence I have 
presented suggests that they may not be entirely inaccurate. Indeed, they are lent some 
plausibility by the fact that they echo a similar insider claim from the early 1990s that the 
three leaders were close comrades who often visited each other at home and drank cognac 
together (Mehta & Mehta, 2013, 152).134 Whether this really meant, as the anonymous 
senior CPP official reported, that they were “the best of friends” is less important than the 
fact that this is the kind of collective, face-to-face interaction amongst influential elites 
that characterises power-sharing regimes. On the basis of the evidence that I have 
presented in this case study, I therefore conclude that one of the factors that kept the CPP 
cohesive in the face of mass demonstrations in 2013 was the ongoing power-sharing 
agreement. While the power balance at the time of the civil resistance campaign had been 
shifting towards personal autocracy, Chea Sim and his factional allies were still able to 
constrain Hun Sen’s decision-making power with regard to the ruling coalition. As 
anticipated by the theoretical framework, the maintenance of power-sharing helped to 
maintain regime cohesion. In particular, Chea Sim in his position as party president played 
a key role: 
You have the communists, they appreciated and honoured those fellow 
revolutionaries, leaders of the revolution. […] They were cooperating very well. It 
was up to Chea Sim as a sort of moderation, a moderating force.135 
As an influential party elder, Chea Sim was able to resolve intra-party disputes that arose 
as a result of personal conflicts or turf wars over private interests, preventing them from 
erupting into regime destabilising divisions and maintaining the appearance of unity.136 
But, as mentioned above, he also acted as a check on Hun Sen’s consolidation of personal 
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control by preventing the replacement of older party members with younger cadres, thus 
forcing Hun Sen to continue balancing these entrenched interests.  
At the time of the campaign, then, the ruling coalition had not suffered the kind of loss of 
influence over the autocrat that in a personal autocracy would encourage them to support 
an alternative to the status quo, and instead chose to remain loyal and support a 
repressive response to the uprising. In contrast, I have argued that the post-Chea Sim 
regime is far more reflective of a personal autocracy as described in the theoretical 
framework of this research, in which Hun Sen’s rule is largely unconstrained by the 
political elite. The political balance of power is now one in which Hun Sen almost entirely 
dominates the CPP and faces far fewer constraints than he did even a few years ago. 
 
6.4. Additional obstacles to success 
This case study also has a secondary heuristic purpose, to identify additional factors or 
hypotheses that can challenge or improve the theoretical framework. Indeed, the ongoing 
power-sharing agreement at the top of the Cambodian regime was not the only factor 
influencing the outcome of the 2013 civil resistance campaign. Other analysis has 
highlighted the role of China in supporting the Hun Sen regime, together with the 
declining influence of Western governments (e.g., Croissant, 2018). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, however, I do not directly address international factors in this thesis, other 
than to note that China’s role as a diplomatic and economic backer of the regime likely 
had a positive influence on its chances of surviving the civil resistance campaign. Instead, 
I focus here on identifying factors relating to the opposition CNRP and the campaign itself, 
including how the protests from July 2013 to January 2014 were carried out, as well as 
some more general obstacles to a transition of power from the CPP to the CNRP. Together 
with the maintenance of power-sharing, I argue that these factors prevented the uprising 
from sufficiently appealing to potential elite allies from within the CPP who might 
otherwise have supported a shift in the status quo distribution of power. The implications 
of these additional factors for understanding the outcome of nonviolent uprisings against 
authoritarian regimes are explored further in the concluding chapter below. 
 
6.4.1. Opposition characteristics 
A major obstacle to the success of the civil resistance campaign, as well as democratisation 
in Cambodia more generally, is that members of the ruling coalition do not trust that the 
CNRP can guarantee their interests and ensure a peaceful transfer of power in the event 
of regime change. Only limited direct evidence for this point is available; CPP officials 
spoken to by the author were dismissive of the CNRP and preferred to discuss it as little 
as possible, likely because they did not want to give the impression that they see it as a 
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credible challenge.137 However, mistrust of the CNRP is also common amongst members 
of civil society, politicians who have defected from the CNRP or established rival parties, 
and foreigners in Cambodia, and their views can be read as likely indicators of the 
thoughts of the ruling coalition. 
The first reason that Cambodian political elites may not trust the CNRP is to do with its 
structure and leadership. Although espousing democratic ideals, the CNRP has frequently 
been accused of being less principled in its own internal makeup, being described as 
highly centralised and focused on a tight inner circle with an “almost obsession with 
consensus […] from the top down.”138 The party has a personalistic structure focused on 
“the leadership dimension” at the expense of well-articulated policy and party 
programme development (Croissant, 2016, 28). The nature of this is illustrated by one 
interviewee’s description of Sam Rainsy’s leadership style:  
Sam Rainsy is a character that doesn’t listen to anybody, just has his own version of 
everything and that’s it, it’s his way or the highway. That’s how he operates. He 
doesn’t listen to anybody. I remember when the decisions were being made by the 
permanent committee or the steering committee, which is actually the highest body 
of the party, and Sam Rainsy would step in and say ‘I disagree’ and that’s it, that’s 
that, end of conversation. And we’re talking about the decision’s already been made, 
there’s meetings and votes are taking place - and Sam Rainsy doesn’t go to these 
kinds of votes, right - and then he’d just walk in and say ‘no I don’t want that’ and 
that’s it. I’ve asked some of the key people, including Mu Sochua, and said that can’t 
be right, that’s not democratic and she said “No, you’ve got to listen to the 
president.”139  
Sam Rainsy has, for much of his career, presented and seen himself as the only legitimate 
leader of the opposition, initially seeing Kem Sokha as a challenger to his position before 
opportunistically agreeing to a merger after the HRP’s unexpectedly strong performance 
in the 2008 election.140 Although the merger between the two parties is reported to have 
gone smoothly at the grassroots level,141 groups of loyalists centred on Sam Rainsy and 
Kem Sokha at higher levels of the party in 2013 still maintained a degree of rivalry.142 The 
party has also been accused of nepotism, for example in the appointment of Kem Sokha’s 
daughter Kem Monovithya as the party’s deputy PR manager, although Sam Rainsy’s 
children are not much involved in party affairs.143 All of these factors are indicative of a 
personalistic, patron-client-type structure in the CNRP: 
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When we look at the structure and the operation of the leadership of the opposition 
party, we see they are not different from the ruling party. […] Kem Sokha is more 
considerate, he’s more consultative, but Sam Rainsy’s personality… but then not only 
these two guys but the whole structure is top down, like the CPP. It’s the leaders that 
appoint the guys down the line. Exactly the same. You need to be loyal to your boss, 
your leader, you need to please them, you need to give them more money and so on, 
you need to go with them everywhere as part of their entourage.144 
At a strategic level, the structure of the CNRP may suggest to CPP members that 
government positions are more likely to go to Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha’s loyalists first. 
This kind of preferential treatment of loyal clients is common in Cambodian politics—and 
indeed Southeast Asia more generally—but decreases the likelihood that potential 
defectors will consider withdrawing support from the incumbent regime, as they consider 
their risk of being excluded from a future ruling coalition to be too high compared to the 
potential benefits and choose to remain loyal instead (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). 
A second factor affecting CPP members’ trust in the CNRP to guarantee their safety and 
interests in the event of regime change is the CNRP’s campaigning style, particularly its 
strong reliance on demagogic rhetoric or “gutter politics” to challenge the legitimacy of 
the current regime.145 Several interviewees highlighted the lack of a clearly-articulated 
policy platform in the CNRP’s campaign messages, particularly in 2013: 
They [the CNRP] need to focus more on the policy, what you’re going to do on 
education, what you’re going to do on health, on job creation business and all of 
those. Which an opposition party has never paid much attention to for the last, I 
think, 20 years. They have the policy written down there but they never talk about 
it. The only thing they say – Hun Sen is a yuon puppet, a Vietnamese puppet, Hun Sen 
is a criminal, we need to bring him to justice and whatever.146 
Instead, as the above quote suggests, the party has primarily relied on anti-Vietnamese 
narratives to gain popular support (e.g., Future Forum, 2017). The CNRP, and the SRP 
before it, have drawn heavily on racist and nationalist rhetoric in opposing what they 
claim to be Vietnamese influence over the CPP, typically casting the CPP as a ‘yuon 
[Vietnamese] puppet’.147 Sam Rainsy was part of the CGDK delegation which opposed the 
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U.N.’s recognition of the (Vietnam-sponsored) PRK government,148 and has a long history 
of using xenophobic appeals in his speeches, with SRP rallies in the past occasionally 
leading to violence against ethnic Vietnamese (Hughes, 2001). Kem Sokha is not innocent 
of this either, having accused Vietnam of ‘staging’ the S-21 prison, where the Khmer Rouge 
interrogated and later executed thousands of prisoners, and blamed Vietnam for the Koh 
Pich bridge stampede in 2010 which killed 353 people (Future Forum, 2017). CNRP 
election monitoring is very heavily focused on preventing ‘illegal immigrants’ (codeword 
for ethnic Vietnamese) from registering or voting.149 During the 2013 campaign 
demonstrators abused security forces as yuon, even though they were definitely Khmer, 
prompting a violent response from the troops.150  
The focus on demonising the CPP regime as a Vietnamese puppet regime is one example 
of what many interviewees as ‘painting’ or ‘colouring’, which roughly means distorting or 
misrepresenting one’s opponents in order to delegitimise them. This tactic is common in 
Cambodian politics: other examples include the CNRP accusing new opposition parties 
like the Grassroots Democracy Party (GDP) of being creations of the CPP or the 
government labelling independent, non-partisan civil society organisations or labour 
unions as pro-opposition.151 Colouring was more prominent in the CNRP’s 2013 campaign 
than in previous elections, as they switched their focus from intellectuals and civil society 
towards broader mass appeals.152 Indeed, it has been suggested that the CNRP’s anti-
Vietnamese stance is more strategic than heartfelt, as invoking nationalist sentiment is an 
effective way to mobilise popular support in Cambodia.153  
The consequences of relying on such negative attacks, however, is that a political 
transition is more likely to be seen as zero-sum, prompting potential defectors to remain 
loyal for fear of instability and conflict in the event of regime change. Given Cambodia’s 
history, in which a peaceful transfer of power has never occurred, such a fear may be more 
salient than in other contexts. Hence, an interviewed CPP official’s statement that the 
CNRP’s “not peaceful talk” in 2013 put Cambodia’s relative peace and security at risk may 
indeed represent genuinely-held concerns.154 As another interviewee put it, 
If they feel scared, if they feel fearful, they will not hand over power and they will 
protect power more. And that’s why I was disappointed that Sam Rainsy did not 
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grasp that idea, you know? If you would like to lead a peaceful change there are 
already good examples. But the way of his message remains the same: this is the bad 
guy, this is the corrupt guy, this is the traitor, the Vietnamese puppet. So how can 
you earn the trust of this person to give over power? He just pushes him to protect 
more.155 
 
6.4.2. Problems of the campaign 
The 2013 campaign had several other features that civil resistance researchers have 
linked to success. These included training in nonviolent discipline,156 large numbers of 
participants, inclusion of social groups with substantial social and moral authority,157 
sustained action, ethnic homogeneity between protestors and security forces, and clear, 
well-defined goals (e.g., Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994; Schock, 2005; Chenoweth & Stephan, 
2011; Nepstad, 2011, 2013).  
However, it fell short in several areas. The CNRP was either unable or unwilling to build a 
broad coalition of civil society and labour organisations to support the campaign. People 
from a range of backgrounds did take part in the demonstrations, a factor which is likely 
to contribute to the ability of protest movements to obtain concessions from governments 
(Denardo, 1985), but there was a notable lack of participation from social groups as such. 
For example, Buddhist monks began joining protests around the beginning of September, 
particularly younger monks.158 The involvement of monks in the 1998 protests had 
severely damaged the CPP’s legitimacy, particularly when they were beaten and shot at 
by security forces (Heng, 2008). Yet in 2013 the sangha hierarchy, which remains 
dominated by the CPP, did not officially condone the involvement of monks in protests or 
come out in support of the opposition, limiting the ability of the sangha’s great moral 
authority to be used against the regime.  
Civil society organisations, even those critical of the government, remained on the 
sidelines, taking on support roles such as human rights monitoring and first aid, but 
asserting their independence.159 Organisations did allow their members to take part, but 
most did not actually engage in mobilising their networks in support of the CNRP,160 
which could have potentially generated substantially more participation and legitimacy 
for the campaign. Those members who did participate in protests were maintained to be 
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doing so as individuals and not representatives of their organisations, despite CPP 
attempts to ‘colour’ them as such.161  
Particularly important here was that the CNRP was unable to adequately take advantage 
of concurrent but separate labour strikes that were being carried out by Cambodia’s 
powerful garment worker unions during the civil resistance campaign. During December 
2013, unions carried out strikes involving hundreds of thousands of participants that 
crippled the economy after negotiations over wage increases had failed to yield a result.162 
Large numbers of individual garment workers had also voted for the CNRP during the 
general election because of their promise to raise minimum wages. During the civil 
resistance campaign, CNRP officials made informal efforts to get the support of workers 
by visiting protests and making political speeches, and individual workers also joined the 
protests in Freedom Park. However, the CNRP never approached the organisers of labour 
protests to seek an alliance or overt support, nor try to persuade them to connect their 
economic demands with the CNRP’s political goals.163 Thus the CNRP was unable to 
capitalise on widespread worker discontent and the unions’ size, economic power, or 
extensive networks and organisational structure to increase protest participation, 
breadth, and leverage against the regime. 
Thus, while the campaign had the individual involvement of people from a wide variety of 
backgrounds, there was no broad coalition of the type seen in the Philippines. Virtually 
the only organisation which took place as such seems to have been the CNRP itself. The 
opposition was thus not able to effectively bring the moral authority of the sangha, the 
mobilisational ability of civil society, or the economic influence of the labour unions to 
bear in support of the campaign. Together with the rapid escalation of demands for Hun 
Sen to step down while the results were still being contested, the lack of a broad coalition 
of organisations opposing the CPP also encouraged international actors to view the 
campaign as the reaction of ‘sore losers’ complaining about the loss, rather than an 
expression of mass discontent against an authoritarian regime. As a result, the campaign 
also failed to attract overt international backing or pressure on the government either.164 
Related to this, the leadership of the CNRP did not have a strong strategy for the protests. 
Immediately after the election there was a strong upwelling of support for civil resistance, 
as described by one interviewee: 
The number increased from day to day, day to day. I talked to a lot of people at the 
Freedom Park that day, or those who travelled to the city, some of them said ‘I sold 
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my cow, I sold my cow in order to get enough money to get here, we need change, 
we want change.’ I think the energy was very powerful, very influential.165  
However, the leadership did not have clear strategic aims for the campaign, with 
disagreement taking place between the older generation and younger figures who came 
into politics through civil society involvement.166 Furthermore, after short periods of 
protest, Sam Rainsy called for breaks so that people could return home and rest. As a 
consequence, the campaign lost much of its momentum between protests: 
I think that was the mistake that Sam Rainsy made, I would say, when he called for 
postponing the momentum. He said ‘go home, relax, we start again next week. During 
that time those who want to stay here can stay, but those who want to leave, you 
leave’. And you know like hundreds and thousands of people who were there, on the 
Freedom Park, left back home and left about 4 or 5 hundred people at Freedom Park. 
And after one attack by the government, the opposition party could not call for that 
number again, they lost the number, they lost the momentum. 
The lack of strategy can also be seen in the over-reliance on tactics of concentration. A 
petition demanding an independent investigation into the election did attract the 
thumbprints of a reported 2 million people and was delivered to the United States 
embassy.167 Nevertheless, the campaign almost entirely consisted of the occupation of 
Freedom Park in Phnom Penh; once Freedom Park was forcibly cleared on 4 January 
2014, the CNRP did not have alternative means of resistance to fall back on. While tactics 
of concentration are more damaging to regimes, they are also more vulnerable to 
repression as they provide a clear target, and an ability to cycle between tactics of 
concentration and tactics of dispersion—such as boycotts and stay-aways—is important 
for maintaining resilience to repression. 
The campaign’s lack of resilience to repression was also brought up by a number of 
interviewees, who emphasised the perceived failings of the CNRP leadership in 
‘chickening out’ once the CPP decided to crack down.168 While I wish to emphasise that I 
do not endorse such a view personally, it was repeatedly claimed that if the campaign 
leaders had been willing to put more lives on the line, including their own, it may have 
had a better chance of overthrowing the Hun Sen government. Sam Rainsy’s decision to 
enter into the so-called culture of dialogue with Hun Sen following the crackdown is also 
seen as a major let-down for those who supported change.169  
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6.4.3. Roadblocks to transition 
Finally, contextual factors may have increased the perceived risks of regime change by 
making negotiating transitional arrangements more difficult. One is the fact that the 2013 
election result was a complete surprise. The CPP failed to recognise the change in national 
feeling about reform and change, and so was unable to respond to popular preferences in 
their campaign, relying instead on propaganda.170 One consequence of this is that the CPP 
was unable to respond quickly and effectively to contain protests, and it took some 
months before hardliners like the head of the military police Sao Sokha could persuade 
the rest of the leadership to use force.171 Yet another consequence was that there was also 
no expectation of a serious challenge to Hun Sen’s leadership. In the lead-up to the 2013 
election, Cambodia was therefore lacking the kind of leadership crisis that would have 
prompted elites to begin considering alternative options, surveying the attitudes of other 
members of the ruling coalition, or building connections to possible rivals for the 
leadership of the country. The rapid and surprising onset of the civil resistance campaign 
thus provided less room for elite manoeuvring that could have encouraged divisions to 
lead to regime breakdown. The CPP is still very concerned about the destabilising effect 
of sudden political change, and there continues to be a reluctance to openly discuss 
succession or transition options: 
Nobody even dares ask “what happens if there’s no Hun Sen tomorrow?” What if he 
was no longer there to hold the factions in check? I would assume that’s never been 
entertained within the ruling party, because nobody wants to be seen as asking such 
a doom and gloom question.172 
A further obstacle to the campaign’s success may have been the difficulty of negotiating a 
transition. Even aside from making it easier for Hun Sen to step down, the extensive 
implication of the CPP in corruption at all levels would necessitate some form of amnesty 
arrangement simply so that the new government could function.173 Yet since the 
abdication of Norodom Sihanouk there are no independent institutions in Cambodia that 
would be capable of mediating or guaranteeing such an arrangement. The current king, 
Norodom Sihamoni, is apolitical and does not have the skill or power to manage 
negotiations.174 The sangha hierarchy, while dominated by the CPP, likewise sees itself as 
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too apolitical to play this role.175 NGOs played a role in encouraging the culture of dialogue 
negotiation between Sam Rainsy and Hun Sen,176 but are not influential enough to really 
shape political calculations regarding regime change.177 And international actors which 
would be able to apply pressure if required have so far refused to do more than provide 
statements of support for negotiation and compromise.  
The CNRP itself did not and does not have any lines of communication with the CPP. 
Opposition members avoid talking to CPP members, even lower-ranking officials, for fear 
that they will be labelled ‘CPP puppets’; even figures like Kem Ley who engaged with the 
CPP were similarly painted as yuon puppets.178 Previous research has highlighted the 
importance of communication with middle- and low-ranking government officials for 
building trust and providing guarantees of safety in the event of regime change 
(Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006), yet this appears to have been completely absent in the 
Cambodian case.  
 
6.5. Case study conclusion 
This second part of the qualitative component builds on the quantitative findings 
presented in Chapter 4 and the qualitative findings presented in Chapter 5 by examining 
Hun Sen’s rule of Cambodia from 1985 to the onset of civil resistance in 2013 as a ‘deviant’ 
case, where the expected establishment of personal autocracy was not associated with the 
success of a nonviolent uprising. Indeed, the expectation that Cambodia was a personal 
autocracy in 2013 on the basis of the quantitative findings is also supported by the 
widespread notion that Hun Sen had established personal rule at least several years prior 
to 2013, if not earlier. 
Contrary to expectations, I have concluded that the Cambodian regime had not broken 
down from power-sharing to personal autocracy prior to 2013.179 While there have been 
a number of events that have been presented as significant power grabs by Hun Sen 
throughout his time in power, the evidence in favour of this interpretation is often too 
ambiguous to justify the conclusion that they represented substantive moves towards 
personal autocracy. I have also presented evidence that Hun Sen was still constrained in 
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his ability to act autonomously with regard to the ruling coalition prior to 2013 by the 
need to accommodate entrenched interests, particularly related to the rival faction in the 
CPP centred on Chea Sim. This assessment challenges existing perceptions of Hun Sen’s 
dominance within the Cambodian regime, indicating that the establishment of an absolute 
personal autocracy came at a much later date than previously suggested. The case study 
thus clearly illustrates the need to use caution when it comes to assessing underlying 
power dynamics on the basis of surface characteristics, as discussed in Chapter 3, and the 
potential pitfalls that can come from accepting existing accounts at face value.  
Hence, although Cambodia is a deviant case with regards to the quantitative component, 
I find that it is consistent with the theoretical framework. While China’s support for the 
CPP and the declining influence of the West in Cambodia has played a role in keeping Hun 
Sen in power, I have also argued that power-sharing continued to limit the incentives for 
elites to support a change to the status quo distribution of power by protecting their 
interests from arbitrary rule, thus reducing the leverage that the opposition campaign 
could exert against the regime. In particular, Chea Sim’s position as president of the CPP 
maintained balance within the party by preventing Hun Sen from stacking the party 
leadership, removing party veterans, or initiating ‘reform’ policies that would affect their 
influence. He also helped to maintain elite cohesion by resolving intra-party conflicts, 
preventing personal disputes from escalating into major divisions. Power-sharing thus 
did not lead to the kind of internal division and marginalisation of sectors of the ruling 
coalition that could have led to regime breakdown when challenged by mass protests, as 
it did in the Philippines under Marcos. 
The case study does, however, show that tenure may not always be a fully reliable 
indicator of personalisation. While the direction of the process is consistent with 
theoretical expectations, in that power-sharing was followed by the establishment of 
personal autocracy, the time to personal autocracy of approximately 30 years is well 
outside the expected range. Power-sharing in Cambodia lasted far longer under a single 
leader than the theoretical framework and quantitative results assume is generally 
possible. In this respect, therefore, Cambodia is indeed a deviant case. I explore potential 
explanations for this discrepancy further in section 0 of the conclusion, where I directly 
assess the coherence of the qualitative and quantitative components of this thesis. 
The case study has also shown that the ongoing power-sharing agreement within the 
ruling coalition is not the only reason that the civil resistance campaign was unsuccessful. 
In line with the heuristic purpose of the case study, I have highlighted several additional 
factors that also contributed, particularly with regards to the opposition’s tactics and 
strategy. A particular issue that came out of interview data is that members of the CPP do 
not trust the CNRP to guarantee their interests and safety in the event of regime chance, 
due the opposition party’s structure, campaign rhetoric, and refusal to communicate with 
the government. Other important issues include a failure to build a broad coalition 
capable of leveraging the political and economic power of other social groups in 
Cambodia, strategic weaknesses of the campaign itself, and contextual obstacles to 
ensuring a smooth transition. Counterfactually, it does seem possible that the campaign 
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could have been successful had some or all of these factors been addressed, as the 
campaign had widespread support and created a major crisis for the regime, a point that 
was emphasised by a number of interviewees. Yet, in combination with the ongoing 
power-sharing agreement, these weaknesses were insufficient to overcome elites’ 





7. Integration and conclusions 
 
7.1. Summary 
In this thesis I set out to examine how variation in authoritarian regimes influences the 
outcome of nonviolent uprisings. I argued that one dimension of authoritarian rule in 
particular, the power balance between autocrats and their elite allies, should play a role 
in explaining why uprisings succeed or fail by affecting elite incentives to actively support 
the ruler. Based on this argument, I divided regimes into two types: power-sharing 
regimes, where the autocrat’s decision-making authority is constrained by competing 
centres of power within the regime, and personal autocracies, where these constraints 
have effectively been removed. I then argued that personal autocracies should be more 
vulnerable to mass civil resistance campaigns, while power-sharing regimes should 
remain more cohesive when challenged by mass protests.  
To test this argument, I adopted a mixed methods sequential quan → qual design, 
involving both cross-national quantitative analysis and in-depth qualitative case studies 
selected on the basis of the quantitative results. The rationale for collecting both types of 
data was that either approach in isolation was unlikely to be sufficient to explore the topic 
in enough detail to adequately address the research question. The two components had 
distinct but complementary purposes: the quantitative component to establish a 
statistically significant association between measures of personal autocracy and civil 
resistance campaign outcome, and the qualitative component to unpack and explore these 
results in more detail by examining two cases, one most likely and one deviant. The 
second case study also had a heuristic purpose, to identify factors that could not be 
adequately explained by the existing theoretical framework. 
The quantitative results are largely consistent with the theoretical argument. Although 
the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) indicator of personal autocracy had only an 
inconsistent association with campaign outcome, I somewhat discounted this finding due 
to the existing problems with the dataset that have already been highlighted by 
Morgenbesser (2018) and others. However, the alternative indicator that I developed in 
Chapter 2, the leader’s time in power—which I argue to be a more consistent, albeit 
indirect indicator of the establishment of personal rule—is consistently and significantly 
associated with campaign success.  
I then carried out two in-depth case studies to examine this association in more detail. 
The overthrow of the Marcos regime (1965-1986) in the Philippines was identified as a 
most likely case for the purposes of theory testing, and I found that the case is indeed 
consistent with the theoretical argument. The establishment of personal autocracy 
threatened the interests of portions of the ruling coalitions, leading key figures who were 
marginalised from patronage flows and influence over decision-making to look for 
alternatives to the status quo to protect their personal safety and political interests. 
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Marcos’s consolidation of personal power thus ironically played a major role in his 
downfall by giving his elite allies incentives to support regime change. 
The 2013 uprising against the Hun Sen regime (1985-present) in Cambodia was then 
analysed as a deviant case. Counter to existing analyses of Hun Sen’s rule, I argued that 
the case is also consistent with the theoretical argument, with power-sharing surviving to 
2013 and playing a role in maintaining elite cohesion in the face of the pro-democracy 
protest campaign. I also highlighted a number of additional factors that made it difficult 
for the campaign to overcome the barrier of the continuing power-sharing agreement, 
including strategic and tactical weaknesses, characteristics of the opposition party, and 
other obstacles to a peaceful transition of power. 
The final stage of this study involves integrating the quantitative and qualitative 
components in order to draw overall conclusions, as well as assessing the coherence of 
the two sets of findings. The next section thus combines the results of both components 
to present the conclusions that I have drawn. It then assesses the quantitative study in 
light of the qualitative findings, and identifies additional explanatory factors highlighted 
by the Cambodia case study. I also highlight the main contributions that this thesis makes, 
including to research on civil resistance and authoritarianism, Southeast Asian politics, 
and political science methodology. I finally identify several limitations, including those 
relating to the scope and to the amount and quality of evidence available, and discuss 
areas that are likely to be productive for future research. 
 
7.2. Integration 
An essential part of combining qualitative and quantitative analysis in a mixed methods 
study is assessing how well the components ‘fit’, i.e., whether they are coherent or 
whether they have areas of divergence or disagreement (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are three general outcomes: confirmation, when the 
results from each component corroborate one another, reinforcing the overall conclusion; 
expansion, where results diverge and expand understanding by examining different or 
complementary aspects of the research focus; and discordance, where the results are 
inconsistent or contradictory (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). 
In terms of the overall research focus, the quantitative component shows a strong and 
consistent correlation between measures of personalisation and the outcome of 
nonviolent uprisings, with plausible confounders taken into account and using a range of 
analytic techniques. The qualitative component is consistent with these findings. In the 
Philippines, I found that personalisation of power by Ferdinand Marcos was a factor in his 
downfall, as it generated divisions within the ruling coalition that emerged into open 
conflict following the 1986 election. In Cambodia, I found that the maintenance of power-
sharing within the CPP was associated with elite cohesion in the face of the 2013 
campaign, giving members of the ruling coalition a continued stake in the regime’s 
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survival. Hence, I conclude that the quantitative and qualitative components largely 
confirm one another. 
There are two areas, however, where the results are not confirmatory. The first is the 
partial discordance over the use of time in office as an indicator for personalisation. 
Although it is consistent with Marcos’s consolidation of personal rule, it is challenged by 
the unexpectedly long duration of the power-sharing agreement in Cambodia under the 
Hun Sen government. The second is regarding characteristics of the opposition identified 
particularly in the Cambodia case study that are also likely to have played a role in 
influencing elite decision-making. The qualitative component here expands on the 
quantitative findings by showing that these aspects of nonviolent uprisings are also likely 
to be important in explaining outcomes. The following two sections address each of these 
areas in turn.  
 
Tenure as an indirect indicator of personalisation 
The results of the qualitative component are partly discordant with regard to the use of 
time in office as an indirect indicator of personal autocracy. In the Philippines, Marcos had 
established a personal autocracy by the mid-1970s, approximately ten years after taking 
office in 1965, while the height of his personal power is cited as being 1982. This 
timeframe is consistent with the approximate judgement that most regimes where a 
leader has been in power for much longer than a decade are likely to have become 
personal autocracies. In this case, therefore, the argument that time in office is correlated 
with personalisation of power largely holds. In the Cambodia case, though, I have 
concluded that the power-sharing agreement held for three decades after Hun Sen 
initially took power, from 1985 to 2015. While the general pattern of long tenure 
eventually leading to personal autocracy remains in place, the timeframe is sufficiently 
different from theoretical expectations to pose a challenge to the suitability of leader 
tenure as an indicator of personalisation. 
As Fetters, Curry, and Creswell (2013) point out, there are a number of options when 
findings are discordant, including offering potential explanations for the discordance, 
gathering additional data, re-analysing existing datasets, or rejecting the theoretical 
framework altogether. Given the limitations of a graduate research project, I have chosen 
to highlight the discordance and discuss some potential reasons why Cambodia may be 
an outlier in terms of how long the power-sharing agreement remained in place. 
One explanation that is immediately apparent is the continuing legacy of the Khmer Rouge 
and the Democratic Kampuchea regime from 1975-1979. The conflict of the 1980s and 
the enduring presence of a threatening armed insurgency until the final defeat of the 
Khmer Rouge’s remaining forces in 1998 may have had a cohesive effect on Cambodia’s 
political elite. Levitsky and Way (2012) argue that violent struggle in the early days of a 
regime’s existence tends to create enduring partisan identities, produces leaders with 
large amounts of legitimacy, and enhance the rulers’ capacity for repression, while Smith 
(2005) similarly argues that revolutionary origins tend to increase party cohesion. 
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Although it is not entirely clear whether these mechanisms apply in the Cambodian case, 
it is possible that they have played a role; some interview evidence from the case study 
suggests that the experience of CPP cadres in armed conflict during the 1980s, in 
particular, may have indeed contributed to party cohesion, at least at the grassroots 
level.180 
More relevant to the argument of this thesis is the fact that the 1993 Cambodian 
constitution did not place term limits of any kind on Hun Sen’s position (Cambodia Const. 
[1993]). As a result, the kinds of checks on the autocrat’s time in power that I argued 
underlie the relationship between power-sharing, personal autocracy, and length of 
tenure were not present in this case.181 As pointed out earlier, however, an autocrat needs 
to maintain a balance amongst competing centres of power, avoid the temptation to 
opportunistically subvert the power-sharing agreement, and prevent ambitious 
lieutenants from launching challenges to their position, all of which are likely to limit the 
average leader’s time in power even in the absence of term limits. Hence, while the lack 
of constitutional limits on Hun Sen’s tenure may have made it easier for him to remain in 
power without needing to make overt power grabs, more explanation is still needed.  
A further and more idiosyncratic factor may be Hun Sen’s evident political skill, which has 
allowed him to survive major challenges to become one of the longest-enduring autocrats 
in the modern world, and which may have enabled him to effectively manage the threat 
from within the ruling coalition without having to create a personal autocracy. This would 
suggest that political skill by the autocrat has a role to play in maintaining a balance of 
power that minimises the risks of rebellion from within the ruling coalition while 
maintaining a broad enough support base to fend off external challenges. That said, 
Marcos is also noted to have been a masterful political player (e.g., Celoza, 1997); whether 
this factor can provide an adequate explanation is therefore not immediately obvious.  
A third factor may be the ready availability of easily-exploitable natural resources in 
Cambodia. I included oil production as an independent variable in the quantitative study, 
but members of the Cambodian regime have benefited from other natural resources that 
are not included such as timber, gemstones, and sand (Global Witness, 2009; 2016). While 
                                                        
 
180 Interview, CPP official, Svay Rieng province, May 2017. 
181 It is true that it is not unusual for parliamentary system to lack constitutional term limits, which 
are more commonly associated with presidential systems (cf. Baturo, 2014). However, in 
democratic parliamentary or similar non-presidential governments other functioning limits on 
the leader’s position exist. In constitutional monarchies such as Australia and New Zealand, for 
example, the Governor-General, who represents the monarch, holds ‘reserve powers’ that allow 
the dismissal of the prime minister, while exercising few powers otherwise. Typically, prime 
ministers in parliamentary systems can also be removed by a vote of no confidence from the 
parliament, which—in genuinely democratic contexts—is itself responsible to the electorate. Yet 
while the National Assembly is theoretically capable of passing such a vote in Cambodia, the 
inability of the UNTAC administration to implement genuine democratic accountability during its 
mandate meant that this and other democratic checks and balances did not seriously constrain 
Hun Sen’s position (Cambodia Const. [1993], art. 90). 
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oil is the only resource that has been found to be consistently associated with 
authoritarian durability (Ross, 2015), and hence is the most appropriate for cross-
national regression analysis, in individual cases the particular resources that are used to 
fund patronage and repression may play more of a role. Indeed, the impact of natural 
resource extraction—including potential future oil reserves—on Cambodia’s political 
system has received some attention in previous work (e.g., Un, 2005). However, the 
impact of these revenue streams on power dynamics within the regime have yet to be 
explored, and warrant further attention in the future. 
A related aspect that seems especially likely to be salient is the degree of Western 
intervention in Cambodia that has taken place during Hun Sen’s rule, not only through the 
unprecedented UNTAC administration but also through continuing aid flows to the 
country. Large quantities of this aid have been misappropriated by the Cambodian 
government in order to maintain the patronage system and enrich those at the top of the 
regime (e.g., Calavan, Briquets & O’Brien, 2004; Ear, 2013). A large proportion of this aid 
has been, at least in name, tied to the notion that Cambodia is progressing towards 
democracy, or at least ‘good governance’, although obviously the reality has been 
somewhat different (Ear, 2013). Overt personalisation of power may have threatened the 
continued flow of funds by removing the thin veneer of democracy and making it more 
difficult for Western donors to continue supporting the regime, thus giving Hun Sen a 
strong incentive to limit his attempts to create a personal autocracy. Additional evidence 
for this interpretation comes from the observation that Hun Sen’s more recent open 
moves to consolidate personal rule have occurred at a time when Western influence in 
Cambodia has substantially declined and become increasingly supplanted by China as a 
source of economic and diplomatic support, with a corresponding decrease in pressure 
for democratic reform (see Croissant, 2018). 
Overall, it is difficult to determine why the power-sharing agreement in Cambodia 
remained in place for so much longer than theorised. Potential explanations are related 
to the lingering effects of genocide and civil war, the lack of checks on Hun Sen’s position 
in the 1993 constitution, individual characteristics of Hun Sen, or the presence of easily 
exploitable natural and aid resources. All of these factors may be fruitful areas for future 
enquiry. As a result, while evidence from the Philippines case supports the use of tenure 
as a proxy indicator of personalisation, the Cambodia case implies that it should be treated 
as only an imperfect measure and thus treated with some caution.  
 
Opposition factors not included in the quantitative component 
While less information about civil resistance campaigns themselves is included in the 
quantitative component, the qualitative studies expand on the quantitative findings to 
show that characteristics of the opposition are likely to interact with power 
personalisation to determine whether the regime breaks down or remains cohesive 
during a civil resistance campaign. In particular, my research on the Cambodian campaign 
indicates that issues including lack of trust in the opposition leadership, the 
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comparatively narrow social base of the campaign, and strategic weaknesses also posed 
obstacles to success.  
A major factor preventing Cambodian political elites from considering alternatives to Hun 
Sen was identified by many interviewees as their lack of trust in the CNRP. There were a 
number of elements to this. Given the CNRP’s undemocratic internal structure and the 
authoritarian personal style of its leadership, the CPP is likely to have seen the CNRP as 
simply a competing patronage network, thus making political competition an all-or-
nothing struggle for power. This view is likely to have been reinforced by the CNRP’s 
campaign methods of ‘colouring’ the entire CPP as illegitimate yuon puppets. 
Furthermore, there were no lines of communication open between the CPP and CNRP. All 
of these factors would have made it difficult for CPP members to gain assurances that a 
CNRP victory would not have led to their interests or safety being threatened and 
potential political instability for the entire system. In contrast, Corazon Aquino’s call for 
civil resistance focused primarily on removing Marcos and his ‘cronies’, rather than 
challenging the system as a whole. As a member of the elite class, she also had a stake in 
the stability of the Philippines’ political and economic system, a factor which is likely to 
have helped Marcos’s supporters view her as a relatively safe alternative.  
An additional factor, which has been highlighted in Denardo’s (1986) formal work on 
protest but has received less attention in empirical civil resistance research, was the social 
breadth of participation in the campaigns. In the Philippines a wide range of social groups 
joined protests against Marcos in the lead-up to the EDSA revolution, including students, 
left-wing radicals, right-wing business groups, land-owning elites, and religious authority 
figures. Although the coalition subsequently broke down, the breadth of social groups 
taking part played a major role in Marcos’s overthrow, as it signalled both a widespread 
lack of support across society as well as providing signals for Marcos’s supporters that the 
movement was ‘moderate’ rather than ‘radical’ and hence could be supported without 
threatening dramatic political instability (Anderson, 1988). In contrast, the breadth of 
social participation in the Cambodian campaign was more limited. While representatives 
of different social groups took part, including Buddhist monks and NGOs, there was little 
official participation by the leadership of those groups, with individuals instead taking 
part as citizens only. The CNRP, which has been resistant to coalition building in the past 
in order to maintain its status as the primary opposition movement, was unable to link its 
political objectives to the interests of other important social groups, particularly 
organised labour. The preeminent status of the CNRP in the protest campaign is also likely 
to have contributed to it being viewed as a ‘sore loser’ by the international community, 
which was more reluctant to lend its overt support in comparison to the challenge to the 
more blatantly fraudulent result of the Philippines’ election in 1986. 
Finally, the Cambodian campaign featured strategic weaknesses. The campaign relied 
solely on tactics of concentration, which are more vulnerable to repression than tactics of 
dispersion such as strikes or boycotts (Schock, 2005). Sam Rainsy’s calls for periodic 
breaks—even in the absence of overt repression—dissipated the momentum of the 
protests. And when Freedom Park was forcibly cleared in January 2014, the leadership 
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was unable to continue the campaign, choosing instead to negotiate with the regime from 
a position of weakness, a move much criticised by many in the aftermath. The Philippines 
campaign, in contrast, involved a wide range of groups protesting in different locations 
and at different times, thus making it more difficult for the regime to focus on one clear 
target for repression. Even when repression did occur, the opposition was able to 
continue maintaining pressure on the regime. 
There are therefore a number of features of the Cambodian campaign that contributed to 
its failure to achieve regime change, in addition to characteristics of the regime itself. 
Especially interesting is the important role given by research participants to the 
campaign’s communication strategies and political message and the way that this is likely 
to have been perceived by members of the ruling party, something that has received little 
attention in civil resistance research to date. While work has examined the different 
effects of ‘maximalist’ versus reformist goals (e.g., Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), also 
important may be the difference between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ goals, in the sense of 
targeting just the regime leader and a few close allies versus attacking the legitimacy of 
the entire government or state system; the latter may, for example, make it more difficult 
for ruling elites to feel that their safety or interests would be assured in the event of 
regime change. Similarly, the effect of rhetoric that would generally be considered 
negative by Western advocates of the democratising potential of civil resistance, like the 
racist and xenophobic appeals used by the CNRP as well as other opposition parties in 
Cambodia, may play a role in explaining elite preferences for regime continuity versus 
change. Future work on civil resistance, both quantitative and qualitative, may benefit 
from addressing these issues. 
Overall, I have identified some discordance between the quantitative and qualitative 
findings, with leader tenure shown to not be a perfectly consistent indicator of personal 
autocracy. However, I argue that this is not fatal to the overall suitability of tenure as an 
indicator of the establishment of personal autocracy. Cambodia features several 
idiosyncratic features that are plausibly responsible for the unusually long duration of 
power-sharing in this case in particular, although further comparative research into this 
subject would be needed to determine this conclusively. Furthermore, tenure is only a 
probabilistic indicator of power personalisation, and so a small percentage of extreme 
values would be expected; Svolik (2012, 77) similarly acknowledges that there are a small 
number of exceptions to the low likelihood of coups occurring in personal autocracies. 
The fact that Hun Sen’s tenure is likely to be an extreme value in this case is supported by 
Cambodia’s status as an outlier in relation to the quantitative findings, as indicated clearly 
in Figure 4.5.  
In terms of opposition factors, I conclude that the qualitative analysis has not highlighted 
any thing that clearly ought to be considered in the quantitative component, the omission 
of which is likely to be causing omitted variable bias. This is supported by the fact that the 
cases which have been predicted inaccurately do not show any clear patterns, as would 
be expected if omitted variable bias were an issue; a large proportion of these were 
mispredicted mainly due to the difficulties of fitting complex political processes into 
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discrete categories. However, the case studies do suggest several areas for further inquiry. 
In particular, I have highlighted the possible importance of the social breadth of campaign 
participation, in addition to protest size, in influencing success. Measures of campaign 
goals could also be further refined beyond the current broad categories to capture the 
scope of movements’ ambitions. I also argue that specific attention should be paid to 
political communication in nonviolent uprisings and the way that campaign messages 
may influence elites’ decision-making processes.  
 
7.3. Conclusions 
The conclusion that I draw from this study is that civil resistance campaigns are more 
likely to succeed against personal autocracies than power-sharing regimes because of the 
distinctive difference in the relationship between the autocrat and the ruling coalition 
under these two forms of authoritarian rule. In power-sharing regimes, members of the 
ruling coalition are capable of coordinating to remove rulers if they attempt to subvert 
the agreement to share control over decision-making and access to resource, thus obliging 
rulers to balance their own interests against those of other centres of power in the regime. 
Because elites are able to protect their interests by threatening to rebel against a 
predatory autocrat, they have fewer incentives—all else being equal—to support far-
reaching and unpredictable political change. Power-sharing thus increases the regime’s 
cohesion and ability to resist external challenges from anti-regime civil resistance 
campaigns by reducing the likelihood that elites will withdraw support from the ruler. 
By contrast, in personal autocracies the ruler’s monopolisation of power undermines 
elites’ ability to ensure that their interests are protected within the existing system. 
Where autocrats have consolidated control over the legislative, executive, and coercive 
authority of the state, they can act largely autonomously of their ruling coalition, using 
tools such as purges, personnel rotations, separate coercive agencies, and discretionary 
distribution of patronage to deter internal challenges. Elites have incentives to remove 
the autocrat and re-establish power-sharing in order to prevent policies and actions that 
are counter to their interests; indeed, this is possible in principle because elites retain a 
degree of influence and power which is required to keep the regime running. Yet the 
autocrat’s ability to punish first movers effectively atomises the ruling coalition, imposing 
a prohibitively high risk to any individual if they were to initiate a rebellion, thus creating 
a collective action problem. 
In this context, mass civil resistance acts as a coordinating mechanism, allowing regime 
elites to overcome their collective action problem and withdraw support from the 
autocrat. A nonviolent uprising creates an exogenous crisis which removes the need for 
elites to initiate a rebellion themselves, thus avoiding the first mover problem that 
otherwise prevents internal challenges. By forcing a regime response, it opens up space 
for debate, allowing elites to consider alternatives to the status quo and find out whether 
there is wider support for change within the ruling coalition. The opposition leadership 
provides a partner for negotiating a transition, while mass protests provide a political 
158 
 
resource that can be drawn on to legitimise alternative claims to power and may also 
affect the perceived likelihood of a withdrawal of support succeeding. 
Therefore, I conclude that civil resistance is more likely to succeed under conditions of 
personal autocracy because elites are more likely to withdraw their support from the 
ruler than under conditions of power-sharing. The establishment of personal autocracy 
is thus a double-edged sword, protecting the ruler from challenges from within the ruling 
coalition yet at the same time rendering their position more vulnerable to a nonviolent 
mass uprising.  
 
7.3.1. Contributions and implications 
Civil resistance and authoritarianism research 
The main contribution of this thesis to research on civil resistance is to show that explicit 
attention needs to be paid to the characteristics of authoritarian regimes. Focusing on 
opposition characteristics, strategies, and tactics is an important corrective to the 
dismissal of popular agency in large areas of research on politics (Celestino & Gleditsch, 
2013; Martin, 2015), and has highlighted the previously under-appreciated success of 
civil resistance (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Yet, to date, 
work on civil resistance has largely neglected the internal characteristics of authoritarian 
regimes, or has included only the field’s main typologies without fully engaging with 
comparative authoritarianism theory. This thesis shows that analysis of only the 
opposition movement is insufficient to fully understand why some regimes fall to civil 
resistance while others endure even very large and sustained protests. As has been 
pointed out before (e.g., Geddes, 1999; Fjelde, 2010), variation amongst regimes has 
direct consequences for the outcomes they experience. Taking this variation into account 
is likely to become even more urgent for scholars of civil resistance in years to come, as 
authoritarian regimes become increasingly sophisticated in their institutional makeup 
and methods of rule and the effects of these shifts on civil resistance and prospects for 
political change become more pronounced. 
I have not only identified this gap in existing research, but also demonstrated how 
research from comparative authoritarianism can be applied to understand civil resistance 
outcomes. There are two main approaches that I have discussed: typological (e.g., Geddes, 
Wright & Frantz, 2014) and deductive (e.g., Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). Both have 
now generated substantial bodies of literature, and can be used as a source of insights for 
developing theory and producing new hypotheses. Each approach has its own advantages. 
While there are problems with regime typologies, they are relatively simple to apply and 
capture broad commonalities and differences across a wide range of regimes. Hence these 
are a good starting point for incorporating authoritarianism theory into studying civil 
resistance. Deductive models, on the other hand, rely on often complex formal models, but 
are able to at least partly deal with the problem of gathering evidence on political 
processes inside the authoritarian ‘black box’, as well as show the far-reaching 
consequences of simple variations in a few key dimensions of interest. Approaches based 
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on game theory can be particularly valuable for producing non-intuitive hypotheses about 
connections between regime characteristics and campaigns; the strong correlation 
between leader tenure and campaign outcome, for example, only makes sense once the 
competing incentives of autocrats and their ruling coalitions are taken into account. 
Furthermore, civil resistance research does not necessarily need to develop complex or 
technical models from scratch, but can make use of the findings of the increasing range of 
formal work that is being produced; the conceptual framework developed here, for 
example, draws a number of key insights from Svolik’s (2012) work, yet is itself quite 
simple. It is also consistent with Sharp’s (1973) foundational work in civil resistance, 
which argues that undermining support for the ruler from key areas of the regime is 
essential for civil resistance success. 
Related to this last point, a further implication of this thesis for scholarship on civil 
resistance is that it needs to pay more specific attention to the central roles of autocrats’ 
elite allies in influencing the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. Although civil resistance 
work typically considers the autocrats various bases of support, most explicitly in the 
commonly-used ‘pillars of support’ model (e.g. Helvey, 2004), it has not emphasised 
enough the role of the ruling coalition, which, by definition, is absolutely central to 
maintaining authoritarian rule. Although I do not argue that regime change is an 
inherently elite-led process, as espoused by earlier scholars such as Pareto (1935), the 
findings of this thesis do point towards the importance of the decision by members of the 
ruling coalition to support either the status quo or an alternative regime in influencing 
the likelihood that civil resistance campaigns will succeed. The importance of elites is not 
only highlighted in the theoretical framework but also by some of the additional factors 
that I identified as contributing to the failure of the 2013 campaign in Cambodia. These 
include the CNRP’s reliance on xenophobic rhetoric, its broad attacks on the entire CPP’s 
legitimacy rather than just the leadership of Hun Sen, its perception as a competing closed 
patronage network that would not seek a compromise solution, and signals that it did not 
have the full support of a broad social base. I concluded that all of these issues negatively 
impacted the campaign’s likelihood of success because of the way they impacted elite 
preferences for change versus the status quo. 
This thesis also contributes to comparative authoritarianism by demonstrating the 
particular vulnerability of personal autocracies to nonviolent uprisings, something that 
has not been highlighted in previous research. I have concluded that this occurs because 
autocrats’ moves to protect themselves from the ruling coalition simultaneously increase 
their susceptibility to nonviolent external challenges. Thus the same process that Svolik 
(2012) identifies as accounting for the decreasing incidence of coups the longer autocrats 
remain in power is also a major factor increasing the likelihood that anti-regime civil 
resistance succeeds. It has been pointed out in the past that the greatest threat to 
autocrats’ positions comes from their elite allies (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011; Svolik, 2012). Yet 
this thesis shows that, for the minority of autocrats who succeed in overcoming 
constraints on their position and establishing a personal autocracy, the threat of a 
challenge from civilians outside the regime is a much more pressing concern. 
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As with civil resistance, this thesis thus shows that research on comparative 
authoritarianism would benefit from incorporating insights from the ‘other side’. Civil 
resistance research has been largely absent from typological work on comparative 
authoritarianism, which has tended to conflate conceptually distinct forms of resistance 
such as riots, coordinated protest campaigns, and spontaneous demonstrations under the 
umbrella of ‘mass protest’. This misses important variation across different instances of 
civilian-based resistance, including the type and range of tactics employed, the degree of 
underlying organisation and coordination (which is often greater than it appears on the 
surface), the degree of nonviolence and precise boundaries of what constitutes violence, 
and other factors that have been highlighted in research of civil resistance. Civil resistance 
research has also been markedly absent from formal, deductive work, which typically 
focuses on strategic interaction only amongst elite actors and ignores the role of popular 
pressure in influencing regime dynamics.  
In general, the findings of this thesis highlight the fact that a one-sided approach in either 
field is inadequate for understanding complex political phenomena such as nonviolent 
uprisings. Contrary to Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) central conclusion, I argue that 
regime characteristics cannot be left out of a complete explanation of why some 
campaigns succeed while others fail. Yet at the same time, the shortcomings of the 
Cambodian campaign demonstrate that the focus should not shift entirely to the regime 
at the expense of the opposition movement, as for example Way (2008) has argued, as 
civil resistance movements are not all alike. Rather, it necessary to examine the 
characteristics and strategies of both sides, and perhaps more importantly the interplay 
of these factors, if we wish to understand why civil resistance campaign succeed or fail. 
 
Southeast Asian politics 
The qualitative case studies also make a distinct contribution to the study of Southeast 
Asian politics, an area which is receiving more scholarly attention with the shift in 
comparative politics generally away from democratisation towards examining 
authoritarian survival.  
In the Philippines study, I am able to revisit a much-studied case with a new analytical 
framework derived from deductive work concerning the strategic interaction of regime 
actors under authoritarianism. While many comparative works either focus on the 
differences and specific characteristics of individual cases, or restrict comparison to 
within the region, this framework allows me to show that the Marcos regime has 
commonalities—in particular, the consolidation of personal power and consequent effect 
on ruling coalition cohesion—with other authoritarian regimes, both within Southeast 
Asia and outside. In addition, while much previous work on the EDSA revolution has 
emphasised the role of civil society mobilisation in bringing down Marcos (e.g., 
Thompson, 1995), this case study contributes to the growing recognition that the loss of 
support from regime insiders played a key role in weakening the regime to the point 
where Marcos was forced to flee (Lee, 2015; Fukuoka, 2015). Thus, like Fukuoka (2015) 
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and in contrast to studies which emphasise the role of external forces (e.g., Slater, 2010), 
I argue for a need to look at what is happening inside the regime as well if we wish to 
understand how governments in Southeast Asia endure or collapse. 
In the Cambodian case study, I provide a detailed analysis of the 2013 democracy 
campaign, which has not yet been addressed in academic work.182 I show that, although 
some observers have dismissed the campaign (e.g., McCargo, 2014), it in fact posed a 
major threat to the CPP’s hold on power, and had real potential to force political change. 
Indeed, subsequent and ongoing warnings by the CPP and military leadership against 
nonviolent protest show the extent to which they were threatened by the 2013 uprising, 
and that they continue to view the possibility of mass mobilisation as a serious risk. In a 
region where the number of large-scale anti-regime campaigns still remains limited, this 
case study can provide a foundation for future comparative analysis by both highlighting 
the importance of the 2013 campaign, which has otherwise been missed or downplayed 
in research on Cambodian politics, and providing detail about it and the political context 
in which it occurred. 
In addition, the case study uses original data to generate new insights about the dynamics 
of Cambodian politics. I have highlighted ambiguity surrounding key regime events 
following the UNTAC administration, providing new interpretations that challenge 
existing interpretations. As a result, I have been able to present a more nuanced 
assessment of Hun Sen’s personalisation of power by highlighting the balance at the top 
of the regime provided by Chea Sim and his faction. While undoubtedly the turn to China 
has played a role in influencing the direction of the current regime, I point to the 
importance of internal factors in explaining developments in Cambodian politics. In 
particular, my analysis implies that the death of Chea Sim in 2015 marked a critical 
juncture for the Cambodian regime, with Hun Sen now facing much fewer restrictions on 
consolidating personal power from within the ruling coalition than he did at the time of 
the 2013 campaign. This is likely to have major consequences for Cambodia, as Hun Sen 
will now be more free to eliminate opposition and act without intra-regime constraint; 
indeed, it may help to explain the unusually overt and bold nature of the crackdown which 
is ongoing in the country at the time of writing (see the postscript below). Yet there is also 
room for cautious optimism; in the light of the results of this research, Hun Sen’s current 
personalisation of power also implies that if a major civil resistance campaign can emerge 
again in the future, it may have a greater chance of bringing about political change. 
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Political science methodology 
A further contribution of this thesis is that it utilises an innovative methodology that has 
to date received little attention in political science research. In doing so, it shows how 
developments in the mixed methodology field can be applied in political science. 
Currently, recommendations for carrying out mixed methods studies in political science 
remain limited, being either neglected from methodological works entirely or limited to 
narrow prescriptions of how projects should be carried out (e.g., Lieberman, 2005; 
Toshkov, 2016). In contrast, methodological work from education and health science, as 
well as the growing dedicated mixed methodology field, allows for a wide range of 
possible research designs, focusing on how the principles of mixed analysis are applied in 
a study rather than setting out rigid steps to be followed (e.g., Nastasi, Hitchcock & Brown, 
2010). These principles include compatibility and communication across methodological 
approaches, an instrumental approach to methods, and careful evaluation of the 
consistency and coherence of quantitative and qualitative results. Especially important is 
the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to generate a more 
complete understanding of the phenomenon under investigation and increase confidence 
in the research findings. Hence, this thesis contributes to political science methodology 
by paying specific attention to these principles, showing how they can be applied in 
practice, and demonstrating the utility of doing so. 
One particular benefit of using mixed methods in this thesis is that it has been possible to 
compensate for the weaknesses of relying on either a quantitative or qualitative approach 
in isolation to study authoritarian politics. For instance, quantitative analysis can be 
rigorous and persuasive, and a useful solution to the ‘black box’ problem. But in isolation 
it is often limited by a lack of evidence that proposed causal processes actually exist, and 
also generally has to rely on only imperfect indicators of key theoretical concepts. I have 
been able to deal with this issue by using qualitative analysis to show that the theoretical 
argument of degeneration into personal autocracy leading to regime vulnerability 
provides a good explanation of individual cases, and to examine the validity of time in 
office as a measure of personalisation. The qualitative component has also provided a 
much more detailed and nuanced description of power-sharing, personalisation, and the 
impact of the establishment of personal autocracy on civil resistance than would be 
possible in a quantitative-only study.  
At the same time, the use of global quantitative data has shown the generalisability of the 
theoretical framework, something which can be challenging for small-n comparative 
studies. I have also been able to generate new insights regarding the two case studies by 
applying an analytical framework that draws heavily on formal modelling of authoritarian 
politics, something which has largely been absent from qualitative studies of 
authoritarianism. By drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data I have been able 
to provide a more detailed description of the phenomenon of personalisation and how it 
relates to nonviolent uprisings than would otherwise be possible, while also making up 
for some of the more challenging problems of relying on either approach in isolation, thus 




7.3.2. Limitations and areas for future research 
There are a number of limitations to this study. While I conclude that the case studies have 
provided qualified support for the use of autocrat tenure as a proxy indicator for 
personalisation, it is possible that other factors are driving the relationship between time 
in power and civil resistance outcome. While I have endeavoured to evaluate and dismiss 
what I consider to be plausible explanations, the absence of fully developed theoretical 
alternatives linking authoritarian rule to civil resistance outcomes makes it is difficult to 
do so with complete confidence. Further research into the relationship between internal 
regime politics and the outcomes of civil resistance campaigns, and especially how the 
dynamics of these change over time, is therefore needed to explore this relationship in 
more detail.  
One particular limitation is that the argument I develop is based on the incentives faced 
by regime elites and the decisions they make as a result. However, other than in the 
Philippines case study where post-transition documentary evidence exists, I am not able 
to draw on direct evidence that these incentives influenced elites in the way that I have 
argued. This is a problem faced by many studies which address elite decision-making, 
particularly in authoritarian regimes (e.g., Slater, 2010; cf. Art, 2016; Barros, 2016). In 
general, the secrecy that pervades authoritarian regimes still limits the availability and 
quality of direct evidence, regardless of research approach. Again, this is a problem for 
the vast majority of studies of authoritarian politics, especially when studying regimes 
that are still in existence (Art, 2016; Barros, 2016). As mentioned above, this is the case 
in Cambodia, where access to reliable information about the internal dynamics of the CPP 
remains limited. The lack of access thus qualifies my conclusions regarding the balance of 
power within the regime, as new information may come to light in the future that enable 
the re-evaluation of existing evidence. There are also limitations to the evidence that 
could be drawn on to reach the conclusions presented here. Due to the time and budget 
limitations of a graduate research project, I was not able to carry out fieldwork in the 
Philippines. As a consequence, there is less detail in the Philippines case study, 
particularly regarding the actions of other members of Marcos’s ruling coalition during 
the civil resistance campaign and the 1986 election.  
In terms of scope, the empirical focus of the study is restricted to only large civil resistance 
campaigns aiming at regime change in authoritarian states. As stated earlier, it does not 
consider campaigns that occur in democracies. Nor does it consider campaigns with other 
goals, such as more restricted policy reform, group- or identity-based rights, radical social 
change or otherwise; indeed, as the theoretical argument here is based on contestation 
over control of government, it would be expected that these kinds of campaigns would 
exhibit different success/failure dynamics. One area where these findings may have 
implications, though, is civil resistance campaigns aiming at secession or other territorial 
goals. Cunningham (2014), for example, argues that the outcome of self-determination 
campaigns (in both democracies and autocracies) is influenced by the number of factions 
within the central government of the state that are capable of vetoing decisions. Given 
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that establishing personal autocracy involves removing constraints on the autocrat, 
including vetoes, the dynamics of collapse into personal autocracy seem likely to be 
pertinent in explaining variations in the outcome of self-determination campaigns. Taking 
into account the constraints of this project, I leave further investigation in this area to 
future research.  
A final important limitation is that the study is based on a restricted definition of ‘success’, 
which I defined as the breakdown of the authoritarian regime in response to civil 
resistance, and operationalised as the autocrat either stepping down or initiating a 
transition away from the incumbent regime. The constraints of using a dichotomous 
success variable have been discussed already in Chapter 4. But this definition also means 
that the study does not consider the longer-term or normative outcomes of campaigns. 
Yet these areas are obviously of importance, not only to scholars but also those living in 
the countries involved. Indeed, although the democratising potential of civil resistance 
has been highlighted in previous research (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Celestino & 
Gleditsch, 2013), others have seriously questioned whether the longer-term effects of 
successful campaigns have been positive or not (e.g., Rupnik, 2010; Chabot & Sharifi, 
2013). More specifically to this project, the successful overthrow of personal autocracies 
in Southeast Asia has had mixed consequences. For example, the post-EDSA period in the 
Philippines featured multiple coup attempts by the military (see Davide et al., 1990) while 
the country’s minimally-democratic government remains dominated by the oligarchic 
elite (Fukuoka, 2016). Similarly, although Indonesia remains one of the only democracies 
in the region, the fall of Suharto did not lead to a dramatic shift in underlying power 
relationships (Fukuoka, 2016). The election of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 and his 
subsequent authoritarian-like style of leadership raises further questions about the 
quality of democracy in the Philippines. The relationship between personalisation, civil 
resistance, and longer-term outcomes—which may be related to the effect of 
personalisation on the strength of state institutions (cf. Snyder, 2000)—therefore 
warrants more attention in the future. 
The results of this thesis point to two further areas that are likely to be productive for 
future research. One is the relationship between personalisation and campaign onset and 
growth. This study finds that when campaigns do emerge, they are more successful 
against more personalised regimes. But there are also autocracies where the ruler’s 
tenure is long enough to suggest personalisation, yet open civil resistance has not 
occurred. This includes a handful of cases where the autocrat survived in office longer 
than the maximum tenure in the sample used for this study, Bulgaria’s Todor Zhivkov at 
35 years, including Cuba’s Fidel Castro (49 years), Jordan’s Hussein ibn Talal al-Hashimi 
(46 years), and Tonga’s Taufa'ahau Tupou IV (41 years). Further examination of why civil 
resistance campaigns have emerged in some personal autocracies and not in others may 
shed additional light on the relationship between authoritarian politics and civil 
resistance.  
The second is the role of international actors in supporting authoritarian regimes or civil 
resistance movements. Although I have for the most part excluded international factors 
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from the analysis presented in this thesis, instead focusing on internal and domestic 
factors, the influence of powerful third parties is often emphasised in both academic and 
non-academic accounts of nonviolent regime change, particularly from outside the field 
of civil resistance research. Especially of importance for the regional focus of the 
qualitative component is the growing influence of China in Southeast Asia, given its 
willingness to support non-democratic regimes (e.g., Denoon, 2017; Croissant, 2018). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the declining authority and influence of the United 
States, particularly since the election of their most recent president, may also be playing 
a role in affecting repression and dissent in the region. While the importance of external 
actors is often exaggerated at the expense of dismissing political pressure driven ‘from 
below’, changing dynamics between major international powers may be an important 
factor to consider in future research on the relationship between authoritarian rule and 
civil resistance. 
As a final note, I wish to stress that the findings of this research should not be interpreted 
as being pessimistic about the chances of successfully challenging non-personalised 
authoritarian regimes. Nor should it be inferred that I am recommending delaying 
activism in pursuit of democracy for years until the leader of the regime has personalised 
power. The power balance within the regime is just one factor among many that 
contribute to the success of a civil resistance campaigns; as has been argued by others 
(Sharp, 1973; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), a well planned, strategised, and executed 
campaign can be successful even against a very strong opponent. Far from the popular 
image of the all-powerful, entrenched dictator, this thesis shows that the longer one 
individual is in office, and the more personal power they amass, the more vulnerable they 
become to a mass campaign of nonviolent civil resistance. I therefore hope that these 
findings may offer a sense of optimism about the ongoing potential of civil resistance to 





Research does not occur in a vacuum, and even as this thesis was being finalised events 
were unfolding in Cambodia. As I noted in Chapter 3, I was surprised at how willing 
interviewees were to talk about highly sensitive political topics. There was, however, an 
element of good fortune in achieving the level of openness that I did. In August, only a few 
weeks after my field visit, the Cambodian government initiated a widespread crackdown, 
beginning by shutting down the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia radio stations and 
ordered the closure of the National Democracy Institute, a pro-democracy NGO supported 
by the United States government.183 Shortly afterwards, CNRP leader Kem Sokha was 
arrested in a midnight raid on trumped-up charges, without a warrant and in violation of 
his parliamentary immunity.184 Several days later, the critical English-language 
newspaper The Cambodia Daily was forced to close over charges of tax evasion.185 
Notably, this is the first time that the government has openly targeted Western 
organisations and the English-language press in Cambodia, which, until now, have been 
allowed to operate remarkably freely (CCHR, 2010; Strangio, 2014).  
The crackdown culminated in the formal dissolution of the CNRP on the 16th of November, 
with the party’s National Assembly seats and commune council heads redistributed 
(mostly to the CPP) and its senior officials banned from taking part in politics for five 
years.186 Mu Sochua, who had taken over as party leader following the arrest of Kem 
Sokha, has been forced to flee the country along with a number of other senior party 
figures.187 Former leader Sam Rainsy is also set to be charged with treason alongside Kem 
Sokha, although he remains in exile.188 The move has been followed by a widespread 
campaign of intimidation against former CNRP members, with Hun Sen ordering officials 
to “break the legs” of the party at the local level; this has included coercing defections to 
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the CPP, in an attempt to destroy the opposition’s morale and mobilisational ability in the 
lead-up to the 2018 election.189 
The central findings of this thesis imply that Hun Sen’s personalisation of power ought to 
increase the likelihood that the regime would collapse if another mass uprising were to 
occur in Cambodia. That Hun Sen may be aware of this risk is attested to by the regime’s 
frequent and heavy-handed use of propaganda to deter ‘colour revolution’, a term which 
is misused by the regime to conflate nonviolent uprisings with violent revolution.190 The 
regime has also taken more concrete steps to proactively prevent an uprising. These have 
included posting pictures of soldiers and police drilling with heavy weaponry to put down 
nonviolent protests to social media,191 and ordering local cadres to arrest former CNRP 
members at the first sign of mobilisation.192 In the short term, mass protests may be 
unlikely, as the CNRP’s leadership is mostly in exile and has had difficulty maintaining 
lines of communication, while its grassroots structure has been disrupted by 
repression.193 Yet, as Hun Sen’s rule increasingly resembles that of Ferdinand Marcos and 
other personal autocrats, he may be increasing his future vulnerability to a nonviolent 
uprising. 
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Additional information to accompany the quantitative component of the thesis. 
 
A.1. Case list 
This list gives each case used in the quantitative component. Campaign outcome is coded 
as ‘1’ for success, ‘0’ for failure, and ‘-99’ where the outcome could not be unambiguously 
determined or insufficient information on the campaign could be found. I have classified 
campaigns as targeting authoritarian regimes if either Svolik (2012) or Magaloni, Chu & 
Min (2013) [MCM] designate the regime in the peak campaign year as such. There is 
substantial overlap between the two datasets for the campaigns under enquiry; in only 
three cases—Armenia in 2008, Nepal in 2006, and the Maldives in 2005—do judgements 
differ. The Maldives are excluded from MCM for failing to meet their 500,000 population 
size threshold, while the reasons for disagreement over the remaining cases are not clear. 
 
Table A.1: Case list 
Country Peak year Leader name  Campaign  
outcome 
Svolik MCM 
Albania 1991 Ramiz Alia  1 * * 
Algeria 2011 Abdelaziz Bouteflika  0 *1 * 
Argentina 1983 Reynaldo Bignone 1 * * 
Armenia 2008 Tigran Sarkisyan  0 - * 
Bahrain 2011 Sheikh Hamad ibn `Isa 
Al Khalifah 
0 *1 * 
Bangladesh 1990 Hossain Mohammad 
Ershad 
1 * * 
Belarus 2006 Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka 
0 * * 
Benin 1990 Mathieu Kérékou 1 * * 
Bolivia 1982 Celso Torrelio Villa  1 * * 
Brazil 1984 João Baptista de 
Oliveira Figueiro 
1 * * 
Bulgaria 1989 Todor Zhivkov  1 * * 
Chile 1988 Augusto Pinochet 
Ugarte  
1 * * 
China 1956 Mao Zedong  0 * * 
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China 1978 Hua Guofeng  0 * * 
China 1989 Deng Xiaoping 0 * * 
Czechoslovakia 1988 Milos Jakes 1 * * 
Djibouti 2011 Ismail Omar Guelleh 0 *1 * 
East Germany 1953 Walter Ulbricht  0 * * 
East Germany 1989 Erich Honecker 1 * * 
Egypt 2004 Hosni Mubarak  0 * * 
Egypt 2011 Hosni Mubarak  1 *1 * 
Egypt 2013 Mohamed Morsi 0 - *2 
El Salvador 1979 Carlos Humberto 
Romero 
0 * * 
Georgia 2003 Eduard Shevardnadze 1 * * 
Greece 1974 Georgios Papadopoulos 1 * * 
Guinea 2007 Lansana Conté  0 * * 
Guyana 1991 Desmond Hoyte 1 * * 
Haiti 1986 Jean-Claude Duvalier 1 * * 
Hungary 1956 Mátyás Rákosi 0 * * 
Hungary 1989 Károly Grósz 1 * * 
Indonesia 1998 Suharto 1 * * 
Iran 1978 Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi  
1 * * 
Iran 2009 Ayatollah Sayyed Ali 
Khamenei 
0 *1 * 
Iraq 2011 Nuri al-Maliki 0 - * 
Jordan 2011 Abdullah II 0 *1 * 
Kenya 1991 Daniel Arap Moi -99 * * 
Kyrgyzstan 2005 Askar Akayev 1 * * 
Madagascar 1993 Didier Ratsiraka 1 * * 
Malawi 1993 Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda 
1 * * 
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Maldives 2005 Maumoon Abdul 
Gayoom 
1 * - 
Mali 1991 Moussa Traoré 1 * * 
Mauritania 2011 Mohamed Ould Abdel 
Aziz 
0 *1 * 
Mexico 2000 Ernesto Zedillo -99 * * 
Mongolia 1990 Jambyn Batmönkh 1 * * 
Morocco 2011 Muhammad VI 0 *1 * 
Myanmar 1988 Ne Win 1 * * 
Myanmar 2007 Than Shwe 0 * * 
Nepal 1990 Birendra Bir Bikram 
Shah Deva 
1 * * 
Nepal 2006 Gyanendra Bir Bikram 
Shah Deva 
1 - * 
Niger 1991 Ali Saibou 1 * * 
Nigeria 1998 Sani Abacha  0 * * 
Pakistan 1969 Mohammad Ayub Khan 1 * * 
Pakistan 1983 Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq 0 * * 
Pakistan 2008 Pervez Musharraf 1 * * 
Panama 1989 Manuel Noriega 0 * * 
Peru 2000 Alberto Fujimori  1 * * 
Philippines 1986 Ferdinand E. Marcos 1 * * 
Poland 1956 Edward Ochab 0 * * 
Poland 1968 Wladyslaw Gomulka 0 * * 
Poland 1976 Edward Gierek 0 * * 
Poland 1989 Wojciech Jaruzelski 1 * * 
Portugal 1974 Marcelo Caetano 1 * * 
Russia 2012 Dmitry Medvedev 0 *1 * 
Senegal 2000 Abdou Diouf 1 * * 
South Africa 1952 Daniel F. Malan 0 * * 
South Africa 1994 Frederik W. de Klerk 1 * * 
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South Korea 1960 Syngman Rhee 1 * * 
South Korea 1979 Chun Doo Hwan 0 * * 
South Korea 1987 Chun Doo Hwan 1 * * 
Sudan 1985 Gaafar Nimeiry 1 * * 
Sudan 2011 Omar Hassan Ahmad 
al-Bashir 
0 *1 * 
Syria 2011 Bashar al-Assad 0 *1 * 
Taiwan 1985 Chiang Ching-kuo -99 * * 
Tanzania 1995 Ali Hassan Mwinyi 0 * * 
Thailand 1973 Thanom Kittikachorn 1 * * 
Thailand 1992 Suchinda Kraprayoon 1 * * 
Togo 2012 Faure Gnassingbé 0 *1 * 
Tunisia 2011 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 1 *1 * 
Uruguay 1984 Gregorio Conrado 
Álvarez Armelino 
1 * * 
Venezuela 1958 Marcos Pérez Jiménez 1 * * 
Yemen 2011 Ali Abdullah Saleh 1 *1 * 
Yugoslavia 1968 Josip Broz Tito 0 * * 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) 2000 Slobodan Milosevic 1 * * 
Zambia 1991 Kenneth Kaunda 1 * * 
 
1 This year is not inside the dataset, but the same leader is recorded as authoritarian for earlier 
years and no change of regime subsequently took place. 




Excluded NAVCO cases 
Territorial, anti-colonial, or anti-occupation campaigns: 











































East Timor, 1974 
East Timor, 1989-1999 
Estonia, 1988-1991  
Georgia, 1989-1991 
Ghana, 1949-1957 












Northern Ireland, 1968 
Northern Ireland, 1994-2006 
Palestinian Territories, 1987-1993 






Sri Lanka, 1972-1975 
Tibet, 1987-1989 
Tunisia, 1952 
West Papua, 2000-2006 








Campaigns which appear to be primarily violent, or for which information on nonviolent 
aspects could not be identified: 














Campaigns against democratic regimes (using minimal definition only): 




















Other campaigns excluded from analysis: 







Argentina, 1987 – campaign against an attempted coup, not a 
regime. 
Nepal, 2006 – two campaigns are recorded in NAVCO 2.0; they do not 
appear to be separate, however, as they had the same target, and 
hence only one case is recorded here. 






A.2. Robustness tests 
A.2.1 Alternative measures 
Regime type 
In Chapter 4 one of the ways I identify regimes as personal autocracies is where they are 
coded by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) as personal or personal-hybrid regimes. 
However, what constitutes a ‘hybrid’ regime is not clearly defined by the authors, so it 
may be the case that personal-hybrid regimes feature only a partial consolidation of 
control by the ruler, or are identified by some other features. Hence, I re-estimate Models 
1 and 2—the larger regression models on the full and restricted sample, respectively—
excluding hybrid regimes, as shown in Table A.2 (next page). With personal-hybrid 
regimes not counted as personalist, the GWF variable loses significance in Model 1; 
otherwise, the results are substantively the same as in Chapter 4. Aside from small 
changes to coefficient estimates, the results for AIC-based model selection are also 
identical, with personal regime type selected but remaining insignificant and not adding 





Table A.2: Regression results for GWF personal regime type only, full and restricted samples. 
 Model 1* 
Full sample 1946-2013 
Model 2* 
Restricted sample, 1970-2013 
 β OR p  β OR p  
Leader tenure 0.088 
0.041 
1.092 0.032 ** 0.116 
0.049 





2.615 0.228  0.482 
0.908 
1.620 0.595  
Military 0.804 
0.698 
2.234 0.250  -0.126 
0.805 
0.882 0.876  
Peak year -0.018 
0.018 
0.982 0.318  -0.073 
0.034 
0.929 0.032 ** 
Legislature -0.478 
0.944 
0.620 0.613  -0.411 
0.986 
0.663 0.677  
Ethnic divide 0.033 
0.862 
1.033 0.970  0.933 
1.259 
2.542 0.459  
Oil production 0.000 
0.000 
1.000 0.152  -0.001 
0.000 
0.999 0.038 ** 
GDP 0.028 
0.353 
1.028 0.937  0.108 
0.401 
1.114 0.787  
Population -0.455 
0.249 
0.634 0.067 * -0.322 
0.277 
0.725 0.244  
Campaign size 0.866 
0.268 
2.377 0.001 *** 0.847 
0.329 
2.333 0.010 ** 
n 74 64 




Likelihood-ratio -35.433*** -24.943*** 
 Note: Logit regression using penalised MLE, standard errors in italics, intercept not reported. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Likelihood-ratio tests against against intercept-only models. 
 
 
Ruling coalition spell duration 
 In Chapter 4 I use Magaloni, Chu, and Min’s (2013) coding of ruling coalition spell 
duration because its coverage goes to 2013. Geddes, Wright & Frantz (2014) [GWF] also 
have data on ruling coalition spells (labelled regimes in their analysis, as discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 3), although it only covers the period up to 2010. Re-running regression 
on Models 1a and 2a as shown in Table A.3 (next page) shows that the same substantive 
results are obtained, with age and ruling coalition spell duration remaining insignificant 
and likelihood-ratio tests indicating that their addition does not improve model fit 
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compared to Models 1 and 2, respectively. AIC-based model selection continues to assign 
it a low relative variable importance (0.218). 
 
Table A.3: Regression results for GWF ruling coalition spell duration, full and restricted samples. 
 Model 1a* Model 2a*  
β OR p  β OR p  
Leader tenure 0.084 
0.047 
1.087 0.074 * 0.104 
0.055 
1.110 0.060 * 
GWF personalist 1.308 
0.773 
3.699 0.091 * 0.413 
0.889 
1.512 0.642  
Leader age -0.007 
0.033 
0.993 0.821  0.025 
0.045 





1.013 0.538  -0.013 
0.025 
0.987 0.609  
Military 0.184 
0.734 
1.202 0.802  -0.272 
0.805 
0.762 0.735  
Peak year -0.024 
0.020 
0.977 0.247  -0.073 
0.035 
0.930 0.035 ** 
Legislature -0.889 
1.046 
0.411 0.396  -0.159 
1.115 
0.853 0.887  
Ethnic divide -0.216 
0.938 
0.805 0.818  1.246 
1.440 
3.476 0.387  
Oil production -0.001 
0.000 
0.999 0.113  -0.001 
0.000 
0.999 0.070 * 
GDP 0.063 
0.372 
1.065 0.866  0.138 
0.396 
1.148 0.727  
Population -0.462 
0.261 
0.630 0.077 * -0.426 
0.325 
0.653 0.190  
Campaign size 0.918 
0.286 
2.505 0.001 *** 0.792 
0.324 
2.208 0.015 ** 
n 74 64 




Likelihood-ratio -34.082 -24.632 
Note: Logit regression using penalised maximum likelihood estimates. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01, standard errors in parentheses, intercept not reported. Likelihood-ratio test against Model 1 
and 2, respectively. 
 
A.2.2 Collinearity checks 
As leader tenure and the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) personalist regime type are 
both intended to measure aspects of the same underlying phenomenon, collinearity may 
be an issue. Indeed, tenure is associated with classification as a personal or personal-
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hybrid regime type at p < 0.05 as shown below, although evidence regarding goodness of 
fit is not decisive.  
 








Note: Logit regression using penalised MLE, standard error in italics, intercept not reported. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Likelihood-ratio test against intercept-only model. 
 
Association between independent variables is not necessarily a major problem in 
regression analysis, however, if it does not result in biased coefficient estimates. The 
following page thus gives a correlation matrix for the independent variables used in 
Chapter 4. The highest correlation is between military regime type and the existence of a 
legislature (0.35) and between legislature and personalist regime type (-0.23), but these 
are not high; otherwise, there is no significant correlation between the independent 
variables. 
I also check variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables in each of the main models 
used in Chapter 4; higher values (≳2.5 for logistic regression) indicate that 
multicollinearity may be a problem. However, none of the values exceed 2 for any of the 




β OR p  
Leader tenure 0.054 
0.027 










Table A.5: Full correlation matrix for all independent variables 
 
Table A.6: Variance inflation factors for main models 
 VIF 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Leader tenure 1.540 1.704 1.491 1.508 
Peak year 1.269 1.639 1.267 1.274 
Oil production 1.506 1.988 1.821 1.689 
Campaign size 1.523 1.662 1.641 1.539 
Population 1.325 1.454 1.350  
GWF personalist 1.476 1.467   
Military 1.506 1.536   
Legislature 1.434 1.417   
Ethnic divide 1.096 1.182   
GDP 1.326 1.186   
 
 
A.2.3 Model selection 
Table A.7 (next page) gives the results of AIC-based model selection. The ‘best’ models 
consist of leader tenure, peak year, oil production, campaign size, plus or minus 
population; as discussed in Chapter 4, GWF personalist regime type is selected by AIC but 
is not statistically significant and does not improve model fit or predictive accuracy, hence 
is left out. Other models are close in terms of the difference in AICc value, but have 
additional model parameters; for each additional parameter, the difference between the 
AICc value and the minimum AICc value (∆AICc) needs to increase by at least 2 before the 
extra variable can be considered informative (Arnold, 2010). K gives the number of 
parameters in each model (excluding intercept).  
 
Ten. GWF Age RCS Mil. Peak Leg. Eth. Oil GDP Pop 
Tenure            
GWF personalist 0.00           
Leader age 0.00 0.00          
RCS duration 0.00 0.01 0.00         
Military 0.00 -0.19 0.00 0.00        
Peak year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
Legislature -0.01 -0.23 0.00 -0.01 0.35 0.00      
Ethnic divide 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.05     
Oil production 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
GDP 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 0.04 0.00   
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03  




Table A.7: AIC-selected model list 
 
Model AICc ∆AICc K 
1* Tenure + GWF personalist + Peak year + Oil production + 
Population + Campaign size 
71.386 - 6 
2 Tenure + GWF personalist + RCS duration + Peak year + Oil 
production + Population + Campaign size 
72.181 0.795 7 
3* Tenure + GWF personalist + Peak year + Oil production + 
Campaign size 
72.523 1.137 5 
4 Tenure + GWF personalist + Peak year + Ethnic divide + Oil 
production + Population + Campaign size 
72.863 1.477 7 
5 Tenure + GWF personalist + RCS duration + Peak year + Oil 
production + Campaign size 
73.206 1.820 7 
6 Tenure + GWF personalist + RCS duration + Peak year + Ethnic 
divide + Oil production + Population + Campaign size 
73.303 1.917 8 
7 Tenure + GWF personalist + Peak year + legislature + Oil 
production + Population + Campaign size 
73.812 2.426 7 
8 Tenure + GWF personalist + Peak year + Oil production + GDP + 
Population + Campaign size 
73.858 2.472 7 
9 Tenure + GWF personalist + Leader age + Peak year + Oil 
production + Population + Campaign size 
74.023 2.637 7 
10 Tenure + GWF personalist + Military + Peak year + Oil 
production + Population + Campaign size 
74.043 2.657 7 






A.3. Predicted campaign outcomes 
Cases are sorted by discrepancy between predicted and actual outcome in ascending 
order, i.e., with most accurately predicted cases at the top. 
Table A.8: Campaigns by actual versus predicted outcome 




Russia 2012 0 0 0 
Myanmar 1988 1 0.993 0.007 
Bulgaria 1989 1 0.991 0.009 
Iraq 2011 0 0.010 0.010 
Philippines 1986 1 0.989 0.011 
Zambia 1991 1 0.985 0.015 
East Germany 1989 1 0.984 0.016 
Algeria 2011 0 0.019 0.019 
Mauritania 2011 0 0.046 0.046 
Mali 1991 1 0.945 0.055 
Malawi 1993 1 0.940 0.060 
Albania 1991 1 0.935 0.065 
Poland 1989 1 0.933 0.067 
Egypt 2011 1 0.931 0.069 
Haiti 1986 1 0.926 0.074 
Nepal 1990 1 0.925 0.075 
Senegal 2000 1 0.925 0.075 
South Korea 1987 1 0.920 0.080 
Togo 2012 0 0.083 0.083 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) 
2000 
1 0.912 0.088 
Portugal 1974 1 0.912 0.088 
Madagascar 1993 1 0.906 0.094 
Djibouti 2011 0 0.103 0.103 
Czechoslovakia 1988 1 0.895 0.105 
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Yemen 2011 1 0.893 0.107 
Maldives 2005 1 0.890 0.110 
Sudan 1985 1 0.881 0.119 
Brazil 1984 1 0.861 0.139 
Argentina 1983 1 0.856 0.144 
Iran 2009 0 0.146 0.146 
Benin 1990 1 0.853 0.147 
South Africa 1994 1 0.852 0.148 
Thailand 1973 1 0.842 0.158 
Jordan 2011 0 0.172 0.172 
Greece 1974 1 0.812 0.188 
Morocco 2011 0 0.206 0.206 
Chile 1988 1 0.791 0.209 
Uruguay 1984 1 0.784 0.216 
Indonesia 1998 1 0.784 0.216 
Tunisia 2011 1 0.773 0.227 
Egypt 2013 0 0.233 0.233 
Tanzania 1995 0 0.244 0.244 
Sudan 2011 0 0.251 0.251 
Bolivia 1982 1 0.730 0.270 
Nigeria 1998 0 0.290 0.290 
Armenia 2008 0 0.295 0.295 
China 1989 0 0.301 0.301 
Egypt 2004 0 0.313 0.313 
Georgia 2003 1 0.685 0.315 
Bangladesh 1990 1 0.644 0.356 
Niger 1991 1 0.636 0.364 
Syria 2011 0 0.385 0.385 
Belarus 2006 0 0.389 0.389 
El Salvador 1979 0 0.391 0.391 
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Hungary 1989 1 0.572 0.428 
Guyana 1991 1 0.569 0.431 
Mongolia 1990 1 0.552 0.448 
Kyrgyzstan 2005 1 0.533 0.467 
Iran 1978 1 0.528 0.472 
China 1978 0 0.538 0.538 
Pakistan 1983 0 0.545 0.545 
Bahrain 2011 0 0.546 0.546 
Myanmar 2007 0 0.550 0.550 
Thailand 1992 1 0.420 0.580 
Peru 2000 1 0.402 0.598 
Poland 1976 0 0.690 0.690 
Nepal 2006 1 0.292 0.708 
Guinea 2007 0 0.722 0.722 
South Korea 1979 0 0.821 0.821 
Cambodia 2013 0 0.837 0.837 
Pakistan 2008 1 0.138 0.862 
Panama 1989 0 0.883 0.883 
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